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This dissertation sets out to build a semantic framework for the English present 
perfect capable of accounting for: [1] the opposition between the English present perfect 
and the simple past, [2] the classification of the English present perfect into the category 
of tense, [3] the ambiguity of the English present perfect with durational adverbs and [4] 
McCawley's primary readings of the present perfect (1971). 
In chapter 1, the widespread notions of "indefiniteness" and "current relevance," 
used to characterize the opposition between the English present perfect and the simple 
past, are identified in five well-known grammar resource books utilized by EFL 
teachers. It is argued that these notions fail ultimately to characterize this opposition. In 
chapter 2, four tense theories are disciissed in relation to the present perfect: [1] 
Reichenbach's (1948), [2] Bull's (1960), [3] Allen's (1967) and [4] Comrie's (1985). 
None of them, however, is found to be suitable to accommodate the present perfect 
comfortably. In consequence, the need of a new model is pointed out. In chapter 3, the 
"extended-now" interpretation of the present perfect is discussed in detail, and 
Declerck's tense model (1986) is presented as capable of accounting for it and for the 
opposition between the present perfect and the simple past. In chapter 4, a semantic 
model for the present perfect is developed, based on Declerck's (1986) tense model and 
Godoi's (1992) definitions of "Aspectual Classes" and "Aspect". It is argued that this 
model is capable of: 
[1] offering a new semantic frame to analyze the ambiguity of the present perfect with 
durational adverbs; 
[2] providing a new semantic interpretation for McCawley's primary readings (1971). 
It is also argued in this chapter that the English present perfect is a "tense" and not a 
marker of "aspect" as claimed by Comrie (1976/1985). Finally, in chapter 5, we 
compare the English present perfect with Portuguese tenses and suggest some key 
concepts that, according to our analysis, are considered fundamental to an unequivocal 
understanding of this tense. 
VII 
INTRODUCTION 
Dowty (1979: 339), observes that, "aside from the progressive, no English tense 
has received more attention from linguists and yet eluded a convincing analysis so 
completely as the present perfect." Among the persistent and prominent problems in the 
description of the present perfect has been that of: [1] characterizing the difference in 
meaning between sentences in the present perfect and in the simple past, [2] accurately 
classifying the present perfect as "tense" or "aspect", [3] describing the ambiguity of the 
present perfect in sentences like: (1.1) Max has lived in São Paulo for four years, which 
is first interpreted, out of context, as implying that Max still lives there, but which could 
also be used to introduce Max, a former São Paulo resident to someone who wants to 
know more about the city, and [4] characterizing McCawley's primary readings of the 
present perfect (1971). 
Present Perfect x Simple Past 
Many descriptive efforts break down the opposition between sentences in the 
simple past such as (1.2) he went and sentences in the present perfect such as (1.3) he has 
gone into a variety of different subtypes according to an "indefiniteness" or a "current 
relevance" parameter. In chapters one and two, we argue that such classifications cannot 
provide a consistent contrast between the present perfect and the simple past, and, 
therefore, fail ultimately to have any explanatory power as theories. 
The common element in the theories couched in the "indefiniteness parameter" 
is the claim that the present perfect locates events somewhere before the moment of 
speech, but without pointing to any particular occasion or subpart of the past. The time 
reference of the perfect is thus indefinite. The simple past, on the other hand, narrows 
down the temporal location of the prior event to some well-defined limits. In the course 
of the discussion in which we will question the validity of such assumptions, many 
inconsistencies will be pointed out. For instance, it will be observed that sentences 
containing adverbs believed to be completely indefinite by supporters of the 
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"indefiniteness parameter"1, such as in the example below provided by Bryan (1936: 
364-5), occur with the simple past, the so called "definite tense": 
(1.4) European civilization originated on the shores of the Mediterranean and for 
long ages existed only in the lands bordering upon this great inland sea. 
The "current relevance parameter", according to McCoard (1978: 31), has 
generated more versions of theories to explain the opposition between the present 
perfect and the simple past than any other that can be found in the literature. In spite of 
many differences, they all agree that the defining function of the perfect in English is to 
express the pastness of the event embodied in the lexical verb, together with a certain 
applicability, pertinence, or relevance of the said past event(s) to the context of the 
speech, the "now" of the speaker or writer. The simple past, in contrast, appears when 
the event in hand is past but lacks the connection of relevance to the present. But is this 
parameter more successful than the "indefiniteness" one? If not, is there a firm basis for 
Dowty's claim that: 
"What McCoard has not ruled out, it seems to me, is the possibility that the perfect 
has as part of its meaning (or to be more exact, as part of its conventional 
implicature) a very, very general notion of 'current relevance'...?" (Dowty 
1979:340) 
Tense and Aspect 
Although Bernard Comrie (1985:9) considers tense as a "grammaticalized 
expression of location in time", and therefore with an independent meaning, in 
discussing the interpretation of sequential events assigned to perfective past verbs in a 
narrative, to which the controversy of defining the categories of tense (and also aspect) 
in terms of their contextual functions applies, he argues that this sequencing is an 
1 cf. section 1.2 
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implicative, deducible from the context by "general conversational principles", and not 
part of the meaning of these forms. Comrie explains that if the sequence in focus was: 
"...indeed part of the meaning of the forms in question, it would mean that they 
should by definition be assigned to the category of tense, because sequencing is one 
way of locating situations in time (relative to other situations)." (Comrie 1985: 26) 
Comrie emphasizes his opinion that the present perfect is not a tense but an 
aspect implying "current relevance": 
"The perfect is rather different from these aspects, since it tells us nothing directly 
about the situation in itself, but rather relates some state to a preceding 
situation."(Comrie 1976: 52) 
Declerck (1986), however, observes that if current relevance were the all-
important factor, we could not explain why we have to use the past tense in examples 
like: 
(1.5) I know what Tom is like. I (*have) spent my holidays with him two years 
ago. 
"There can be no doubt", says Declerck (1986: 311), "that there is current relevance 
here: if I know what Tom is like it is because I spent my holidays with him." In this 
way, he questions the validity of the "current relevance" parameter, as McCoard (1978) 
also had done in his dissertation on the present perfect. 
Even denying the validity of "current relevance" though, can the English present 
perfect, which allows for so many interpretations, such as those pointed out by 
McCawley (1971): [1] continuative, [2] experiential, [3] resultative, be considered a 
tense? It seems that one of the major problems in classifying the present perfect as a 
"tense" or an "aspect" is that the very definition of the terms "tense" and "aspect" are 
not clear enough. The following definitions, quoted in Godoi (1992:8-11), exemplify the 
divergence among various definitions of aspect, as well as their vagueness: 
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Comrie: 
a. "As the general definition of aspect, we may take the formulation that aspects are 
different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation" (1976: 3). 
b. "Aspect is not concerned with relating the time of the situation to any other time-
point, but rather with the internal temporal constituency of the one situation; one could 
state the difference as one between situation-internal time (aspect) and the situation-
external time (tense)" (ibid., p.5) 
Guillaume: 
a. "L'aspect est une forme qui, dans le système même du verbe, dénote une opposition 
transcendant toutes les autres oppositions du système et capable ainsi de s'intégrer à 
chacun des termes entre lesquels se marquent les dites oppositions" (1929: 109). 
b. "L'aspect est dans le système du verbe une distinction qui, sans rompre l'unité 
sémantique de ce dernier, le scinde en plusieurs termes différenciés, également aptes à 
prendre dans la conjugaison la marque du mode et du temps" ( 1963: 46). 
Marin 
"El apecto es la expresión de una acción en cuanto terminada o en progreso 
(perfectivo/imperfectivo). Aktionsart (modo de acción) sería la expresión de una acción 
en cuanto realizada de cierta manera: iterativa, durativa, etc." (1987: 268). 
Rozental 
"A categoria de aspecto verbal caracteriza a ação do ponto de vista de como esta 
ação se desenvolve no tempo, independentemente do momento de fala" (1984: 351). 
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Castilho 
"O aspecto é a visão objetiva da relação entre o processo e o estado expressos 
pelo verbo e a idéia de duração e desenvolvimento. É a representação espacial do 
processo." (1968) 
Given the abstractness and looseness of such definitions, which in fact have little 
value as systematizing parameters, it is not surprising that it turns out to be impossible 
to single objective features of events based on "aspect" which could relate to the 
speaker's use of the language. This situation makes Hoepelman's desperate comment 
still valid: 
"The problem is that... a clear understanding of what Aktionsarten and Aspects are 
is lacking. This makes it difficult to attack or defend the one or the other position, 
for one does not know what exactly one is attacking or defending." (Hoepelman 
1978:58) 
McCoard, however, seems to refer to "aspect" as a well-defined category: 
"Another reason for typing the perfect as an aspect is simply that there is no other 
well-defined category into which it fits comfortably..." (McCoard 1978: 11) 
Nevertheless, McCoard himself does not provide a definition of "aspect", nor is 
it clear in his text to which "well defined" definition of "aspect" he is referring in this 
passage. It is ver}' clear, however, that he criticizes Comrie's attempt to classify the 
present perfect as "aspect" when he quotes Ridjanocic (1969: 40): 
"...the English perfect fails what we believe should be the major test of an 
Aspectual category: it cannot be used in the same tense as another set of structures 
to refer to the same situation in the real world..." (In: McCoard, 1978: 10) 
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Moreover, at the end of the same paragraph McCoard states that: 
"...we shall not refer to the English perfect as an Aspectual category: in this book, 
the perfect is not a marker of aspect." (McCoard 1978: 11) 
This leaves no doubt about his disagreement with Comrie's classification. It is 
curious, however, that in the opinion of McCoard (1978: 17), the present perfect does 
not differ from the past tense in terms of time location: both tenses locate a situation as 
prior to the present moment, which is the same view as Comrie's. If the present perfect 
is not a marker of aspect (although McCoard (1978: 152) says it is a marker of 
inclusion), and does not differ from the past in terms of time location, then it should 
coincide in all respects with the simple past, which does not occur at all, or should be 
assigned to another category different from tense or aspect. 
In relation to the definition of "tense", the situation is no less confusing. 
Jespersen (1931), for instance, built a tense system based on two points: a point of 
reference in which the speaker is located (it can be present, past or future) and the event 
which is localized as present, past or future in relation to that point of reference. 
Reichenbach (1948)2, unlike Jespersen, built a tense system based on three points: 
"point of speech", "point of reference" and "point of event." And more recently, Comrie 
(1985) argued for a "mixed system" in which some tenses require just the "point of 
speech" and "the point of event" and other tenses require an additional point, "the point 
of reference". 
Given such a variety of concepts and parameters developed by linguists in their 
attempt to build tense systems and define the category of aspect, it seems impossible to 
answer consistently the question proposed: "is the present perfect a tense or an aspect?", 
without sifting, sorting and filtering definitions and concepts in order to draw a useful 
conclusion. In this dissertation, after a discussion on concepts of "tense" and "aspect" 
in chapters three and four, we will introduce our own answer to the proposed question 
above, arguing for a new semantic interpretation of the present perfect. 
2 cf. section 2.2 
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The Ambiguity of the Present Perfect 
The third topic which will be addressed in this dissertation is the "ambiguity of 
the present perfect." This is a subject recently reopened by Heny (1982) in response to 
Richards (1982): do perfect sentences with durational phrases have two distinct 
readings, depending on different scope relations of the perfect and adverbial operators? 
More generally, are there two semantically distinct frames of the perfect? 
This issue is directly related to the notion of truth. There are, in fact, several 
distinguishable theories of truth that have been proposed by philosophers and they are 
all more or less controversial. Tarski's (1935) definition of the notion of truth is 
intended to capture and make more precise the conception of truth that is embodied in 
the so-called correspondence theory, according to which a proposition is true if, and 
only if, it denotes or refers to a state of affairs which actually exists in the world that the 
proposition purports to describe. An alternative way of putting this is to say that a 
proposition is true if it is in correspondence with reality and that a proposition is false if 
it is not. It will be observed that, under this interpretation of the term "truth", the truth of 
a proposition depends upon the existence or reality of something outside the language or 
system in which the proposition is formulated. A problem that faces us in applying the 
term "true" and "false" to declarative sentences of natural languages is that many 
sentences are ambiguous. What we are concerned with, therefore, is the truth or falsity 
of sentences under a given condition set. It is, in fact, the notion of truth-under-a-given-
condition set which enables us to define ambiguity. For we can say that an ambiguous 
declarative sentence is one that might be true under one interpretation and false under 
another interpretation in some possible state of the universe and, thus that this sentence 
expresses two (or more) distinct propositions, and it is up to the linguist to account for 
this by locating the ambiguity either in the lexis of which the sentence is composed or in 
its syntactic structure. 
Michaelis (1994), examining the primary readings of the present perfect as 
proposed by McCawley (1971), continuative, resultative, etc.(which is the fourth and 
last topic of our discussion), presents arguments in favor of the claim that the present 
perfect is polysemous "in much that same way that words may be polysemous: a single 
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form has several related meanings (Michaelis: 1994: 113)." Her analysis, however, goes 
against Dowty's claim that: 
"...if we are to account for the difference in preposability (in durational perfects), 
then there must be some syntactic difference in the two readings." (Dowty 1979: 
343) 
Our semantic model for the English present perfect will argue in favor of an 
ambiguity caused by the semantic frame of the sentences in focus, for a number of 
reasons which will be discussed in detail in chapters three and four. 
From Research to Practice 
Finally, in chapter 5, we compare the English present perfect with Portuguese 
tenses and propose some general principles to guide the presentation of the present 
perfect to Brazilian EFL students. Declerck (1986: 310-319) remarks that "the scheme 
for the present perfect appears to be very typical of English." And Comrie adds: 
"In discussing the perfect, it is important not to be misled into thinking that eveiy 
form that is labeled 'perfect' in the grammar-book in fact expresses perfect 
meaning. Thus in Latin, for instance the so-called Perfect in fact covers both 
perfect and nonperfect meaning. The same is true of the Perfect (Compound Past) in 
many Romance languages, especially in their spoken forms..." (Comrie 1976: 53) 
This is the case with the compound version of the present perfect in Portuguese 
which does not have the same properties as the English present perfect. If Brazilian EFL 
students fall into the temptation of literal translation, they will inevitably be led to 
wrong conclusions. This issue, however, will not be developed very deeply. This 
chapter is intended only to show a way of applying the research developed in this 
dissertation to the classroom, pointing out what we understand as essential in the 
teaching of the present perfect to Brazilian EFL students. In fact, there are very few 
linguists in Brazil who have attempted a deep study of Brazilian Portuguese tenses 
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which can be compared with the various types of the English present perfect. Ilari 
(1981), for example, discusses the uses of tenses in Brazilian Portuguese, without 
attempting, however, a full comparison with the English present perfect. Another 
example is Marques (1982), who analyses the English present perfect and compares it 
with Brazilian Portuguese tense forms, but within the narrow perspective of Bull (1960), 
which vitiates her analysis because of the problems in Bull's theory which will be 
discussed in chapter 2. For instance she states on in her dissertation: 
"Referindo-se novamente ao estudo de Bull, verifica-se que o presente perfeito é 
E(PP-V), isto é, o evento é anterior e tem relação ao eixo presente que é o momento 
da elocução." (Marques 1982:46) 
What she does not consider, however, is that while the present perfect is on the 
same axis as the present tense, and the past perfect is in line with the past, the future 
perfect is on a different axis from the future, and the conditional perfect is separated 
from the conditional. This situation led McCoard (1978) to protest: 
"This asymmetry seems unjustified and suggests that Bull's tactic of separating all 
the 'axes' one from the other, to avoid a 'double-axis' problem, which Bull claims 
to exist in Reichenbach, brings a certain artificiality of its own. There is a complete 
blindness to certain connections that do hold between axes. This suggests indirectly 
that associating the simple past and the present perfect with different axes may be, 
at least in part, a misrepresentation. It is also curious that the + and - vectors 
apparently do not point at specific times, they only point away from their particular 
axes, while the 0 vector, in contrast, always has its own definite axis to point to." 
(McCoard 1978: 96) 
This makes the perfect correspond to an event simultaneous with an indefinite 
time in the past and the simple past to an event simultaneous with a definite time in the 
past, which turns out to be a variation on the indefiniteness point of view, which, for 
reasons which will be explained in chapter 1, seems not to be a valid parameter for 
characterizing the opposition between the simple past and the present perfect. 
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Based on the cognitive assumption that students build new knowledge based on 
their previous knowledge (cf. Ellis 1986:37), which justifies, in our opinion, an explicit 
analysis of the syntactic form of the present perfect, some strategies for conveying the 
meaning of the present perfect as developed in this dissertation will also be suggested. 
Some may argue that the comparison of syntactic structures may be too heavy a task for 
the students and they may lose interest. This activity, however, does not need to be 
either heavy or boring if the students are mentally engaged in the process of learning 
and the teacher provides good activities, within a communicative framework. On the 
contrary, such activities may be an opportunity for the students to think explicitly about 
the syntactic structures and refine their interlanguage, a chance that very possibly they 
will not have outside the classroom. According to Willis (1987), although the grammar 
of any language is a very abstract and complex system, we should encourage learners to 
analyze it for themselves. Willis claims that this practice makes students feel they are 
not being told about language, but are being asked to work things out for themselves. It 
treats them as intelligent individuals who can think and solve problems. And Willis 
concludes: 
"If the students are encouraged to think critically about language and to draw 
conclusions for themselves about its structure and meaning, the grammar of English 
will not be sensed as a burden but as a challenge..." (Willis 1987: 17) 
CHAPTER I 
KEY NOTIONS IN DEFINITIONS OF THE PRESENT PERFECT 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the parameters of "definiteness" and "current relevance", very 
common in the literature to differentiate the present perfect from the simple past, are 
identified in five well-known grammar resource books and discussed at some length. 
The five grammar resource books were chosen for their popularity among 
English teachers, according to an informal inquiry carried out in the main bookstores of 
Curitiba: 
- Livraria do Chain 
- Guerreiro & Guerreiro 
- Livrarias Curitiba 
- Livraria Ghignone 
Since one of the objectives of this dissertation is to point out some difficulties 
students may have with the English present perfect in contrast with the simple past 
tense, it seems important to analyze the grammar sources from which English teachers 
most frequently get their definitions. The grammar resource books selected were: 
[1] ALEXANDER, L.G. 1988. Longman English Grammar. London. Longman. 
[2] BEAUMONT, D. 1993 The Heinemann Elementary English Grammar - An 
Elementary Reference and Practice Book. Heinemann. 
[3] COBUILD. 1990. English Grammar. Collins. London. 
[4] DIXSON, R. J. 1988. Graded Exercises in English. Regents Publishing 
Company, Inc. New York, NY, USA. 





In all the grammar resource books selected, there is a strong suggestion that the 
opposition between definite and indefinite time plays an important role in determining 
the choice between the present perfect and the simple past3. A learner of English, 
however, could wonder: "what is an indefinite time?" or "is definiteness a sufficient and 
necessary condition for the choice between the present perfect and the simple past?" 
Actually, there are many questions related to the meaning of "definiteness", 
which have led to long and elaborate debates among linguists and philosophers. How do 
we know when to use the definite article and other markers of definiteness? What kinds 
of indefiniteness are there? This dissertation is not the place for a full exposition of the 
different questions about the issue, but let us consider some statements from the 
grammar resource books selected: 
[1] You cannot use adjuncts which place the action at a definite time in the past with the 
present perfect. You cannot say: (1.1 ) I have done it yesterday. (Collins Cobuilt 5.34) 
[2] Sentences using the present perfect tense never mention an exact time of action. If 
we wish to mention or imply an exact time for an action, we use the past tense: (1.2) I 
called you yesterday. (Graded Exercises in English p. 80) 
[3] We use the past simple, not the present perfect, to talk about a definite past time e.g. 
last week, yesterday, two years ago: (1.3) 1 played tennis yesterday. (The Heinemann 
Elementar}' English Grammar p. 107) 
Yesterday is an adverb considered definite. Although it indisputably has bounds 
and is not likely to be confused with other days with respect to the moment of speech, it 
really stands for an entire set of times. According to McCoard's analysis (1978), events 
3cf. Collins Cobuild 5.33, 5.34; Practical English Usage 495.3a, 3b; Longman English Grammar 9.23, 
9.24.2, 9.26.1 ; Graded Exercises in English p.80; The Heinemann Elementar)' English Grammar p. 107. 
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can be said to have happened yesterday if they happened at any of the subtimes 
(including subperiods as well as moments) which are within the limits of yesterday. In 
the example (1.4) Did he call you yesterday?, the time of calling is not understood as all 
and only the set of times constituting yesterday; rather it is equivalent to (1.5) Did he 
call you sometime during yesterday? In consequence of this, if we call yesterday a 
"definite" adverb, then it is definite not in the sense of affording us exact knowledge of 
the time(s) corresponding to the event of calling, but instead as a "definite frame" which 
is assigned to the time(s) of interest by the speaker. 
If this argument is accepted, we can examine certain relations between temporal 
adverbs and the tenses they accompany, with a view to showing, following McCoard 
(1978), that definiteness is not an adequate criterion for separating the simple past from 
the present perfect. Unlike McCoard, however, we will argue that although definiteness 
is not an adequate criterion for separating the simple past from the present perfect, the 
fact that there are different restrictions in the use of certain types of adverbs with the 
present perfect and with the simple past indicates a different underlying semantic 
structure for each one of these tenses. 
1.2.2 Adverbs 
McCoard (1978) points out that the moment of speech itself is about as well-
defined a time as we "normally" encounter. It is not permanently fixed in the way 
calendrical times like (1.6) March 15, 1996 are, but then neither are expressions such as 
yesterday or last week, which are always among those classed as "definite."4 
McCoard argues that if last Friday and yesterday represent definite times, then 
the period between them should also be definite: from last Friday through yesterday. 
And it should also, correspondingly, concur with the past, which it does. But if the 
moment of speech is definite, then from last Friday up till right now should be definite 
as well, yet such a phrase does not go with the past, but with the perfect, the so-called 
"indefinite past" tense: 
4 cf. Collins Cobuild, 1994: 5.33, 34 
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(1.7) (a) From last Friday up till now, 1 have had nothing but problems. 
(b)*From last Friday up till now, I had nothing but problems. 
(In: McCoard 1978: 79) 
And McCoard concludes: 
"Either we must make some specific distinction between two senses of 
'definiteness', or we must admit that a separate descriptor is required, which may 
be quite independent of definiteness." (McCoard 1978: 79) 
In addition, if we think of those adverbs which normally require the past and 
seem to exclude the perfect, an interesting fact can be observed: 
(1.8) (a) He played tennis two months ago. 
(b) * He has played tennis two months ago. 
(c) He played tennis last weekend. 
(d )* He has played tennis last weekend. 
(e) He played tennis just yesterday. 
(f)*He has played tennis just yesterday. 
All these adverbs can be combined, as McCoard (1978:80) observed, by taking 
them to be explicitly or implicitly subsumed in an overall period which extends (at 
least) up to the moment of speech, and the perfect is then possible: 
(1.9) He has played tennis two months ago, last weekend, and just yesterday (so far). 
The individual times remain as well-defined as they ever were; they are not 
somehow made "indefinite" individually. And in accordance with our earlier claim that 
the moment of speech is itself definite, the overall period cannot be considered 
"indefinite" either. Note that the overall period does not have to include the present. One 
can also choose to say: 
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(1.10) He played tennis two months ago, last weekend, and just yesterday. 
Let us consider now the fact that adverbs like never, ever, always, which are 
considered "indefinite"5, occur with both the present perfect and the simple past: 
(1.11) (a) She was never kissed in her youth. 
(b) She's never yet been kissed. 
According to McCoard (1978:80), if the past is definite, then never must be 
definite too. But if "past never" is definite, so is "perfect never," since the period 
never-yet-so-far is scarcely less well-defined. Evoking Dahl, one might say that the 
latter period is "open-ended" and therefore unbounded and indefinite: 
" A class of situations or a characterization of a situation is bounded if and only if it 
is an essential condition on the members of the class or an essential part of the 
characterization that a certain limit or end-state is attained." (Dahl 1985: 29) 
"But never yet", says McCoard (1978: 80), "does not refer to future time, only to 
that part of time which comes up to now and, therefore, should be considered as definite 
as past never." 
We should observe also, that many past-taking "definite" adverbs seem to be, in 
fact, entirely "indefinite". If we consider Bryan's example: 
European civilization originated on the shores of the Mediterranean and for long 
ages existed only in the lands bordering upon this great inland sea. (Bryan 1936: 
364-5) 
it seems unlikely that we are to understand for long ages to be referring to a period of 
time that has clear boundaries separating it from other periods, and that these boundaries 
are identifiable by the interlocutors (cf. McCoard: 1978). Yet, Bryan considers it to be 
definitely fixed. 
5 cf. Practical English Usage 1989: 495.3a 
16 
According to Allen (1966: 155-156), one of the ways in which a noun phrase can 
be definite is by "referring back" to a previously mentioned thing. When the referents 
are different, the second noun phrase remains indefinite: 
(1.12) He saw a bear. She saw a (different) bear. 
If the bear is the same, we must definitize the second noun phrase:(l .13) She saw 
the bear (too). In the case of adverbs it is not as obligatory, but normally we would 
expect (1.14) John left before five, and Bill left before five too to become (1.15) John 
left before five, and Bill left then too, on the understanding that the actual times of 
departure were the same. This is typical of what Geis (1970) calls "instantive" 
adverbials. "Frame" adverbials, on the other hand, work differently. Comparing 
(\ A6)Richard left on Monday, and Mary left on Monday too to (1.17) Richard left on 
Monday, and Mary left then too, she notices that Richard and Mary may have left at 
entirely different times—but both within the frame of "Monday." Geis proposes that 
before five has the underlying structure "at time x before five", but on Monday is 
represented with no underlying "at-phrase". Then will take the place of before five only 
on condition that the two times are the same, but this constraint does not apply to on 
Monday, it suffices that the two Mondays be the same. Since the speaker need not even 
know the actual times of Mary's and Richard's departures, we cannot claim that then 
refers to definite event-times. Then specifies only the outer limits of those event-times, 
that is, the "chunks" of time within which they fall. 
McCoard points out that this is a rather different sense of definiteness than is 
applied ordinarily to nominal referents. He concludes that if Monday is definite, 
yesterday would also count as definite; and if the yesterday-chunk of time is definite, 
then surely the today-chunk is just as definite. Yet today can appear with the perfect: 
(1.18) Richard has left today, and Mary has left today too. 
McCoard observes that even a common statement like I overslept this morning is 
problematical: 
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"...if we concern ourselves about defining the time of the event, we can hardly say 
*At 9:01 this morning I overslept; neither was the oversleeping a morning-long 
project. For that matter, this morning is but roughly defined: we must understand 
something like 'during that period of the morning which constitutes the gradual 
transition between on time and late, I slipped into the late part.' Then are we saying 
anything less definite in I've overslept this morning? We could argue that this is 
actually more definite in its time reference, since if the morning is not yet over (still 
'now'), the possible time-frame of oversleeping is relatively less than the whole 
morning." (McCoard 1978: 84) 
If definiteness of the containing time-chunk, that is, the "period within which", is 
what we mean when we talk about the definiteness of past-taking adverbs, then we must 
somehow count today and other moment of speech-including adverbs as exceptions. On 
Monday will normally go with the past, while today may freely go with the perfect. The 
definiteness characterization of adverbs does not tell us why this should be the case. 
While on the subject of reference, McCoard (1978) proposes the following 
example in which the perfect seems to function anaphorically: 
(1.19) I've called up my brother several times, but he's been too drunk to talk every one 
of those times. 
If coreference is a sufficient condition of definiteness (which is generally 
agreed), then he's been drunk should count as a definite verb form. This conclusion is in 
keeping with Vlach: 
"It has frequently been observed that clauses in the past tense are anaphoric in some 
sense, but the parallel claim for the perfect is less widely accepted. In fact the two 
forms are very similar in this respect. Both require an adverbial to locate the time of 
the reported eventuality, and in both cases this time is often not explicitly stated and 
must be supplied anaphorically. Past clauses and perfect clauses differ not in their 
ability to contain understood time adverbials, but only with respect to the type (XN 
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or non-XN) of possible adverbials." (Vlach 1993: 270) 
Vlach's claims not only reinforce McCoard's opinion that there is no consistent 
difference between the simple past and the present perfect in terms of anaphora, but also 
support McCoard's conclusion that the present perfect should be seen: 
"...as the marker of prior events which are nevertheless included within the overall 
period of the present, the 'extended now'." (McCoard, 178: 123) 
According to Vlach (1993: 270), a past tense clause can pick up its temporal 
adverb from a present perfect antecedent. The "supposed asymmetry", using Vlach's 
terms, between past and present perfect depends partly on this observation, but, says 
Vlach (1993: 270), "consideration of many sentences strongly suggests that there is no 
difference other than the XN distinction." He proposes the analysis of the following 
sentences: 
(1.20) (a) Bill has arrived, but Mary didn 't talk to him. 
(b) Bill has arrived, but Mary hasn 't talked to him. 
(c) Bill arrived last night, but Mary hasn't talked to him. 
(d) Bill arrived last night, but Mary didn't talk to him. 
Supposing for (1.20a), says Vlach (1993: 271), that the antecedent for the 
understood adverbial of the second clause comes from the first clause, and not from 
some previous discourse, the adverbial for the second clause of (1.20a) must be when 
Bill arrived. In (1.20b) the adverbial of the second clause is either since Bill arrived or 
something inferred from the previous discourse. In (1.20c) the adverbial of the second 
clause is since Bill arrived. The adverbial of the second clause of (1.20d) must be last 
night or when Bill arrived. In all these cases the possibilities are consistent with the idea 
that the available adverbials for the second clause are those that can straightforwardly be 
inferred from the events and adverbials of the first clause, given the XN6/non-XN 
restrictions for the present perfect and past. These restrictions, in our opinion, seem to 
6 McCoard's abbreviation for "Extended Now" 
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suggest different underlying semantic structures for each one of these tenses and not to 
be a function of Gricean pragmatic principles (Grice, Ï975:45ff), as McCoard (1978: 
47) claims. This subject will be developed more extensively in chapter three in which 
we propose differentiated temporal structures for the present perfect and for the simple 
past. 
1.3 Current Relevance 
1.3.1 Presentation 
A second concept, constantly presented as an important determiner of the choice 
between the present perfect and the simple past, is the "current relevance" of an action 
that happened or started happening in the past7. This concept had its origin in the 18th 
century with White (1761) and Pickbourn (1789) and was amplified by linguists such as 
Poutsma (1926), Jespersen (1931) and Zandvoort (1932) in the beginning of this 
century. We will argue, like McCoard (1978), that there is no consistent contrast 
between the present perfect and the simple past that we can seize hold of on the basis of 
relevance and, therefore, that current relevance fails ultimately to have any explanatory 
power to characterize the uses of the present perfect and the simple past. However, in 
order to account for some ambivalences in the meaning of the present perfect in respect 
to some types of relevance which do not occur with the simple past, we will differ from 
McCoard, who relies on purely pragmatic matters, by arguing that there are distinct 
semantic structures underlying the present perfect and the simple past which enable the 
speaker to choose one or other tense, according to the characteristics of the situation he 
wants to express. 
1.3.2 Types of Current Relevance 
McCoard (1978:32), quotes White to show that the "current relevance" point of 
view is not a recent concept: 
7 cf. Collins Cobuild 5.35; Practical English Usage 493.2a, 2b, 495.1b; Longman English Grammar 9.23, 
9.26.1; Graded Exercises in English p.80; The Heinemann Elementary English Grammar p.l 13 
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"We make use of the First Past Tense (= past), when we refer to actions long since 
past, and the performers of which have already left the present stage of life. In this 
view of it, it might be called the Historical tense. We also make use of it when we 
refer to the past acts of ourselves, or others not alive [sic!], when taken in a distant 
view, or unconnected with present proceedings. The Second Past Tense (= present 
perfect) is seldom used but with respect to persons now existing, and with respect to 
such acts of theirs, as have either been but very lately performed, or such at least as 
are taken into view as connected with their present proceedings." (White 1761:83-
4) 
White (1761:85) offers only a couple of examples, and discusses them only in 
terms of a recency/remoteness criterion. Quoting Shakespeare, (1.21) beauty-waining 
and distressed widow.... Made prize and purchase of his wanton eyes, " he explains: 
Here made, the (past) of the verb to make, represents this conquest gain'd by the 
widow, as an event that had fallen out some considerable Time before: for had it 
happen'd but just then, whilst the speaker takes notice of it, or but a little while 
before that: hath made would have been the proper expression for it. (In: McCoard 
1978:33) 
In his general description of the opposition between perfect and past, however, 
White (1761: 87) identifies three main characteristics of the present perfect (expanded 
by later scholars) which still can be found in current grammar books: 
[a] Recent events: 
(1.22) The President has been assassinated (stated in a news program) 
Swan (1986: 494) 
[b] Events pertaining to persons presently alive: 
(1.23) He has had a haircut. 
Beaumont (1993: 108) 
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(cj Events connected somehow with the present: 
(1.24) Utopia has declared war on Fantasia. 
Swan (1986: 494) 
Jespersen (1931), who is one of the staunchest proponents of the CR point of 
view, generally lumps [b] and [c] together, but distinguishes them from a different 
variety, the "inclusive" principle: 
"The pe r f ec t . . . is itself a kind of present tense, and serves to connect the present 
time with the past. This is done in two ways: first the perfect is a retrospective 
present, which looks upon the present state as a result of what has happened in the 
past; and second the perfect is an inclusive present, which speaks of a state that is 
continued from the past into the present time." (Jespersen 1931: 47) 
What Jespersen refers to as "retrospective present" is exemplified by: 
(1.25) (a) He has died. 
(b) Vve walked up from Haslemere. 
(c) He has taken the matter so much to heart that he has remonstrated.... 
Jespersen says that these examples have in common the fact that they 
communicate something about the present, stemming from a prior event. Another term 
used by him is "retrospective perfect". An equivalent and currently more common term 
is "resultative perfect". Examples of Jespersen's inclusive present are: 
(1.26) (a) He has lived here for three years. 
(b) He has been deadfour days. 
(c) Black falsehood has ineffaceably soiled her name. 
(d) I have never seen my boy, since he was a tiny baby. 
(Jespersen 1931: 48) 
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All of these express an "action or state still . . . lasting at the time implied in the 
sentence" (Jespersen 1931:56). An equivalent term "continuous perfect" is used by 
McCoard (1978) instead of "inclusive present," and is considered the fourth CR 
principle: 
[d] Events that continue to the present: 
(1.27) All my adult life I have waited for the emergence of a strong center party. 
Collins (1990: 251) 
Jespersen (1931:70) also considers a number of examples in which "the perfect 
often seems to imply repetition," but makes no special category for them. Many of these 
contain an adverbial phrase based on the conjunction when and the striking thing about 
them is that the reading seems very strongly iterative: 
"In Anthony's great speech at Caesar's funeral...he generally uses the past, but says: 
'He hath brought many captiues home to Rome (they are here still), Whose 
ransomes did the general coffers fill: Did this in Caesar seem ambitious? When that 
the poore haue cry'de, Caesar hath wept ' - this is probably in accordance with the 
rule...(repeated action with when), but some grammarians find fault with it. A little 
further down the 2nd citizen says: 'If thou consider rightly of the matter, Caesar ha's 
had great wrong'-- here, the preterit 'Caesar had great wrong' would have implied, 
on one particular occasion." (Jespersen 1931:67) 
For the purpose of our analysis, we will follow McCoard in considering the 
iterative principle as the fifth characteristic of the present perfect, which supposedly 
would allow the speaker to differentiate it from the simple past: 
[e] Iterative events: 
(1.28) She's attended classes regularly. 
Alexander (1988: 171) 
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Zandvoort (1932), after analyzing many examples with perfects, finally decided 
that the only crucial thing about all of them was that they contained a statement based 
on personal experience: 
"The perfect of experience may be said to constitute a genus, with an iterative and 
a non-iterative (or neutral) species, each with its several varieties." (Zandvoort 
1932: 111) 
This "genus" constitutes McCoard's (1978) sixth category: 
[f] Events which are part of personal experience: 
(1.29) I've never had scarlet fever. (So I can still get it) 
Swan (1986: 493) 
This list of six readings of the present perfect elaborated by McCoard (1978) 
seems to be large enough to encompass other lists of the same nature such as Comrie's 
(1976) and McCawley's (1971). Comrie (1976: 56-60 ) discusses four types of perfect: 
[a] Perfect of result: 
"In the perfect of result, a present state is referred to as being the result of some past 
situation: this is one of the clearest manifestations of the present relevance of a past 
situation." 
This type corresponds to Jespersen's (1931) "retrospective perfect" which is 
represented in readings [b], [c] and [f] of McCoard's list. 
[b] Experiential perfect: 
"The experiential perfect indicates that a given situation has held at least once 
during some time in the past leading up to the present." 
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This type corresponds to Zandvoort's (1932) "personal experience" or reading 
[f] in McCoard's list. Readings [b] and [c] of McCoard's list would also fit into this 
category. 
[c] Perfect of persistent situation: 
"One use of the English Perfect, indeed one that seems to be characteristic of 
English, is the use of the Perfect to describe a situation that started in the past but 
continues (persists) into the present..." 
This type corresponds to reading [d] "Continuous perfect" in McCoard's list. 
[d] Perfect of recent past: 
"In many languages, the perfect may be used where the present relevance of the 
past situation referred to is simply one of temporal closeness, i.e. the past situation 
is very recent. In English....the perfect does not, of course, in general necessarily 
imply that the past situation is recent....However, while present relevance does not 
imply recentness, recentness may be a sufficient condition for present relevance." 
This type corresponds roughly to reading [a] in McCoard's list. Note that Comrie 
(1976) does not discard the possibility of the use of the simple past with a recent past 
situation. 
McCawley (1971) distinguishes three meanings for the present perfect: 
[a] Universal/Continuative: 
"A state obtains throughout an interval whose upper boundary is speech time." 
This meaning corresponds to reading [d] of McCoard's list. 
[b] Existential/Experiential: 
"One or more events of a given type are arrayed within a present inclusive time 
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span." 
This meaning corresponds to readings [b], [c], [f] of McCoard's list. 
[c] Resultative: 
"The result of a past event obtains now." 
This meaning corresponds to readings [b] and [c] of McCoard's list. 
Since McCoard's list seems to encompass other lists which deal with the 
meanings of the present perfect, let us examine in more detail each one of the categories 
of opposition between the present perfect and the simple past contained in it. 
1.3.2.1 Recency Principle 
The recency principle predicts that any past event that can be characterized by 
the speaker as recent will appear in the present perfect. An event not so characterized 
will appear in the past. Modern grammarians do not usually put too much emphasis on 
recency, since there are many examples not readily accommodated by it. Poutsma thinks 
of the recency opposition mainly in terms of the choice of specific adverbs which 
accompany either the perfect or the past, but not both: 
"The point of time denoted by just is understood to be so near the moment of 
speaking that it does not separate the action or state appreciably from the present. 
Hence it requires the predicate to be placed in the perfect." (Poutsma 1926:263) 
But alongside his example (1.30) Mrs. Long has just been here, McCoard 
(1978:34) cites (1.31) Mrs. Long was just here, in modern American usage at least. 
Poutsma (ibid.) allows the past with just now, arguing that the space intervening 
between the time indicated by just now and the moment of speech is felt to be long 
enough to justify the use of the past. Usage is, however, more or less variable. 
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It is clear that Poutsma would like to be able to say that adverbs are categorized 
as recent or non-recent, and that these divisions are semantically natural, i.e. they 
correspond to actual differences in meaning along a scale of recency. It does not quite 
work out that way, however. The purported difference in time-sense between just and 
just now appears quite artificial, and the only clear evidence of a difference is the co-
occurring verb forms themselves, which are at least partly "variable". It would be 
helpful if "nearness to the moment of speech" had some specific external indicator in 
the physical world, but this does not happen to be the case, as we can see from examples 
like(1.32) just in this century has literacy become fairly widespread (McCoard: 1978). 
Sorensen offers the following perspective: 
"It is no doubt true that a person who says that he has bought a car, especially when 
he says 'a new car', is more likely to be the owner of a car than one who says that 
he bought a car (at such and such a time). That, however, is because we are more 
inclined to use an identification of past time, and therefore a past, when the action 
took place some or a long time ago than when it took place in the immediate past; 
which, again, is to say that the perfect, as regards the point of the action, is 
statistically more of an immediate past than the past is." (Sorensen 1964:80) 
According to McCoard (1978), the statistical tendency for (1.33) I've bought a 
new car to be interpreted as an act of the past recent enough for the new car to be 
presently in evidence, rather than as an expression of something done in the course of 
one's life - (1.34) Have you ever bought a new carl - is not to be confused with the 
semantic basis of verb-form choice. However, a semantic structure underlying the 
present perfect would have to account for the possibility of this ambiguous 
interpretation. This semantic structure will be developed in chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation. 
1.3.2.2 Present Existence and Present Connection Principles 
In evaluating the principles [b] Events pertaining to persons presently alive 
and [c] Events connected somehow with the present, which McCoard (1978) calls 
"present existence" and "present connection" respectively, it is important to note that 
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the perfects, according to Jespersen (1931), do not simply assert present states, but 
express the "transition" between a prior event and the consequent present state. 
For instance, in the world of our normal experience, the relationship between 
dying and being dead is indeed a firm one, but it is not without exceptions. We can 
easily imagine cases of the dead miraculously (or scientifically) resurrected. "The point 
here", says McCoard, "is not a quibble about whether a person has really died at all if 
we find he is subsequently alive." It is that given an appropriate, and in these cases, 
extraordinary, context, the message (1.35) he is dead is not there, and consequently 
cannot be a specific contribution of the perfect form. According to McCoard, it is 
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misleading to say that there is only a difference of "emphasis" between (1.36) he has 
died and (1.35) he is dead: the latter asserts only a present state, and normally implies a 
prior event; the former asserts only the prior event, and "suggests" the present state. A 
semantic model for the present perfect would have also to account for this "suggestion". 
Jespersen's view on the function of the past is not unexpected: 
"...the past refers to some time in the past without telling anything about its 
connection with the present moment. The question 'Have you finished?' refers to 
the present moment ('Are you through?'), while 'Did you finish?' asks about some 
definite portion of past time. " (Jespersen 1931:60-1 ) 
Apparently Jespersen does not believe an English speaker would ever say Did 
you finish? in any situation where he might also ask (1.37) Are you through? This 
seems, as McCoard (1978) remarks, "a dubious claim". But having identified the perfect 
with highly specific information about present resultant states, the past must embody the 
specific converse of that information, or at least lack positive indication that a certain 
state holds. We will see that Jespersen makes the stronger claim that the past actually 
implies the converse of what is implied by the perfect: 
"It is a natural consequence of the definition (of the past) that in speaking of dead 
people the past is necessary, except when reference is to the result as affecting the 
present day. Thus we may say: 'Newton has explained the movements of the moon ' 
(i.e. in a way that is still known or thought to be correct, while 'Newton explained 
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the movements of the moon from the attraction of the earth ' would imply that the 
explanation has since been given up). On the other hand, we must use the past in 
'Newton believed in an omnipotent God, ' because we are not thinking of any effect 
his belief may have on the present age." (Jespersen 1931: 66) 
Here we are given two options to base our tense-choice on: [1] we can use the 
past in talking about dead persons; [2] we can talk about the deceased in the perfect as 
long as the effect of their past deeds still holds, signaling, as Twaddell (1968:8) puts it, 
"a significant persistence of results, a continued truth value." Jespersen illustrates these 
options with a literary example: 
"The difference between the reference to a dead man and to one still living is seen 
in the following quotation which must have been written between 1859, when 
Macaulay died, and 1881, when Carlyle died (note also Mr. before the latter name): 
... Macaulay did not impress the very soul of English feeling as Mr. Carlyle, for 
example, has done." (Jespersen 1931:66-7) 
This is a very neat distinction, but, as pointed out by McCoard (1978: 39), it 
does not account for an amended version: (1.38)...as the late Mr. Carlyle, for example, 
has done. Apparently it is not required that Mr. Carlyle himself maintain a bodily 
existence, but only that he "continues" through personal influence, through his literary 
productions. Thus, where principle [b] is inadequate, we slip into principle [c]. 
Pickbourn (1789:33-4) reports the opinion of a "learned friend" that we may say, 
(1.39) Cicero has written orations; but we cannot say (1.40) Cicero has written poems. 
We suppose Cicero still existing, and speaking to us in his orations; but as the poems 
are lost, we cannot mention them in the same manner. In general, Pickbourn (1789) 
points out, the perfect may be applied whenever the action is connected with the present 
time, by the actual existence either of the author or of the work, though it may have 
been performed many centuries ago, but if neither the author nor the work now remains, 
it cannot be used. 
The Ciceronian example and argument appear in nearly identical form in 
Dietrich: 
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"Cicero has written orations is possible because the orations still exist, and thus 
indirectly continue the period applicable to Cicero himself down to the present. On 
the other hand, we say Cicero wrote poems because the poems are lost and so do 
not provide the necessary connection with the present." (Dietrich 1955:192) 
McCoard (1978) remarks that there is a certain plausibility to the argument, but 
it immediately runs into trouble with equally plausible examples such as (1.41) All of 
Cicero's poems have been lost, in which it may well be the case that it is the non-
existence of the works that provides the connection with the present. We might be 
speaking about great writers and orators known to us only by name and reputation, for 
example. In regard to the past, we can see that (1.42) My friend here, Max, wrote the 
speech you are now reading does not deny the present existence of either Max or his 
speech. Nor, for that matter, would (1.43) Cicero wrote poems tell us, by itself, anything 
about the status of Cicero or his poems; we depend on external knowledge to supply 
these data. 
Donaldson (1973:155-6) gives some examples which at first glance seem to 
support a "present-existence" criterion for tense choice. She posits a situation where one 
of the speaker's parents is dead but the other is still living. Then neither the past nor the 
perfect seems quite suitable: 
(1.44) (a) My parents have always been champions of civil rights. 
(b) My parents were always champions of civil rights. 
The problem, as Donaldson puts it, is that the term my parents has "faulty 
reference," because one of its referents no longer exists. Or alternatively, the reference 
may fail because one of the parents has changed opinion on civil rights somewhere 
along the way. If the other one dies, then the set again becomes consistent. There are, in 
fact, any number of factors that can change to alter the existence of a specified set: the 
statement (1.45) Bill's sisters were all blondes does not necessarily require that Bill is 
now bereft of sisters; he may simply no longer have any blond sisters. Donaldson (1973) 
says the only requirement is that whatever the attribution, it must apply to all members 
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of the set, and cannot be mixed, e.g.(l .46) half the sisters dead and half with gray hair 
(Donaldson 1973:158). Even this constraint may be too strong, however. 
In all these examples we have been discussing, the underlying operative 
principle seems to be this: 
"...the use of the perfect reflects some reason for placing Cicero, Max, etc. and/or 
their poems, plays, etc. within a span of time conceptualized as extending right up 
to the present, as a past continuous to the present. It frequently happens that such a 
period is connected with individuals or objects still extant; one may say that, ceteris 
paribus, the time-span of the perfect will usually be specifically associated with the 
present existence of the entity or set within its field of reference. But this is only 
one kind of connection with the present, and it may be overridden by other 
factors." (McCoard 1978:41) 
Let us return to the example about Newton, in which the perfect was supposed to 
imply that Newton's explanation is "still known or thought to be correct" by the speaker 
(the same example appears in Poutsma 1926:264): 
(1.47) Newton has explained the movements of the moon (Jespersen 1931:66) 
First we observe that if we were to apply principle [b], which specifies that 
something must "presently exist" for the perfect to be used, it would be impossible to 
identify this existence with any obvious surface constituent: it is presumably "Newton's 
explanation" that exists. The sense of "exists" is special, too, being roughly that of 
"presently valid." Now, even with these allowances: 
"...it appears that we are constraining the reading of the perfect/past opposition too 
strongly. Consider that someone who rejects all theories subsequent to that of 
Newton would then necessarily utilize the present perfect in speaking of Newton's 
work, assuming, of course, that he did not reject Newton as well. But this need not 
be the case. We can perfectly well say (1.48a) In the history of Science, Newton's 
8 Numbers (1.48a) and (1.48b) were inserted by us. 
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theories have been of premier importance, though they have been superseded. Or 
with the past, (1.48b) In the history of Science, Newton's theories were of premier 
importance, and many of his ideas are still considered valid. ( McCoard 1978: 41)" 
According to McCoard, in the first version (1.48a), the past is "thought of ' , to 
use Jespersen's own words, as extending up to the speaker's present; in the second 
(1.48b), he is thinking of some sub-part of the past which is separate from the present, 
possibly something like "in Newton's own time. " Working from these basic temporal 
contrasts, our inferential capacities set about generating various possible correlations: 
we may infer that the connection with or separation from the present regards the validity 
of a theory, or a person's life span, or perhaps a certain span of relevant history. Bryan 
offers these possibilities: 
"If one were writing a life of Newton . . . the account of his explanations of the 
moon would be presented through the past tense, however valid the explanation 
might be today. If, on the other hand, one were making a survey of the 
achievements...of British scientists throughout a period extending from some point 
in the past up to the present, one might well use the perfect tense even if the 
explanation had lost its validity." (Bryan 1936:372) 
Sorensen rejects the "present validity" explanation, but seems to cling to a kind 
of "present existence" idea: 
"What is relevant, as regards the present moment, is not the result, but the 
movements of the moon....They belong to the present, since they still exist. And by 
a logical coup d'état, they are made the subjects of discourse...and thereby make the 
moment of speech a quasi-legitimate point of reference; quasi-legitimate, for 
although the movements of the moon could have been explained at any time, they 
could not have been explained by Newton, at any time between the zero point (the 
day when Newton was born) and the moment of speech." (Sorensen 1964:82) 
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Rather than defend the legitimateness of the perfect on the basis of the present 
existence of the moon and its movements, McCoard appeals to the more general 
conception that where there is reason to speak within a framework of past-to-present, 
the perfect is sufficiently justified. McCoard, however, does not make a correspondence 
between a situation which requires a "framework of past-to-present" with a possible 
semantic representation, characteristic of the present perfect tense, which would be 
capable of expressing such situations: 
"We shall claim in this work that the preterit and the present perfect are not, in fact, 
distinct in terms of tense or sequence: their distinctiveness lies elsewhere." 
(McCoard 1978:17) 
Exactly where this "elsewhere" is McCoard does not state, and he uses rather 
vague expressions like "word-choice", "context" and "conversational implicatures" to 
justify his position. In this dissertation, a semantic model for the present perfect as a 
place for "this framework of past-to-present" will be discussed at some length in 
chapters three and four. 
13 .23 Continuity 
The continuous perfect is often thought of as one type where current relevance 
has an indisputably concrete interpretation, and the opposition with the past is easily 
demonstrable. An example like (1.49) I have lived here for ten years is taken to mean 
that "Istill live here. " The "living here" continues right up to the moment of speech. 
In contrast,(1.50) I lived here for ten years, is supposed to imply that "I no longer live 
here. " As McCoard (1978) points out, however, things are not as simple as they seem if 
we take the above examples within a certain context: 
"When we say,(1.51)9 I have lived here on and off for ten years we are uncertain 
about whether the present is an 'on ' period or an 'off period. (McCoard 1978: 46)" 
'Number (1.51) was inserted by us. 
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The same question attends (1.52) 1 have lived here for a period as long as ten 
years, responding to (1.53) What's the longest you have ever lived here? Twaddell 
(1968:8) gives the following example as clearly continuous: 
(1.54) My family has lived in this town since 1638. 
But Diver (1963:147) counters with: 
(1.55) My family has lived in this town, but not since 1638. 
And McCoard (1978) submits: 
(1.56) My family has lived in this town on and off since 1638. 
According to McCoard, on the past side: (1.57) / lived here for ten years before I 
got to know my neighbor, does nothing to inform us about the speaker's present 
domicile, and: 
"...if someone says simply I have lived here, we take him to be implying that he 
does not now live wherever "here " is, because if he were still living there, he 
should have expressed the situation as I live here. Where there is no apparent reason 
for him to involve a specifically past-to-present reference, he would not be expected 
to use the perfect. Where such a reason does present itself (as expressed, say, in 
since 1934), the perfect will be responsively utilized." (McCoard 1978: 48) 
It is interesting to note here that in spite of identifying situations in which a past-
to-present reference is involved, McCoard does not think of a semantic apparatus to 
cope with these situations, but throws all the burden of it onto unclear pragmatic devices 
which cannot account for the differences in use between the present perfect and the 
simple past. 
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The "first-choice" reading of (1.58a) I have lived here since then, according to 
McCoard (1978:46), will usually be that the speaker still lives "here." But, when other 
relevant information is added as in (1.58b) / have lived here every -winter since then, we 
are no longer so sure that the speaker is in residence (though he certainly is "here") 
since the time of speaking may not be winter. Again McCoard points out an ambiguity 
of interpretation of the present perfect, but does not offer a solution, other than obscure 
"pragmatic factors" guiding the speaker's choice between one or other interpretation. 
Let us consider now the Stative analog of Jespersen's example he has died, 
namely he has been dead, which has all the basic indeterminacies of the former, as 
Sorensen observes: 
"If it were possible for a person to die more than once, we could certainly say, 
'Angus has been dead twice, but right now he is immensely alive, owing to the 
unparalleled skill of Professor Rattray, the famous cardiologist '. This, by the way, 
is not mere speculation, so far as I know." (Sorensen 1964:78) 
"Normally, once dead is dead forever", says McCoard (1978: 37), "but if 
someday it changes, the normal inference will change". Precisely because the content of 
normal inference is independent of particular verbalizations, exactly the same 
ambivalence which attend the interpretation of (1.59) he has died attend the past 
counterparts: 
"It follows that if we were to say that 'has been dead' is an incomplete perfect, we 
would also have to say that 'was dead' and 'died' are incomplete pasts." (Sorensen 
1964:7) 
We noted in an earlier example, I have lived here a good many years, that the 
speaker may or may not be understood to be still resident here. The choice seemed to be 
between a reading of presently-continuous state, (1.60) I've lived here a long time now", 
and a reading of a vaguely remote episode in the past, (1.61) I've experienced living 
here before for a good while." Yet there are instances where the intended sense seems to 
be somewhere between the two, as Tregidgo shows: 
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"He hath been dead for four days could have been said of Lazarus either before or 
shortly after his resurrection. Similarly one can perfectly well say, for example: I've 
been a teacher for ten years, but I've just been dismissed, or I've lived here all my 
life but now I'm going away" (Tregidgo 1974:102-3) 
It is as if the recentness of the state's conclusion makes it not quite real, not quite 
established, as if the overall period is still thought of, by the speaker, as being only in 
the process of separation from the present, and so he retains the perfect. And McCoard 
concludes: 
"This points up, once again, the essential subjectivity of the speaker's 
conceptualization of time periods which is at the root of the perfect/past choice." 
(McCoard 1978: 50) 
Nevertheless, subjectivity must be supported by linguistic structures. If a 
language does not provide a linguistic basis from which the speaker's choice can be 
made, there will be no choice at all. Once again, the ambivalence of the present perfect 
and its distinct uses from the simple past point to different temporal structures, and not 
just to the speaker's subjectivity. 
Curme goes too far in saying that: 
"The passing of a single minute may make it impossible to employ the present 
perfect. A minute before 12 o'clock in the morning we may say I have bought a 
new hat this morning. A minute later this morning is gone for ever and we must say 
I bought a new hat this morning, for the morning belongs to the past." (Curme 
1935:321) 
Palmer also exaggerates when he writes: 
"We may say I've seen him three times today, but I saw him three times yesterday 
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and not *l've seen him three times yesterday. Similarly I've seen him this morning 
is a possible utterance only if it is still morning; if the morning is over, the period of 
time indicated is wholly in the past and a present perfect form cannot be used." 
(Palmer 1968:75) 
According to McCoard, it is true that we cannot say (1.62)*I've seen him 
yesterday by itself; this is because yesterday is an adverb which cannot include the 
moment of speech. But this morning is not thus limited: (1.63) I saw him this morning/ 
I've seen him this morning. The combination saw + this morning most usually yields 
the understanding that the morning is not yet over. Yet, as McCoard argues, even these 
distinctions are not inviolable. The particular subdivisions of time important to the 
speaker may not be those most evident in the conventional calendar or time-table. To be 
able to express these "particular subdivisions", however, we insist that this "particular" 
speaker must have the support of a semantic framework which enables him to 
communicate his/her subjectivities, otherwise there would be no linguistic basis for any 
choice. 
13.2.4 Expertentiality 
Zandvoort (1932), who was struck by the frequent iterativity of the perfect, 
accepted the resultative and the continuous types, but felt there was a third type to be 
recognized. It is interesting that, after analyzing many sentences, he turned to the notion 
of "personal experience," very broadly conceived, and abandoned the idea of iterativity 
as part of the meaning of the present perfect. Although he makes no direct comparison 
between the resultative and the experiential subtypes, it is possible that he viewed the 
resultative as expressing "concrete results" in the present, while the experiential 
connects the event with the present more abstractly "as part of the sum total of the 
writer's experience" (Zandvoort, 1932:116). In fact, this sounds rather like a restatement 
of principle [c] that we talked about earlier. Just as we found [c] vague enough to 
encompass all the more explicit versions of current relevance, Zandvoort's experiential 
perfect seems to lack an identity of its own: experientials are those perfects which are 
not tagged as resultative or continuous. Nor does the experiential principle offer much 
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insight into the past opposition; would we want to say that any past event which the 
speaker refers to via the past has not entered into the sum total of his experience? 
1.3.3 Problems with Past Non-Relevance 
It has been noted in several places that a major difficulty with the current 
relevance approach is that it seems to require that the past be somehow lacking, or 
neutral, with regard to current relevance as compared to the perfect. When dealing with 
highly specific forms of relevance, the opposition is not reliable, since many past 
expressions involve the same intimations of consequences as their perfect counterparts; 
"when dealing with abstractions, the past is identified as the bearer of somehow 
'irrelevant' information, which seems to go against the very nature of communication" 
(McCoard 1978: 56). We might argue together with Sorensen that nothing is irrelevant 
in the great chain of being: 
"Any past event, significant or negligible, is connected, or may at least be plausibly 
maintained to be connected, with the present, in one way or another, directly or 
indirectly, through its results or consequences, since whatever is the result of past 
events, and since whatever was cannot have vanished into thin air, leaving no trace 
whatsoever." (Sorensen 1964:79) 
While Sorensen develops this and related ideas into a rejection of the CR point 
of view, Joos makes an effort to build a case for CR that avoids the paradox of 
irrelevance. He acknowledges: 
"A finite verb will hardly be used to specify an event unless there are effects; it is 
fair to say that language is not organized for entirely idle talk but is rather well 
adapted to mentioning things because they matter. Let us take it as axiomatic that 
the referent of a finite verb is regularly the cause of certain effects - unknown, 
perhaps, often unforeseen, but in any case not assumed to be non-existent - since 
otherwise the finite verb would be idle, otiose, and rather left unused." (Joos 
1964:138) 
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In Joos's terms, the past does not deny events their consequences, but simply 
places both event and effect at more or less the same time in the past, and does not refer 
to them separately: they are thus in "current phase." The perfect, in contrast, focuses 
attention on the resultant component separately from the originating event. This is 
"perfect phase": 
"...the events designated by perfect verbs may be interesting in themselves, and may 
have simultaneous effects, but all that is now treated as uninteresting; the focus of 
attention is entirely on the delayed effects which remain uncertain until separately 
specified by other verbs. It is this focus of attention that determines what effects 
will figure as principal effects...the essential point here is that the meaning of 
perfect phase is that the principal effects of the event are out of phase with it... that 
the event is not mentioned for its own sake but for the sake of its consequences." 
(Joos 1964:140) 
Joos illustrates with examples taken from Sybille Bedford's play, The Trial of 
Dr. Adams: 
"'The Judge came on swiftly' is the beginning of Trial, and the simultaneous effect 
is that he is seen to come, the immediate effect is that he is here, and later (perhaps 
delayed) effects can be taken for granted. The past here does not bother us about the 
present traces of the act of coming on. This stands in contrast to the series of 
perfects in: The high-backed chair has been pulled, helped forward, the figure is 
seated, has bowed, and the hundred or so people who had gathered themselves at 
split notice to their feet rustle and subside into apportioned place." (Bedford 1964: 
139) 
Joos claims: 
"This is not simply a narration of events in sequence; instead, certain of them (is 
seated, rustle and subside) are presented as effects (or at least the possibility of their 
occurrence is an effect) of the earlier-in-time events stated in the perfect phase." 
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(Joos 1964:140) 
Joos is evidently of the opinion that "delayed effects" are well-defined properties 
of the present which follow upon some event. Is seated is very likely an effect of a prior 
act of sitting down, to be sure. But now just what is the causal event associated with 
rustle and subside? Probably the judge's entrance and chair-taking. But such a relation is 
not spelled out in so many words, and remains much looser than the tie between sitting 
and being seated. This looseness may be what Joos is talking about when he says that 
"at least the possibility of occurrence" of some events is the effect of prior events. Here 
we have a vastly liberalized notion of cause and effect, however. If we start with the 
event the figure has bowed, we might expect to see the figure still bent over, or there 
may be some entirely nonphysical effect ("so now the others present can sit down"). Yet 
all that has actually been said is that prior to the moment of speech, the judged bowed; it 
does not tell us, in fact, whether or not the judge has since unbent! In spite of the 
perfect, we do not know for sure what the "principal effects" of the act are. This is just 
the opposite of the phrase rustle and subside which asserts events without pointing 
toward identifiable causes. Yet Joos insists: 
"The English perfect does not mean that the specified event occurred previous to 
some other event specified with the current phase (i.e. past or present tense.) That is 
a possible interpretation of it, but it is not what it means, just as many other kinds of 
utterances can be interpreted into messages that they do not intrinsically mean: 
'How do you do?' meaning 'I'm pleased to meet you' but interpretable as an 
inquiry about health. The previous occurrence is at most a connotation of the 
perfect phase; its denotation indeed contradicts that by telling us that the event 
presented in the perfect phase is not being presented for its own sake but only as a 
means to a separate end, and its denotation positively is that we must look 
elsewhere for the important message." (Joos 1964: 140) 
According to McCoard (1978), Joos has got things the wrong way round here. 
(1.64) How do you dol, How goes itl and the like, elicit the respondent's state of being 
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in virtue of their form, but they are normally interpreted instead as social gestures. Other 
questions, e.g. (1.65) How do you like it here?, have only their literal function. A 
statement like (1.66) You have seen the Cheshire reports, which according to Joos 
(1964:14) "is not a past-tense message," may in fact have a virtually unlimited number 
of effects or relevances in the present, among them: 
(1.67) (a). . . so you know what the reports say 
(b). . . so I won't have to hunt them up for you again 
(c). . . so you know how voluminous they are 
(d).. . so you 're certainly better informed than 1 am 
But the only question we have a firm answer to has to do with your seeing 
certain reports at some prior time. Somewhat confusingly, Joos allows that: 
"...if the later effects of an event are of great interest, that does not in itself require 
that precedent event to be presented in the perfect phase; it may be enough for the 
addressee to know that it did take place, and when later another, thus prepared-for 
event comes along, he can make the connection himself...." (Joos 1964:142) 
Apparently the perfect is marked for "present effect," while the past is simply 
unmarked for this meaning. But notice now that the fact of an "important" present effect 
or relevance is insufficient to predict the form of the verb. Moreover, it makes the 
perfect and past free alternates, at least partly: 
"...the perfect marking seems to be not an abstract element have, but rather the mere 
insertion of completed words have, has, had, into completed verbs; for example, 
'They have shot President Kennedy' seems to be 'They shot President 
Kennedy'...plus an extra have too pedantic for such an occasion, that is, too 
frivolous." (ibid.:146) 
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As Dubois (1972:23) points out, Mrs. Kennedy's immediate reaction to the 
murder was: 
(1.68) Oh, my God, they have shot my husband! 
Here, rendered in the present perfect, is an event worthy of mention for its own 
sake, if any event ever has been; and it is to be hoped that Joos would not accuse Mrs. 
Kennedy of pedantry and frivolity in these circumstances. Other aspects of Joos's 
analysis remain open to question, of which we will just mention a couple. He considers 
the fact that the perfect "cannot be used for narration" as in (1.69)*/ have seen him 
yesterday to be evidence of the exclusively present denotation of the perfect (Joos 
1964:145). But (1.70) wouldn't 1 have seen him recently counts as narrative, unless we 
let "narrative" mean "couched in the past" (as Weinrich 1964, 1970 does). Besides, if 
the perfect is really a present tense, then why does a perfect-accompanying adverb like 
"recently" not go with the simple present (1.71) *I see him recently ? And if the past and 
perfect are so closely interchangeable, how is it that they are placed in completely 
different grammatical categories: the past as "remote tense" (Joos 1964:121) and the 
perfect as "perfect phase, not a tense in any sense of the term, however loose"? (Joos 
1964:145) 
For Comrie (1985:78), the present perfect is a tense that "in terms of location in 
time....is not distinct from the past". This does not mean that the past tense does not 
differ from the present perfect at all, only that this difference is exclusively one of 
aspect, since the perfect implies "current relevance", whereas the past does not. But, as 
we have seen, concrete versions of current relevance are applicable to no more than a 
subset of examples with the perfect. We have seen that the past is supposed to represent 
"current non-relevance," yet here again, the attempt to pin this notion to any of the more 
literal interpretations runs into problems. Although Jespersen made much of the 
past/perfect opposition as it relates to a contrast between living and dead personages, it 
remains unavoidably true that (1.72) he died offers, in the normal run of things, just as 
firm a communication about the subject's present state of demise as does he has died. 
Principle (b), "present existence," obviously fails; but is principle (c) any more 
successful? 
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Maurice is puzzled that: 
"The world war (W.W.I) is over; it lies completely in the past; but can anyone deny 
that its results are still felt as present? And yet we cannot say: 'The war that has 
taken place in 1914-1918'." (Maurice 1935:323) 
Despite accepting that the events of the war were of such import that the fabric 
of the modem world would even now be materially changed in their absence, we still 
cannot produce the perfect in the above example. In a similar vein, Dietrich observes 
that: 
"...we generally say Gutenberg discovered the art of printing, despite the fact that 
there is hardly any other event of the past which as far as objective consequences or 
effects, so undeniably extends into the present. (Dietrich 1955: 195)" 
If current relevance is really what it is supposed to be, we should have no 
problem with (1.73) *I have been born in 1960, since the speaker's own birth would 
undeniably count as relevant to him. Most views of current relevance are more 
sophisticated in that they attempt to deal with "relative relevance" to the particular 
occasion of utterance. Yet it is true that: 
"...even great real-world relevance, however defined, is not by itself sufficient to 
promote many examples to acceptability. There is no external measure of relevance, 
no absolute significance, which requires the perfect." (McCoard 1978: 44) 
We maintain, like McCoard, that the key is whether or not the speaker chooses 
to include a prior event within the compass of his "extended present." As long as we 
insist, unlike McCoard, on the need for a semantic structure which makes the speaker's 
choice possible. 
CHAPTER 2 
DISCUSSION OF SOME THEORIES OF TENSE 
2.1 Introduction 
Thus far, we have been establishing certain difficulties, in terms of indefiniteness 
and current relevance, with definitions of the present perfect as they appear in some 
grammar reference books. Most theorists of the so called "ID (McCoard's abbreviation 
for "Indefinite Past") point of view" in relation to the present perfect, simply use a 
definiteness parameter within an entire matrix of tense-features, where it may reflect 
certain properties of the way tenses provide each other with "reference points" in the 
establishment of event-sequences. This does not mean, however, that ID adepts have 
been blind to the problems of reconciling the definiteness parameter with adverbial 
cooccurrences; Allen (1966:157) observes in a footnote: 
"A peculiar use of have in verb-clusters referring to times that are not really 
'indefinite' is to be found in its use with the middle adverb just, as in I've just seen 
Mr. Puddleditch. Some form of have seems also to be almost obligatory with 
certain time-expressions like by now, by then, since two years ago, etc. Have is 
regularly used with already when it means 'at some unidentified time before now' 
(but the use of the past with already seems to be increasing in the United States)." 
Another important issue, according to McCoard (1978), which concerns 
indefiniteness of the past as well as the current relevance of events as parameters to 
characterize the present perfect, is the place of definiteness and current relevance 
oppositions within full-blown models of the English tense system. In this chapter, one 
tense model which adopts the current relevance parameter - Comrie's (1985) - and three 
tense models which adopt the definiteness parameter to characterize the present perfect -
Reichenbach's (1947), Bull's (1960) and Allen's(1966) - will be discussed. 
Reichenbach's model (1947) will be presented first since it is considered the most 
influential of these various attempts at making explicit and formalizing the precise 
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relation between time and the use of the tenses in English. This presentation will be 
followed by a discussion of Comrie's model (1985). Although it is based on the idea of 
current relevance view of the present perfect and breaks the chronological order, we 
think it is important to present this tense system right after Reichenbach's in order to 
show how it has developed from Comrie's criticism of it and how it ultimately creates a 
number of new problems. After the discussion of Comrie's tense model, the other two 
models which follow the definiteness parameter will be presented chronologically: 
Bull's (1960) and Allen's (1966). 
These models largely grow out of attempts to establish what possible temporal 
relationships between events there are, and then to map these relationships onto the 
actually occurring forms of English. The perfect gets analyzed within the entire set of 
available verb forms, though some authors claim some ambivalence as to whether it is a 
"real tense" like the past, the present, etc.(as Comrie (1985), does). 
The problem, however, related to those who favor the idea of an indefinite factor 
and those who resort to the idea of a current relevance factor is whether such approaches 
are successful. 
2.2 Reichenbach's Tense-Formulas (1947) 
Reichenbach (1947: 288-298) develops a system in which there are three 
elements involved in the description of the tenses: a "point of speech", an "event", and a 
"reference point". The way in which these three are interrelated is illustrated with the 
help of the past perfect: 
"Let us call the time point of the token the point of speech....From a sentence like 
'Peter had gone ' we see that the time order expressed in the tense does not concern 
one event, but two events, whose positions are determined with respect to the point 
of speech. We shall call these time points the point of the event and the point of 
reference. In the example the point of the event is the time when Peter went; the 
point of reference is a time between this point and the point of speech. In an 
individual sentence like the one given it is not clear which time point is used as the 
point of reference. This determination is rather given by the context of speech." 
4 5 
(Reichenbach, 1947: 288). 
It is not hard to see how the past perfect "goes back" two levels or degrees from 
the present: it points to time which is before a time before now, "at some time in the 
past, Peter had already gone." Reichenbach then goes on to claim that these three points 
are relevant to every one of the tenses, not just to tenses such as the past perfect or the 
future perfect: 
"In some tenses, two of the three points are simultaneous. Thus, in the past, the 
point of the event and the point of reference are simultaneous, and both are before 
the point of speech....This distinguishes the past from the present perfect. In the 
statement 'I have seen Charles' the event is also before the point of speech, but it is 
referred to a point simultaneous with the point of speech; i.e., the points of speech 
and reference coincide....We see that we need three time points even for the 
distinction of tenses which, in a superficial consideration, seem to concern only two 
time points. The difficulties which grammar books have in explaining the meanings 
of the different tenses originate from the fact that they do not recognize the three-
place structure of the time determination given in the tenses." (Reichenbach 1947: 
289-290) 
In Reichenbach's graphic representation: 
E - point of the event 
R - point of reference 
S - point of speech 
Time is ordered left-to-right from past to present across dashes, while commas 
represent simultaneity: 
(2.1) {a) 1 see John. 




(c) I have seen John. E—S,R 
(d) 1 had seen John. E—R—S 
Reichenbach (ibid.:294) says that when temporal determiners are added, they 
apply not to the event, but to the reference point of the verb phrase. This is necessary to 
provide for the correct adverb cooccurrences, as: 
(2.2) (a) Now I see John. 
(b) Now I have seen John. 
(c) I saw John yesterday. 
(d) I had seen John yesterday. 
Since only the reference point takes temporal determiners, whenever event point 
and reference point are not simultaneous, the event cannot be determined. When they 
are simultaneous, the event can be determined by association with the reference point, 
which is directly determined. Here we see how Reichenbach fits in with indefinite past 
theorists', the perfect can never be determined, while the past can. The distinction 
applies not only to past events, but to future ones too. (2.3) Now I shall go is identified 
as S,R—E while (2.4) I shall go tomorrow is S—R,E (Reichenbach, 1947:295). This 
may be compared with Allen's suggestion: 
"The difference between these two sentences (just given) seems to be primarily the 
difference between reference to a non-identified time in the future and reference to 
an identified time in the future. In other words, English does not distinguish 
formally between a definite future and an indefinite future as it does between a 
definite past and an indefinite past." (Allen 1966:158) 
It is unfortunate for this neat dichotomy, observes McCoard (1978: 90), that we 
can say things like (2.5) Now I shall go tomorrow, for sure, which would seem to be 
both definite and indefinite. Another thing we notice right away is that with the three 
independent components S, R, and E to work with, it is possible to construct a number 
of rather strange formulas for which we would not expect any grammatical realization. 
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An example would be S,E—R (speech and event points coinciding, but reference point 
in the future), in contrast with S—E—R (event will take place before some future 
reference, but subsequent to speaking) and with E—S—R (event is in speaker's past, 
but the reference point lies in the future). All of these meanings are in fact realized by 
the future perfect (Reichenbach's term is "anterior future"). In a similar manner, the 
"posterior past" (there seems to be no standard traditional term) as in (2.6) (he said) he 
would come stands for any of R—S,E or R—E—S or R—S—E. To register these 
differences in English we must resort to adverbial supplements: 
(2.7) (a) (He said) he would come now. (i.e., as I say this.) 
(b) (He said) he would come before now. 
(c) (He said) he would come after now. 
In McCoard's opinion (1978: 91), the problem here is that Reichenbach's model 
makes it appear to be an accident that English has no set of grammatical forms to 
express just these distinctions, but, in fact, it seems that the set of point-orderings 
implies a systematic richness which outstrips the actual resources of natural languages 
(cf. Comrie, 1976: 26). Since the system is not internally constrained to reflect the limits 
of temporal specification in natural language grammars, we may question also whether 
the posited distinction between present perfect and past is "natural" or arbitrary. 
Moreover, Reichenbach's example (2.8) I had seen John yesterday (Reichenbach 
1947: 288) represents a type which is often ambiguous in the reading of the adverb; this 
comes out more clearly if we consider (2.9) John had left at three, where "at three" can 
be understood either as the time of John's departure, or a time at which it was observed 
that John had already left. The first reading, which is probably more common, seems to 
require the formula E,R2~Ri—S, containing two reference points, if we are to maintain 
the parallel with (2.10) John left at three, and the requirement that adverbs apply only to 
reference points (cf. chapter 3 section 3.6.3). In a case like (2.11) I was sure he would 
have received the letter by last Tuesday at the latest, it looks as if we again need two 
reference points Rj—E—R2--S to reflect the relations: 
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(a) the present, (S): it is the case that 
(b) the past with respect to the present, (Ri): I was sure that 
(c) the future with respect to the past point,(R2): he would 
(d) the past with respect to that future point,(E): have received 
The same number of points are embodied in (2.12) I shall have been going to see 
John, an example supplied by Prior (1967:13) with the formula S - R 2 - E — R l . A 
possibly more comprehensible example of this formula would be: 
(2.13) If he makes another appointment, John will have been going to see the doctor 
three times, but he hasn't actually shown up yet. (McCoard 1978: 91) 
To Prior, such examples point to the artificiality of distinguishing the speech-
point from other reference-points: 
"It becomes unnecessary and misleading to make such a sharp distinction between 
the point or points of reference and the point of speech; the point of speech is just 
the first point of reference." (Prior 1967:13) 
If this is granted, then Reichenbach's manner of distinguishing the past from the 
present perfect becomes suspect. Could we speak of the "simultaneity" of the point of 
speech with some other reference point, except as an artifact of description? Pastness 
and futurity are always relative to a point of reference, whatever it is. The only 
remaining distinction between past and perfect is whether or not the event time "E" is 
"simultaneous" with another time "R" which lies before "R", the moment of speech, i.e. 
in the past. If no R2 is involved, then we have the perfect. But even this difference is 
dubious. Reichenbach has not stipulated that events expressed in the perfect tense do not 
occur at a time prior to the speech event; indeed this would be nonsense, and McCoard 
remarks that: 
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"Every event is simultaneous with some time; to happen means to become present 
at some time." (McCoard 1978:92) 
In fact, this is in keeping with Dahl (1985), who points out a problem in 
connection with such sentences as (2.14) When I arrived, Peter had tried to phone me 
twice during the preceding week: 
"R here must be the time when I arrived, and E - or rather the E's - are the time 
points when Peter tried to phone me. But we see that there is nothing in 
Reichenbach's scheme that corresponds to the time referred to by during the 
preceding week The function of that phrase could be said to be to specify a 
temporal frame for the E points, that is, a time period within which they are 
located." (Dahl 1985:30) 
Hence, the lack of an R2 with the perfect must not be taken literally to refer to an 
objective lack of a moment of realization. Instead, it makes sense only if interpreted in 
an indirect sense to mean simultaneous with a time not singled out in the discourse 
from other times. But this is quite different from simply talking about the differential 
ordering of three points of reference, S, E, and R, on which Reichenbach relies. 
2.3 Comrie's Theory of Tense (1985) 
Comrie (1976,1985) criticizes Reichenbach's tense system as follows: 
[1] He pointed out as a weakness of the system that it generates more possibilities than 
are actually to be found in natural language (cf. Comrie 1976: 26). For example, 
Reichenbach (1947) provides for three different future perfect tenses (corresponding to 
the configurations "S-E-R", "S,E-R" and "E-S-R"), but no language appears to have 
these three different tenses. The same overcapacity is observed in connection with the 
three tenses corresponding to the English future, and in connection with the three tenses 
corresponding to the English conditional (cf. section 2.2). 
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[2] Comrie (1985: 64) claims that situations described by one of the "absolute tenses" 
(i.e. the past, present or future tense) are simply located prior to, simultaneous with, or 
posterior to the moment of speech, and that the notion of reference point is therefore not 
needed for the characterization of these absolute tenses. 
(3] For the above claim to be tenable it is necessary for Comrie (1985) to make a 
further claim, viz. that "in terms of location in time (... ) the perfect is not distinct from 
the past" (Comrie 1985: 78). Comrie thus rejects Reichenbach's analysis in which the 
past tense involves a past point of reference, whereas the present perfect involves a 
reference point that coincides with the point of speech. According to Comrie, both 
tenses just locate a situation as prior to the present moment and do not involve a 
reference point at all. This does not mean that the past tense does not differ from the 
present perfect at all, only that this difference is exclusively one of aspect (since the 
perfect implies "current relevance", whereas the past does not): "however perfect 
differs from past, it is not in terms of time location" (Comrie 1985: 78). 
These points of criticism led Comrie (1985) to propose a theory of tenses that is 
radically different from Reichenbach's. In this theory, all that we need for representing 
what he calls "absolute tenses" is two time points (the time of speech [S] and the time of 
the event [E]) and three relations (simultaneity, anteriority and posteriority): 
Absolute Tenses Meaning Representation 
present tense E simul S [E ,S] 
past tense E before S [ E - S ] 
future tense E after S [ S - E ] 
For the representation of the other tenses one more time point is necessary, viz. 
the reference point [R]: 
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Relative Tenses Meaning Representation 
pluperfect E before R before S [ E - R - S ] 
future perfect E before R after S [S - E - R] 
future in the future E after R after S [S - R - E] 
conditional E after R before S [R - E - S] 
For more complicated instances of location in time several reference points can 
be provided for. For example: 
Tense Meaning Representation 
Conditional perfect E before R, after R, before S { [ R - S ] - [ E - R ] } 
This system is extremely simple, yet it remedies the most obvious shortcomings 
of Reichenbach's analysis (1947). It allows for the possibility that more than one 
reference point is necessary. It also obviates the problem of overcapacity of the system: 
whereas Reichenbach's system generates three future perfect tenses (because the point 
of the event can be posterior to, simultaneous with, or anterior to the point of speech), 
Comrie's system needs to generate only one future perfect tense: the future perfect 
implies no more than that E precedes R and that R follows S. Whether the situation (E) 
referred to actually precedes, follows, or coincides with the point of speech is 
immaterial to the meaning of the future perfect tense. The same point can be made in 
connection with the future tense and the conditional tense. 
In spite of this, the theory still raises some problems. The following points of 
criticism immediately suggest themselves: 
[1] As we have noted in section 2.2, Prior objects to Reichenbach's analysis (1947), 
saying that it is: 
"...unnecessary and misleading to make such a sharp distinction between the point 
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or points of reference and the point of speech since the point of speech is just the 
first point of reference and pastness and futurity are always relative to some point of 
reference". (Prior 1967: 13) 
It goes without saying that this criticism is also applicable to Comrie's analysis 
(1976). In fact, it is even more pertinent to Comrie's theory than to Reichenbach's 
(1947), since Comrie denies that some of the tenses (viz. the "absolute" ones) have a 
reference point at all. 
[2] The view that the point of speech is not a point of reference makes it necessary for 
Comrie (1985) to reject Reichenbach's (1947) (intuitively attractive) view that the 
present perfect locates a situation in time relative to a reference point which coincides 
with the present moment. The argumentation runs as follows: 
"If one were to provide an analysis of the perfect analogous to that of the pluperfect 
and the future perfect, then one would say that the reference point for the perfect is 
simultaneous with the present moment, rather than being before the present moment 
(as for the pluperfect) or after the present moment (as for the future perfect). The 
situation in question would then be located in time prior to this reference point. In 
terms of location in time, however, this would give precisely the same result as the 
past, which also locates a situation as prior to the present moment. Thus, however 
perfect differs from past, it is not in terms of time location." (Comrie 1985: 78) 
We could point out here that this conclusion does not appear to be in keeping 
with the fact that the two tenses collocate with different kinds of time adverbials 
(compare (2.15)7 have now read two novels and I saw him yesterday and (2.16) */ have 
seen him yesterday and (2.17)*/ read two novels now). More importantly, however, 
whatever the value of Comrie's argument, it certainly does not prove that analyzing the 
perfect as representing a situation as anterior to a point of reference (which is the point 
of speech) is wrong. In other words, there is no evidence whatever for the claim that the 
point of speech does not act as a point of reference. As regards this, we might as well 
subscribe to Reichenbach's principle (1947) that every tense involves a point of 
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reference and to Prior's claim (1967) that the primary reference point is the point of 
speech. And if we subscribe to these views, the conclusion must be that the past and the 
present perfect do differ in the way they locate a situation in time (since the reference 
point for the past tense is certainly not the point of speech). 
There are a number of observations that support this conclusion. Comrie (1985) 
claims that the two tenses differ only in aspect (presence or absence of "current 
relevance"), not in the way they locate a situation in time. Declerck (1986), however, 
remarks that: 
"...if current relevance were the all-important factor, we could not explain why we 
have to use the past tense in examples like: I know what Tom is like. I (*have) 
spent my holidays with him two years ago. There can be no doubt that there is 
current relevance here: if I know what Tom is like it is because I spent my holidays 
with him. Still, we have to use the past tense, apparently because the situation is 
located at a time which wholly precedes the present. (Note that the perfect would 
have to be used if we used for the last two years instead of two years ago.)" 
(Declerck 1986: 310,11) 
This means that the primary factor determining the use of the perfect and the past 
is not the presence or absence of the idea of current relevance, but rather the way in 
which the situation is located in time. This conclusion is further corroborated by the 
observation made by Declerck that: 
"...the past reference point necessary to account for the past perfect can be 
established by the past tense, but not by the present perfect (e.g. I had left before 
Tom (*has) arrived). Obviously, the present perfect cannot locate a situation in time 
in the same way as the past tense does." (Declerck 1986: 311) 
Another serious objection to Comrie's treatment of the present perfect is that, in 
examples like (2.18) I have not visited him since my car has been out of order, the 
present perfect locates the situation as simultaneous with a time which does not wholly 
lie before the present moment but rather includes it. The past tense, by contrast, involves 
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reference to a time which does not last up to the moment of speaking. Comrie's claim 
(1985: 78) that "both tenses do not differ in the way they locate a situation in time, since 
they both locate it before the present moment", is thus incorrect. (The representation "E 
before S" which Comrie argues for the past tense does not fit the present perfect, since 
Comrie states explicitly (1985: 122) that "before" is to be interpreted as "wholly 
before.") 
[3] When dealing with the "relative" tenses, Comrie repeatedly notes that time 
adverbials have the function of establishing a reference point: 
"Often, the reference point is given by a time adverbial (...) In the next example (...) 
for the text to make sense at ten o 'clock must be interpreted as the reference point 
prior to which John had left: Mary came to visit John at JO o'clock; but John had 
already left at ten o 'clock" (Comrie 1985: 65-66) 
However, if it is true that at ten o 'clock establishes a past reference point and 
that the past perfect had already left represents a situation as prior to this reference 
point, it seems logical to hold the view that at ten o 'clock also serves as a reference 
point for the location in time effected by the past tense, i.e. that came represents a 
situation as simultaneous with this past reference point. This analysis would have the 
additional advantage of explaining why the past tense, and not the present perfect, can 
collocate with adverbials like at ten o'clock yesterday, etc., i.e. with adverbials that 
establish a past reference point. (The claim that the present perfect locates a situation 
relative to a reference time which coincides (at least partly) with the point of speech 
would automatically explain why this tense cannot collocate with such adverbials.) 
[4] As noted above, Reichenbach's theory (1947) cannot deal with sentences like (2.14) 
When I arrived, Peter had tried to phone me twice during the preceding week (Dahl 
1985:30) because it provides for no element corresponding to the time referred to by 
during the preceding week. Exactly the same objection can be raised against Comrie's 
theory (1976). When we look at the sentence in question, we ascertain that, apart from S 
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(the moment of speech), it refers to three different times: the time of my arrival, the 
times when Peter tried to phone me and the time referred to by during the preceding 
week Comrie's analysis of the past perfect ("E before R before S") provides for only 
two time-points besides S. Since R is obviously the time of my arrival and E would 
seem to be the times when Peter tried to phone me, Comrie's theory fails to provide for 
the time referred to by during the preceding week i.e. the time relative to which E is 
located. 
[5] According to Comrie, the past tense can be represented simply as "E before S". In 
this representation, "E" is the "time point or interval which is occupied by the situation 
to be located in time" (1985: 122). The relation "before" is defined as "wholly before": 
"...on the time line an interval X is before an interval Y (X before Y) if and only if 
each time point within X is to the left of each point within Y." (Comrie 1985: 122-
123) 
Given these specifications, the representation "E before S" must necessarily 
mean that the situation referred to is located exclusively in the past, i.e. is no longer 
continuing at the moment of speech. Although many grammar books do claim that this 
is the meaning of the past tense, the inference that the situation no longer holds at the 
time of speech is actually no more than an "invited" inference. Interestingly, Comrie 
himself notes this in another section of his book (without noticing that it vitiates his 
analysis): 
"It should also be noted that use of the past tense only locates the situation in the 
past, without saying anything about whether that situation continues to the present 
or into the future, although there is often a conversational implicative that it does 
not continue to or beyond the present Thus, English John was eating his lunch 
(when I looked into his room) says nothing about whether the situation still 
continues at the present moment or not." (Comrie 1985: 41-42) 
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The observation made here by Comrie can be accounted for if we assume that 
what is located completely before the point of speech is not "E" (the time of the 
situation) but some reference time. The past tense can then be taken to represent the 
situation as holding at (i.e. as being simultaneous with) this reference time. This theory 
provides an adequate analysis of the past tense if we define this relationship of 
simultaneity as meaning that the reference time and the time of the situation overlap 
either completely or partly. In the latter case part of the situation may precede the 
reference time or follow it (including the possibility that the situation continues to the 
present or into the future). In other words, the past tense does not simply locate the time 
of the situation before the moment of speech. Rather, it relates the time of the situation 
to some reference time and locates this reference time before the moment of speech. We 
therefore need a representation that is more complex than Comrie's "E before S". 
In fairness, it should be noted that the validity of this criticism depends on the 
particular interpretation that we have assigned to the meaning of "E". Comrie (1985: 
122) defines E as the "moment of event", adding that this "moment" can be "a point or 
an interval of time longer than a point" and that the term "event" is here meant to refer 
to "situations in general". "E" thus stands for the "time of the situation" and is said to be 
the "time point or interval which is occupied by the situation to be located in time" 
(1985 : 122). This can be interpreted as meaning that "E" is the point or interval of time 
that is taken up by the situation on the time axis (i.e. the time through which the 
situation lasts). It is on this interpretation that representations like "E before S" (for the 
past tense) and "E after S" (for the future tense) have been shown to be deficient. 
However, other references to "E" seem to suggest that Comrie perhaps assigns a 
different interpretation to the notion "time of the situation". Comrie (1985: 122) says 
that "E" is "the time at which the situation is located", which would seem to mean that 
the concept "time of the situation" ought to be interpreted as denoting the time 
(indicated by a time adverbial or by the context) with which the situation is said to be 
simultaneous. However, this interpretation leads to the same conclusion as the first, viz. 
that three times are involved in the description of the past (or future) tense: the time that 
the situation takes up on the time axis, the time (indicated by an adverbial or by the 
context) at which the situation is located (i.e. with which the situation is said to be 
"simultaneous" in one of the senses mentioned above), and the point of speech. This 
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means that the representation of the past tense must be something like "X simul Y 
before S", in which X is the "time of the situation" (in the former sense) and "Y" is the 
time relative to which "X" is located as simultaneous. In other words, the notion of 
"reference point" (viz. "Y"), which in any case plays a role in the description of the past 
perfect and future perfect, must be introduced again in the representation of the past and 
the future. 
There is other evidence leading to this conclusion. Consider, for example, a 
sentence such as (2.19) I went to see John at 5 o'clock, but he had already left. If we 
assume, like Comrie (1985), that at 5 o'clock establishes a reference point and that the 
past perfect had left locates a situation prior to this reference point, then it is only 
natural to assume that the past tense bent to see locates a situation as simultaneous with 
this reference point. In fact, this conclusion is inevitable: if the past tense just located 
the situation before the time of speech and did not locate it as simultaneous with the 
reference point established by at 5 o'clock then the above example would not 
necessarily mean that at 5 o 'clock was the time that I went to see John. The assumption 
of a reference point for the past tense also proves necessary if we want to explain the 
difference in meaning between e.g.(2.20)(a) At 5 o'clock I went into the church and (b) 
At 5 o'clock the procession was going into the church. The difference between the past 
and the progressive here concerns the way in which the situation is located relative to 
the reference point: in the former sentence the situation and the reference point are 
simultaneous in the sense of "commensurate"; in the latter sentence the progressive 
represents the reference point as being included in the longer timespan during which 
the situation lasts (cf. Declerck 1986 and Godoi 1992). 
Another argument showing the necessity of some reference time is provided by 
sentences like (2.21) The balloon burst when we were looking at it. If we assume that 
the only times involved in the use of the past tense are the time of the situation and the 
time of utterance, we get into difficulties, for neither of these times can be the time 
specified by the temporal clause. The temporal clause cannot define the time of the 
situation, since the latter is punctual10 whereas the clause refers to a timespan. There is 
no problem, however, if we assume that the time of the situation is located relative to 
10 Although the time of utterance takes some time, in the analisis of tense it is seen as a point (cf. Comrie 
1985: 37) 
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some time of reference, for the temporal clause can then be taken to specify the time of 
reference. 
A final argument to the same effect can be found in Comrie's own treatment of 
nonfinite clauses: 
"With the English non-finite verb forms, it seems in general clear that they have 
basically relative time reference, i.e. time reference defined relative to some deictic 
center established by the context, so that the primary interpretation of those sitting 
on the benches were asked to leave is as those who were (at that time) sitting on the 
benches were asked to leave." (Comrie 1985: 21-22) 
If we assume that the use of a past tense (were asked) creates a past reference 
point relative to which the situation expressed by the nonfinite clause is located, then we 
must assume that exactly the same thing happens when we use a finite clause (who were 
sitting) instead of the participial clause. That is, the past tense (were sitting) must also 
be taken to represent a situation as simultaneous with a past point of reference. 
[6] There is a similar problem in connection with Comrie's representation of the present 
tense ("E simul S"). At various places in the book (e.g. 1985: 2, 36, 37) he states 
explicitly that "S" is a "point in time", i.e. that "S" is not a timespan. On page 37 he 
discusses a couple of cases in which "there is literal coincidence between the time 
location of a situation and the present moment", but concludes that "a more 
characteristic use of the present tense is in referring to situations which occupy a much 
longer period of time than the present moment, but which nonetheless include the 
present moment within them." Now, the relation "simul" is defined as follows: 
"Xsimul F means that each time point in Xis also in Y and vice versa. Simul is, of 
course, a symmetrical relation, i.e. X simul Y is equivalent to Y simul X" (Comrie 
1985: 123). 
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If we combine this definition of "simul" with the claim that "S" is punctual 
(nondurative)., then the representation "E simul S" which Comrie proposes for the 
present tense must imply that "E" (the time of the situation) cannot be a timespan, i.e. 
that only punctual situations can be referred to by the present tense. This is, of course, 
incompatible with Comrie's own observation that the present tense can be: 
"...used to speak of states and processes which hold at the present moment, but 
which began before the present moment and may well continue beyond the present 
moment, as in the Eiffel Tower stands in Paris and the author is working on 
chapter two" (Comrie 1985: 37). 
Here too, the solution to the problem is to be found in the introduction of a 
reference time: a sentence in the present tense says that a particular situation holds at a 
time which is simultaneous with the moment of speech. That the situation may also 
have held in the past and may continue to hold in the future is immaterial to this. 
This conclusion remains unaffected if we do not interpret "E" as the portion of 
time taken up by the situation on the time axis but rather as the time at which the 
situation is located. (As we have seen, it is not quite clear from Comrie's formulations 
which of these interpretations is meant.) When we say that a situation is "located at time 
X", what we mean is that it is located as simultaneous with that time (cf. Prior 1967: 
15). This naturally means that "X" is the reference time relative to which the situation is 
located. In other words, the present tense is no exception to the rule that every tense 
involves at least one reference point. We will say that the present tense locates a 
situation as simultaneous with a reference time, which is itself located as simultaneous 
with the point of speech. In a sentence like (2.22) At present he is on the dole, the 
reference time is defined by the time adverbial. Notice that, since at present refers to a 
timespan, whereas the point of speech is by definition punctual, we cannot adopt 
Comrie's definition of "simul" (according to which "X simul Y" means that "each point 
in X is also in Y and vice versa" (1985: 123). In the theory proposed by Declerck 
(1986), which we will analyze in chapter three, "simul" indicates either complete or 
partial overlapping. 
6 0 
2.4 Bull's Model (1960) 
Let us follow McCoard (1978) in his criticism of Bull (1960). According to 
McCoard, Bull presents an attempt to build a system of tense analysis which will reflect 
the actual range of ordering relationships among events which are found in human 
languages. To the familiar past, present, and future reference-points, which Bull terms 
"axes," he adds a separate axis for events which were anticipated at a past time, i.e. were 
future at a past time: 
"If RP (Retrospective Point) can be recalled at PP (Prime Point) and if AP 
(Anticipated Point) can be anticipated from PP, then total recall would be 
impossible unless one could remember at PP that he once anticipated an axis from 
RP. This retrospective anticipated axis, which will be symbolized as RAP, is the 
fourth axis needed to complete the hypothetical tense system." (Bull 1960: 23) 
Given these four axes, an event can be located by means of a "vector" from one 
of the axes; a vector is an ordering relationship with respect to an axis, viz. anterior, 
simultaneous, or posterior, represented as -V, 0V, and +V respectively. With E standing 













would have sung 0 
E(RAP+V) 
0 
It is to be noted, says McCoard (1978: 93), that Bull does not place all the axes 
in relation to each other on the same time-line: 
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"It is true that RP. which is recalled, is always anterior to PP, while AP, which is 
anticipated at PP, is always posterior to PP and, therefore, to RP. These three axes 
are, then, serial and sequent and may be identified with the three concepts of order. 
This identification, nevertheless, is fallacious. It is based on the assumption that a 
system containing only three factors can be used to describe a system containing 
four. RAP, obviously, cannot be explained in terms of a direct relationship to PP . . 
. RAP may be anterior to PP, actually identical with PP, or posterior to PP. The 
vector system can be understood only by returning to the axiom that events, like 
points on a line in space, can be meaningfully organized only in terms of one axis 
of orientation at a time. In recollection, the act of recalling is PP and the event 
recalled is oriented directly to PP. If the recalled event, however, is actually an 
event which was once PP but is now RP, then it serves in recollection as the prime 
axis of orientation around which all possible events are now organized. The 
abstract fact that an event posterior to RP may be anterior to PP is now totally 
irrelevant....All this means, to be brief, that the position of RAP relative to PP 
cannot be defined. Once the speaker has moved from PP to RP in recollection, PP 
ceases to be a relevant entity." (Bull 1960: 23-4) 
First of all, remarks McCoard (1978: 94), the statement "once the speaker has 
moved from PP to RP in recollection, PP ceases to be a relevant entity" seems to be too 
strong, for in fact the forms which the speaker uses in "moving from" PP to RP do mark 
the "trip". They indicate that: 
"...the retrospective reference point is retrospective with respect to another point, 
namely the PP. The only way PP could be entirely eliminated would be to simply 
couch statements in nontensed form. Ordinarily, he said he would go and he said he 
will go are understood to be different reports. Bull is quite right that would go only 
indicates posteriority to the past reference (said), without positively indicating 
posteriority to the present reference as well. But some vestige of the present 
reference still appears in the very fact of choosing the "back-shifted" would for an 
original will." (McCoard 1978: 95) 
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Another criticism is that there are problems concerning Bull's choice of a 
structural slot for a given form. Let us follow McCoard's reasoning: 
"The form will sing is put only in the E(PP+V) slot, but I do not see why it could 
not justifiably be put in the E(APOV) slot, which stands empty. Of course, this 
would destroy the separateness of axes, but it is not clear that complete separation is 
desirable anyway, as we have noted. Similarly, would sing would go in both 
E(RP+V) and E(RAPOV). In this way, we would at least reduce the oddity of 
having two axes (AP and RAP) where there is never any verb form to fill two of the 
three slots, including the 'prime' slots APOV and RAPOV. Despite Bull's attempt to 
avoid the consequences of Reichenbach's overrich symbolism, some of the same 
excess appears in Bull's unfilled slots." (ibid.) 
A related problem is that, given that Bull has included a "compound" axis RAP, 
we can also imagine an axis defined as ARP (Anticipated Retrospective Point), i.e. a 
point that will be looked back on (viewed retrospectively) at some time in the future. 
Bull's system does not rule out an ARP axis; it merely does not happen to include it. 
McCoard also points out that while has sung is on the same axis as sings, and 
had sung is in line with sang, the form will have sung is on a different axis from will 
sing, and would have sung is separated from would sing. For him, this asymmetry seems 
unjustified. 
Bull's schema, continues McCoard (1978: 95), makes had sung realize only 
E(RP-V). But the past perfect is also generated by "back-shifting" or embedding pasts in 
the past: (2.23) Marsha graduated last Friday becomes, via second-hand report, (2.24) / 
was told Marsha had graduated the Friday before. This would make it E(RRPOV), the 
axis being a point viewed retrospectively from a point viewed retrospectively from the 
present. Furthermore, even original past perfects sometimes appear in back-shifted 
contexts, and we have to decide whether to identify an underlying third level of pastness 
(RRRP), or to provide for "wiping out" such distinctions at the time of embedding. 
With all the above criticisms McCoard wants to suggest that Bull's tactic of 
separating all the axes from one another brings with it a certain artificiality. There is a 
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"complete blindness", to use McCoard's terms, to certain connections that do hold 
between axes. This suggests indirectly that Bull's analysis in which the present perfect 
and the simple past are located in different axes may be, at least in part, a 
misrepresentation. 
In relation to the distinction between the present perfect and the simple past, it is 
important to note that Bull's + and - vectors apparently do not point at specific times, 
they only point away from their particular axes. The 0 vector, in contrast, always has its 
own definite axis to point to. It seems, however, that the functions: 
"... 'prior to the present' and 'at a past time' are entirely equivalent, unless we bring 
in factors like the definiteness of the'prior'and 'past'times. It would, of course, 
be possible to argue that the two functions express different assertions, as CR 
adepts did, and are only implicationally equivalent. Since Bull does not attempt 
this, we will not take him in this line." (McCoard 1978: 96) 
For this reason, McCoard classifies Bull's system as a variation of the ID point 
of view, which by the reasons discussed in chapter 1, cannot be used consistently to 
differentiate the present perfect from the simple past. According to McCoard: 
"The terminology in Bull's analysis is different from Reichenbach, but the result is 
much the same, in at least this particular regard." (McCoard 1978: 96) 
2.5 Allen's "Definite Past" Argument (1966) 
Allen, provides an argument for characterizing the past as a "definite past" 
independently of a direct comparison with the perfect. The argument is based on his 
analysis of the way subordinate clauses relate to their superordinate clauses within a 
temporal hierarchy. Allen's basic schema of tenses is strongly reminiscent of Bull's 
(1960), except that it rejects the future from the ranks of major reference points, Bull's 
axes, on the grounds that it is not very well integrated into the verb system, and is also 
rare in the corpus Allen works from. What Bull called an "axis," Allen calls a "time-
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reference": they are "past" and "present"; what Bull called a "vector," Allen terms a 
"time-relationship-reference": these are "earlier time, same time, and later time": 
"The distinction between time-reference and time-relationship-reference is crucial: 
verb forms expressing time-relationship are not to be construed as referring to any 
specific time except in so far as the time-relationship which they show with 
reference to an identified time 'places' them in time. The significance of this may 
be seen from a sentence like Tom said that he would come some time next week 
where the time expression next week shows that Tom's coming will take place after 
the moment of coding; the verb-cluster does not show this, it indicates only that the 
time of the coming is later than the time of Tom's speaking." (Allen 1966: 165) 
Let us follow McCoard's footsteps again. The reasoning is sufficiently familiar 
from his criticism of Bull. Allen argues that: 
"The time-relationship signaled by an included verb-cluster is relationship not to 
the point of orientation but to the point of reference: that is, to the time expressed 
by the verb-cluster on the next higher (i.e. superordinate) level. Thus in the 
example, I had it wrapped in tissue paper because she had promised me that she 
wouldn't eat it till we got home, had promised gives the time-relationship "earlier 
to" the act expressed by wrapped in the main clause, and wouldn't eat renders 
futurity with respect to the time of had promised but not with respect to wrapped or 
the moment of coding, and finally got ties with the event of eating, whenever that 
is." (Allen 1966: 166, 8) 
Thus included pasts signal a "same time" relationship with respect to a higher 
verb-cluster containing a "preterital element", either Ved, had Ved, or would V. 
Included presents mark "same time" with respect to higher verb-clusters containing V 
(present), has Ved, or will V, as in: 
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(2.25) (a) I resent il when he begs. 
(b) I've always given him money when he asks. 
(c) I '11 tell him when he comes. 
McCoard (1978: 98) points out that Allen keeps "past" and "present" as 
independent systems because it is necessary to maintain the principle that tenses in 
embedded clauses are "blind" to temporal references beyond their own immediate 
syntactic contexts. For Allen, as exemplified above, past and present perfect relate to 
differing orientations, viz. "same as past" versus "earlier than now". To evaluate this 
arrangement, McCoard scrutinizes several sets of closely-related examples Allen gives 
in support of his model of tense relationships. Examples (2.26a to 2.26t) are in McCoard 
(1978: 98, 99,100,101,102). Let us first consider: 
(2.26) (a) Percy said that he had listened to the radio while he ate supper. 
(b) Percy said that he always listened to the radio while he ate supper. 
(c) Percy said that he was listening to the radio while he ate supper. 
In each case, as pointed out by McCoard, the time of ate is understood to be 
simultaneous with that which is referred to by the verb in the next higher clause. In 
(2.26a), had listened refers to an event which preceded the event of saying; so does ate. 
In (2.26b), ate is simultaneous with the past reference of listened-, and would listen in 
(2.26c) provides the "future from a past viewpoint" which is shared by ate. A similar 
relationship is evidenced by present tenses: 
(2.26) (d) Percy usually listens to the radio after he has eaten supper. 
(e) But tonight he will go to bed after he has eaten supper. 
(f) He will listen to the radio while he eats supper, instead. 
Separation of the past and present orientation systems, according to Allen, is 
what prevents the generation of anomalies like: 
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(2.26) (g)*Percy said that he had listened lo the radio while he eats supper. 
(h) *Percy usually listens to the radio after he ate supper. 
parallel to (2.26a) and (2.26d), respectively. McCoard, however, counter-arguments: 
"...if we posit that there is only one basic orientation point, namely the moment of 
speech, and that the past is then defined as 'earlier than the moment of speech', the 
past becomes an exception to Allen's tense-embedding hypothesis: each past in an 
embedded series would necessarily refer to a time before the moment of speech, 
which is not always true (cf. She had promised me that she wouldn't eat it till we 
got home, where got may not yet have happened); the 'earlier' relation would be 
referring to a specific time; furthermore, with this system, pasts would not assert a 
same-time-relation among the various events expressed in the past, which Allen 
sees as a major function of the past." (McCoard 1978: 99) 
This "same-time-relation" function, according to McCoard, also rules out the 
alternative of regarding the past as simply marking an "earlier" time-relationship-
reference with variable orientation, since embedded pasts would then denote a sequence 
of progressively more remote events, each in turn prior to the event in the next higher 
clause. In sentence (2.26b) above, ate is not past with respect to listened. Moreover, 
since ate and listened are understood to refer to the same time, it is not sufficient to 
identify both events as lying "somewhere before" the moment of speech; we need to be 
able to represent their simultaneity in the grammatical model, and this requires at 
least that the event-times be identified, that is, definite. The simultaneity in (2.26d), on 
the other hand, is not between listening and eating, but between listening and having 
eaten supper. The present perfect works like a present tense in this regard, and is 
consequently defined as a marker of "time earlier than the moment of speech" (Allen 
1966:159). The perfect is thus one of the time-relationship markers which Allen says 
"are not to be construed as referring to any specific time" outside their own orientation-
point. From this, it is clear that we have a characteristically ID sort of relationship 
between the past and the perfect. 
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According to McCoard. if the perfect can never point to or refer to a definite 
time, being only a marker of "earlier than" time relationship, then it is theoretically 
incapable of permitting a past in any sentence embedded beneath it. We should be 
unable to produce (2.27) I've often stayed up as late as I wanted and many others like it. 
Allen admits this is not accounted for: 
"...we would expect the present to signal the same time as the time of either 
have/has or wH] (defined only as 'time later than moment of coding')... But re-
reference to an indefinite time signaled by have or has is expressed by means of (the 
past), so that 'same time' as the time of have or has is signaled by a past verb 
form, not by (the present)..." (Allen 1966:168) 
There are other points, remarks McCoard, which escape Allen's notice. It is 
possible to say: 
(2.26) (i) Percy said that he had listened to the radio while he had eaten supper, (m) 
with little, if any, difference in meaning from (2.26a) above. In Allen's theory, (2.26i): 
"...should mean 'the time after Percy's listening to the radio was also the time after 
his eating supper.' This paraphrase fails to assert that the times of the respective 
events of listening and eating were the same, which is the actual message of (m), 
and of (a)." (McCoard 1978: 101) 
Notice also, remarks McCoard, that we can reverse the tenses in (2.26a) to 
produce an example that is tolerable, though slightly odd: 
(2.26) (j) Percy said that while he ate supper, he had listened to the radio, (n) 
which again is interpreted like (2.26a), though had listened should refer to an event 
preceding ate, according to Allen. 
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McCoard thinks the general problem is that Allen ignores the role of 
conjunctions and other elements in the structuring of temporal relationships, placing the 
entire burden on the fact of embedding itself (cf. Godoi 1992: 211- 225). It is revealing, 
continues McCoard, to alter his examples (2.26a,b,c) by replacing while with even 
though, which allows a "simultaneous" reading, but does not perform very well as a 
substitute: 
(2.26) (k) IPercy said that he had listened to the radio even though he ate supper, (p) 
(1) IPercy said that he always listened to the radio even though he ate supper. 
(q) 
(m) * Percy said that he would listen to the radio even though he ate supper, (r) 
(2.26k) is improved by changing he ate to he was eating; (2.261) works better 
with that, or with he would be eating-, similarly with (2.26i).The only point being made 
here is that if the sequence of verb forms were entirely rationalized by Allen's principle, 
we should not have to worry about such changes at all. When we compare other 
conjunctions, we see that Allen's argument also makes (2.26d), repeated here for 
convenience, entirely equivalent to (2.26n), but then leaves (2.26o) entirely different: 
(2.36) (d) Percy usually listens to the radio after he has eaten supper. 
(n) Percy usually listens to the radio when he has eaten supper, (s) 
(o) Percy usually listens to the radio before he has eaten supper, (t) 
Moreover, if we say (2.28) When I sleep soundly, I usually snore, we normally 
understand the sleeping and snoring to be going on at the same time. But if we say 
(2.29) When I sleep soundly, I do my work better, we think of the sleeping and working 
as alternating. This difference is not accommodated by Allen's theory. 
The purpose of the above discussion has been to see if Allen's theory of tense-
sequencing: 
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"...provided support for an ID model of the perfect/past opposition that was 
independent of direct semantic comparisons such as made by the ID theorists... If 
tense-sequencing had proved to work out as Allen intended, we would have been 
forced to admit that there was some sense to the ID analysis after all... However, we 
have found a number of deficiencies in Allen's explanation....hence we judge that 
Allen has not substantiated an ID interpretation of tense." (McCoard 1978: 102) 
CHAPTER 3 
THE EXTENDED-NOW INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESENT PERFECT 
3.1 Introduction 
Having concluded in chapter 2 that none of the tense models discussed were able 
to account for the difference between the present perfect and the simple past, in this 
chapter we will consider in more detail the "extended-now" concept. We will show that 
the tense model proposed by Declerck (1986) seems to overcome the limitations of the 
models discussed in chapter 2 in that it is capable of accommodating an XN (McCoard's 
abbreviation for "Extended Now") interpretation of the present perfect satisfactorily, 
thereby , providing a solution to the problem of the opposition between the present 
perfect and the simple past. Finally, Declerck's (1986) model suggests that the various 
readings of the present perfect are much more related to its semantic frame than to 
"contextual influences", as claimed by McCoard (1978: 151). 
3.2 Early Extended-Now (XN) Concept Seeds 
It is important to note that Pickbourn (1789), an early scholar who seems to have 
considered just about every theoretical issue relating to the past/perfect contrast, when 
discussing the question of indefiniteness of the present perfect virtually equates 
"indefinite" with "included in present time," and "definite" with "excluded from the 
present": 
"/ have written...evidently belongs to present tense. We do not say, I have written 
yesterday or I have written the first of August; but we say I wrote yesterday, I wrote 
the first of August. This tense (the perfect) may properly be called the present 
perfect, or perfect indefinite. It always expresses a perfect or completed action; but 
an action that has been completed or perfected in the present time, i.e. in the present 
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day, the present year, the present age, etc. If we speak of the present century, we 
say, philosophers have made great discoveries in the present century, but if we 
speak of the last century, we say, philosophers made great discoveries in the last 
century." (Pickbourn 1789: 31) 
A bit later he concedes that the very recent past is not strictly speaking 
indefinite, but the "present period" characterization still holds: 
"...in one case it (the perfect) is definite with respect to time, i.e. when it signifies a 
thing done in the point of time preceding the present instant; as I have just now 
written a letter. But in all other cases it is, with respect to time, indefinite; for it 
only limits the action to a period of time, some of which is not yet expired, without 
referring to any particular part of that period. For, if I only say, Dr. Priestly has 
published an English grammar, I do not thereby ascertain whether he published it 
yesterday or thirty years ago." (Pickbourn 1789: 32) 
Pickbourn's observations seem to be in keeping with an example by Mätzner 
(1892: 94), (3.1) I saw the man today. McCoard (1978: 125) comments that the period 
defined as "today", to which the speaker certainly "belongs", may be subdivided 
mentally into various subparts to which the speaker is attending ("earlier today," 
"during the lunch hour", etc.). A similar understanding is expressed by Brinkmann 
(1906: 724), who identifies the past with the past "closed off from the time of the 
speaker," thus separated from the speaker's present by a "time gap" (Zeitlücke). Even 
where there is no explicit adverb, he says, the choice of the past: 
"...tacitly presupposes an opposition between the present and the time of the act, 
and thereby conflicts with the view that the act belongs to the speaker's present....It 
is not a question of such external matters as today and yesterday, but of the manner 
in which the speaker conceives the event. If we're dealing with a fact which the 
speaker holds in mind as vividly as if it had only just happened, as if it occurred in 
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the time he can call 'present' or 'most recent past', then the perfect is used, 
regardless of whether it happened today, yesterday, or the day before." (Brinkmann 
1906: 725,728) 
3.3 Bryan's Strict XN Theory (1936) 
Bryan (1936), according to McCoard, was the first linguist who clearly 
delineated the notion of the inclusion of the present moment as a typical characteristic of 
the present perfect. Bryan's version of the past/perfect opposition is stripped to the bare 
bone: 
"The past tense represents an action or state as having occurred or having existed at 
a past moment or during a past period of time that is definitely separated from the 
actual present moment of speaking or writing the perfect tense merely includes 
an action or state within certain limits of time, and as a tense form it seems to me to 
do no more than this." (Bryan 1936: 363, 367) 
The "limits of time" involved are those of: 
"...a period which began in the past and extends up to or into the present. The 
terminus 'a quo' of this period of time may be made any point, however near or 
however remote, preceding the present; the terminus 'ad quem' is always the 
present moment of speaking or writing. That is, from the point of view of the 
present the speaker looks back upon some continuous stretch of the past and within 
this he places the action or state. This period of past time may be momentary, as in 
'The messenger has just arrived'; or it may be of considerable extent as in 'The old 
house has been left untenanted for many years'; or it may include all past time, as in 
Shakespeare's 'Men have died from time to time and worms have eaten them, but 
not for love'." (Bryan 1936: 366) 
It is interesting that Dietrich, one of the few who acknowledge Bryan (1936), 
argues in favor of the resultative reading of the present perfect: 
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"...the point of departure is the present situation...the event causally associated with 
this situation is identified as having happened sometime before the present." 
(Dietrich 1955: 186) 
But this means that the existence of a present state somehow predicts that the 
causal act will be expressed in the perfect, which is not always the case. McCoard 
(1978) exemplifies: 
"...given that 'I am missing my umbrella', I must say 'I have lost my umbrella.' 
Obviously, we might just as well say 'Darn, I guess I lost it somewhere.' The act of 
observing the present state does not force us to use the perfect; indeed if this were 
so, the perfect would be operating on a very different basis from the other verb 
forms, it would be used specifically to communicate that the present state had 
somehow automatically pinpointed the causal event and induced the speaker to use 
the perfect." (McCoard 1978: 127) 
Bryan's XN theory for the present perfect, however, does not define this 
"reference time" which is said to extend to the moment of speech, nor does it analyse 
the present perfect in terms of its structure in order to locate the element in it which 
causes the extension of this reference time, ignoring the question of whether this effect 
belongs to the present perfect itself or whether it is a consequence of contextual matters. 
This looseness in Bryan's theory led to different accounts of the XN interpretation, as 
can be noted in McCoard (1978), Dowty (1979) and Declerck (1986). 
3.4 McCoard's Version of the XN Interpretation (1978) 
McCoard assumes the general correctness of the XN approach only while laying 
emphasis: 
" ...on the myriad of contextual influences as the source of the more specific 
meanings identified With various subvarièties of the perfect..." (McCoard 1978: 
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These "contextual influences", however, are not explored, and remain without an 
explanation, as if McCoard felt overwhelmed by the number ("myriad") of them. 
However, when it comes to categorizing the perfect in opposition to the preterite and 
other related forms, McCoard sets up the concept of "inclusion" which the present 
perfect would supposedly mark, in opposition to a "negative inclusion" which the 
simple past would indicate: 
" The perfect will indicate positive inclusion, the preterit negative inclusion (i.e. 
exclusion)" (McCoard 1978: 152) 
McCoard's position, however, is rather curious. Let us consider the following 
statements: 
[1] "We shall claim in this work that the preterit and the present perfect are not, in fact, 
distinct in terms of tense or sequence: their distinctiveness lies elsewhere." (1978: 17) 
[2] "...we shall not refer to the English perfect as an Aspectual category: in this book, 
the perfect is not a marker of aspect." (1978: 11) 
Since the present perfect is not a marker of aspect, although it is a possible 
marker of inclusion, and does not differ from the past in terms of time location, it should 
coincide completely with the simple past, which is not the case, or be assigned to a new 
category. However, McCoard does not risk fitting the present perfect into any existing 
category, nor creates a new one to fill in the gap, only states vaguely that in relation to 
the opposition to other categories: 
"...it remains possible that inclusion is one of the factors, at least"(McCoard 1978: 
153) 
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What is clear from McCoard's (1978) discussion of the present perfect is that: 
[1] the present perfect is not a tense by itself, since it coincides with the simple past in 
terms of location in time, [2] it is not a marker of aspect either, although it possibly 
marks a category of "inclusion" and [3] the XN approach to the present perfect is valid 
only with "emphasis" on the "myriad" of contextual influences as the source of the more 
specific meanings. With this sort of definition, however, nothing is left but a very broad 
XN concept enveloped in pragmatic matters and mystery. 
3.5 Dowty's Version of the XN Interpretation (1979) 
Dowty (1979) bases his analysis of the present perfect on McCoard's Extended-
Now Theory. Like McCoard (1978), Dowty (1979) sees the current relevance and 
indefinite factors as belonging to a theory of pragmatics of discourse, although unlike 
McCoard he admits: 
"...the possibility that the perfect has as part of its meaning (or to be more exact, as 
part of its conventional implicature) a very, very general notion of 'current 
relevance'....say roughly, the event described has some relevance or other to the 
present context, the nature of which is to be inferred entirely from contextual 
factors." (Dowty 1979: 340) 
Dowty prefers, however, not to explore the present perfect in terms of this "very, 
very general notion of current relevance": 
"Fortunately, there is yet another way that the present perfect distinguishes itself 
from the simple past, a way which is far more concrete than 'present relevance' 
This is the difference in the time adverbials that are allowed by the two tenses." 
(Dowty 1979: 340) 
Examining McCoard's list of adverbials (1978: 135), transcribed below, Dowty 
(1979) considers that the overlapping distribution , column 2, could be accounted for by 
the theory that the present perfect is a past tense embedded within a present tense (cf. 
7 6 
Bach, 1967; McCawley, 1971; McCoard, 1978), however with serious restrictions since 
"only some of the adverbials in the third column (and none in the second) can be 
successfully used with the present tense itself." 
Occur with simple past but not Occur with either simple past Occur with perfect but not with 
with perfect or with perfect simple past 
long ago long since at present 
five years ago in the past up till now 
once (formerly) once (one time) so far 
the other day today as yet 
those days in my life during these last five years 
last night for three years herewith 
in 1900 recently lately 
at 3:00 just now since the war 
after the war often before now 




Table 3.1: McCoard's list of adverbials (1978: 135) 
For this reason, Dowty adopts the Extended-Now Theory: 
"This is the view that the perfect serves to locate an event within a period of time 
that began in the past and extends up to the present moment, while the simple past 
specifies that an event occurred at a past time that is separated from the present by 
some interval." (Dowty 1979: 341) 
Based on this theory, Dowty (1979: 342) defines the predicate of times11 
"PAST" in opposition to predicate of times "XN12" as follows: 
"PAST (/) is true at [w, /] iff there exists an interval i ' such that 
(the time denoted by) t < i ' < i 
" A sentence operator of time. 
12 McCoard's abbreviation for "Extended-Now" 
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XN (f) is true at [«',/] iff / is a final subinterval of the interval denoted by f" 
In Dowty's analysis, however, the relation between the XN interval in which an 
event occurs and the time of the event itself is not clear and may generate criticisms like 
those of Michaelis (1994) when analyzing the examples: 
(3.2) (a) 1 have willed my fortune to Greenpeace, 
(b) I willed my fortune to Greenpeace. 
She protests that there seems to be no reason to presume that (3.2a) expresses an 
event proposition which is true somewhere within an interval whose upper boundary is 
now, while (3.2b) does not. Michaelis (1994), in defense of her position, argues that 
adverbs denoting a general present-contiguous past interval cannot be used with (3.2a), 
fact that she interprets as evidence against the XN theory. In reality, it seems that 
Dowty's interpretation of the XN theory does not offer a way out of Michaelis' 
criticism, which will be analyzed in more details in chapter four. 
3.6 Declerck's Version of the XN Interpretation (1986) 
Since our main concern is the analysis of the present perfect, we will not develop 
Declerck's tense model in all its details, but just in the concepts that are directly or 
indirectly related to the present perfect. 
3.6.1 Preliminar}' Notions 
Before starting the argument proper it is important to make two remarks in 
connection with the model developed by Declerck (1986): 
[1] According to Declerck, the word "tense" is used with different meanings in the 
linguistic literature. Some linguists (e.g. Smith: 1978) hold that English has only two 
tenses, viz. the past tense and the present tense. Others distinguish a wider array of 
tenses, maximally including the present tense, the past tense, the future tense, the 
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present perfect, the past perfect, the future perfect, the conditional and the 
conditional perfect. Like Reichenbach (1947) and Comrie (1985). Declerck adopts the 
latter convention and points out two good reasons for this: 
"First of all, even if one assumes that a general theory of tense can distinguish only 
two tenses in English, one needs the eight above labels as names for different kinds 
of verb forms. (It would be rather inconvenient if we had only the label 'past tense' 
to refer to such different verb forms as came, had come, would come and would 
have come.) More importantly, however, it will be argued that the distinction of 
eight tenses in English is also warranted from a theoretical point of view, since each 
of them corresponds to a different temporal scheme. As noted above, Reichenbach 
defends this point of view, and Comrie also does, except for the fact that he 
(Comrie)13 assumes the same temporal scheme for the present perfect as for the past 
tense." (Declerck 1986: 317) 
[2] Declerck remarks that the temporal schemata that he proposes are those that hold for 
the tenses in English, adding: 
"It's not claimed that these schemata are universal. Although some of them (e.g. 
the scheme for the present tense) are no doubt also valid for many, if not all, 
languages, some schemata may have a less universal character, and at least one, viz. 
the scheme for the present perfect, appears to be very typical of English14. The 
basic temporal meaning of the English present perfect differs from that of its 
counterpart even in cognate languages like Dutch and German." (Declerck 1986: 
318) 
3.6.2 Basic Concepts 
Let us begin by concentrating on the notion of "reference point" as interpreted 
by Declerck (1986). Declerck points out that what is striking in Reichenbach (1947), 
13 This parenthesis was included by us. 
14 This bold print was inserted by us. 
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Comrie (1985), and many other treatments of tense (for example Dowty (1979)), is that 
this notion never receives an adequate technical definition. The idea is introduced in 
informal terms in the description of a particular tense (usually the past perfect) and it is 
apparently left to the reader to deduce a definition. From the examples and comments in 
Reichenbach (1947) and Comrie (1985), the reference point seems to be the time 
relative to which the situation (or the time of the situation) is located. In other words, a 
particular tense may locate the time of a situation as simultaneous with, prior to, or 
posterior to a particular time, which is the "time of reference" or "reference point". This 
means that the "time of reference" is "the time pointed from" rather than "the time 
pointed to". On the other hand, it is mostly pointed out that the time of reference can be 
established by a time adverbial and/or by a verb form in the context. In that sense the 
reference time is a "time pointed to". Declerck concludes: 
"So, the term 'reference time' will mean 'time referred from' in one context and 
'time referred to' in another. In order to avoid confusion, the unambiguous labels 
'time referred to' ( henceforth: TR ) and 'time of orientation' (henceforth: TO) will 
be adopted in this section. The latter term indicates the time to which a situation is 
related: whenever we use a tense to describe a situation, this situation is located 
relative to a TO. This clear distinction between the notions TR and TO does not 
mean that the two are mutually exclusive. In a sentence like When we left at five 
John had already left the time which serves as TO for the use of the past perfect is 
at the same time TR because it is referred to by the time adverbial at five." 
(Declerck 1986: 320) 
Apart from the notions TR and TO, Declerck (1986: 321) remarks that we also 
need TS and TU: 
TS = "time of the situation", i.e. for the time that the situation lasts (i.e. the portion of 
the time axis taken up by the situation). 
TU = "time of utterance" (i.e. the time of speech). 
8 0 
In Declerck's analysis, whereas TU is punctual (and is thus represented by a 
point, not by a longer section of the time line), the other times (TR, TO and TS) can in 
principle be points or longer timespans. The "time of utterance", in fact, takes some 
time on the time line, but this does not affect Declerck's system, since it is seen as a 
unit. 
3.6.3 The Past Perfect 
Given the above notions, let us examine now the somewhat complicated 
example proposed by Declerck (1986: 321): 
(3.3) John left at five o 'clock after the others had left at four. 
In this sentence two situations are referred to, and both are located precisely in 
time: the others left at four and John left at five. This means that TSi (the time taken 
up by the departure of the others) is located as simultaneous with TRi (four o'clock), 
while TS2 (the time taken up by John's departure) is located as simultaneous with TR2 
(five o'clock). Declerck (1986) adopts the convention of representing simultaneity 
between two times (X and Y) as in scheme 3.1, while anteriority as in scheme 3.2 and 
posteriority as in scheme 3.3. 
X 
X- Y Y- -X 
Y 
( X at Y) 
Scheme 3.1 
( X before Y) 
Scheme 3.2 
( X after Y) 
Scheme 3.3 
Using this convention, Declerck (1986) represents the temporal relation between 
TSi and TRi and that between TS2 and TR2 as in scheme 3.4. below: 
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TRi TR2 
TS I TS2 
Scheme 3.4 
Now, whenever a speaker refers to a time, he does so from a particular temporal 
point of view. That is, any TR is related to a TO in terms of simultaneity, anteriority or 
posteriority. In the sentence under discussion, both TRi and TR2 are thus related to a 
TO. The TO to which TRi is related is TRz; the TO to which TR2 is related is TU. This 
can be schematically represented as in scheme 3.5.: 
Scheme 3.5 
Declerck (1986: 322) points out that scheme 3.5 conveys the following 
information: 
[a] that both TRi and TR2 are located prior to a TO; 
[b] that the TO to which TRi is related is TR2; 
[c] that the TO to which'TR2 is related is TU. 
It is important to note that one and the same time can be the TR of one relation 
and the TO of another. To represent this, the symbols TR and TO are put in a single 
box. Boxed-in elements are thus taken to refer to the same time. 
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The information in scheme 3.5 can be combined with that provided in scheme 
3.4. The result is scheme 3.6, which is taken to represent the temporal relations 
expressed in the sentence under discussion: 
TSi TS2 
Scheme 3.6 
According to scheme 3.6, the configuration TSi at TRi (realized as the others 
had left at four) is represented as anterior to the configuration TS2 at TR2 (realized as 
John left at five), which is itself represented as anterior to TU. Scheme 3.6, therefore, 
adequately represents the idea that the past tense expresses past time, whereas the past 
perfect expresses past-in-the-past (i.e. what is past with respect to a past TO). 
According to Declerck (1986: 323), scheme 3.6 should still be improved. Since 
any time referred to is assumed to be related to some TO we must also indicate that TRi 
is the TO to which TSi is related and that TR2 is the TO to which TS2 is related. This 




According to Declerck, scheme 3.7 is fully satisfactory, as it makes clear that: 
[a] TU is the TO to which TR2 (at five) is related (i.e. at five denotes a time that lies in 
the past with respect to the moment of speech); 
[b] TS2 (John left) is located as simultaneous with TR2 (i.e. the situation is represented 
as happening at five). TR2 is thus the TO to which TS2 is related; 
[c] TR2 is also the TO to which TRi (at four) is related: TRi is represented as anterior to 
TR2; 
[d] TRi is the TO to which TSi (the others had left) is related: TSi is represented as 
simultaneous with (i.e. happening at) TRi. 
It seems curious, however, that Declerck refers to the relationship between a TS 
and its TR in the same terms as the relationship between a TR and another TR, because 
as claimed by Prior (1967: 15) apud McCoard: 
"...every event is simultaneous15 with some time; to happen means to become 
present at some time" (McCoard 1978: 92) 
This means, in our opinion, that unlike the relation between a TR and its TO, 
which can be of anteriority, simultaneity or posteriority, the relation between a TS and 
its TR (which Declerck (1986) also labels as "TO" ofthat TS) must be a relation of 
simultaneity. Otherwise, we would incur the same multiplicity of verb forms which 
Jespersen's and Reichenbach's systems are accused of. Moreover, it is our opinion that 
this distinction is fundamental to answer Michaelis' (1994) criticism of the XN theory 
(mentioned at the end of last section). We will return to this issue in chapter four. 
The relation "simultaneous with" which holds between a TS and its TO (TR), 
must not be assigned the strict definition according to which any point in TS must also 
15 This bold print was inserted by us. 
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be in TO and vice versa. Rather, "TS simul TO" means, according to Declerck (1986: 
326), that the two times coincide in one of the following ways: 
[a] both occupy the same point of the time line, as in: 
(3.4) At that moment a shot was fired; 
[b] both occupy (roughly) the same section of the time line as in: 
(3.5) 1 was in London yesterday; 
[c] the section occupied by TS is part of the section occupied by TO as in: 
(3.6) I left yesterday; 
[d] the section occupied by TO is part of the section occupied by TS as in: 
(3.7) I was at home at four o 'clock. 
In [d] TS extends beyond TO and there is nothing to prevent it from extending 
even to the present or into the future. The problem noted in connection with Comrie's 
system (viz. that it is not correct to state that the past tense represents TS as (wholly) 
anterior to TU) is thus obviated here: what lies wholly in the past is not TS itself but the 
TO to which it is related. This relationship is of such a kind that TS may continue well 
beyond TO and even include the present and part of the future. 
Let us continue the development of Declerck's (1986) tense model. In example 
(3.3) John left at five o'clock after the others had left at four, TRi and TR2 are 
established by the time adverbials at four and at five. Declerck (1986: 323), however, 
notes that a past perfect or a past tense can also be used without an accompanying 
adverbial of time, as in: 
(3.8) The others had left before John left. 
In that case TRi and TR2 are no longer established in the sentence itself. TR2 
will then have to be established by the context (i.e. the sentence requires a context 
referring to the past). TRi may then not be established at all, which means that there 
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may be no "time referred to" in the strict sense of the term. However, even in that case 
the use of the past perfect implies that TS, (the others had left) is located at some 
(unidentified) TO and that this TO is itself located anterior to the TO that is formed by 
TR2. Declerck, therefore concludes: 
"....if there is no adverbial establishing TRi we might wish to replace the label 'time 
referred to' by some other symbol denoting a time that is not identified in the 
discourse, but the whole of the scheme remains unaffected. (For ease of reference 
the label 'TR' will be used even if the time is not 'referred to' in the sense of 
'specified'.)" (Declerck 1986: 324) 
This is in accordance with the view argued in Katz that: 
"...a sentence does not temporally relate the things it is about to one another 
directly. Rather, it first relates them each to a fixed reference point and then relates 
them to one another indirectly by virtue of their relations to the reference point". 
(Katz 1972: 34) 
In fact, in Declerck's schemes, there is no direct temporal relation between 
different TSs. Each TS is located relative to a TO, and these are related to each other. 
Declerck claims that one of the major advantages of a scheme such as scheme 
3.7 is that it makes clear the different roles played by tenses and time adverbials. The 
tenses are used in defining where the situations and their respective TOs are located in 
relation to another TO (cf. Godoi: 1992); the time adverbials do not specify the times of 
the situations but establish the TOs relative to which the TSs are located. Declerck thus 
concludes: 
"...in The boys were at home at five o'clock the time adverbial at five o'clock 
specifies not the TS (i.e. the section of the time line occupied by the situation) but 
the TO relative to which the TS is located. (Note that in this case, TS may have a 
much longer duration than TO)." (Declerck 1986: 324) 
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This means that Declerck's analysis concurs with Reichenbach's claim that: 
"...when a time determination is added, such as is given by words like now or 
yesterday, or by a nonreflexive symbol like November 1, 1944, it is referred, not to 
the event, but to the reference point of the sentence. We say I met him yesterday, 
that the word yesterday refers here to the event obtains only because the points of 
reference and of event coincide". (Reichenbach 1947: 294) 
Klein (1992), however, claims that past-perfect sentences like (3.9a,b) below are 
ambiguous as to whether an adverbial expression modifies E or R. In (3.9a), according 
to Klein, at two describes R. In (3.9b), at two modifies E, while R is three o 'clock: 
(3.9) (a) [Yesterday, the mail arrived at two.] I had (already) left at two. 
(b) [Yesterday, the mail arrived at three.] I had left at two. 
To offer an answer to Klein's objection, we may argue, following Declerck 
(1986: 324), that if a time adverbial is used in a clause where the tense presupposes 
more than one TR, as the past perfect does (cf. scheme 3.7 repeated below), we can 
expect that the time adverbial can be interpreted as establishing any one of these TRs. 
Therefore in "/ had left at two" (Klein: 1992), at two can establish either TR2 (a time 
before which I had already left) or TRi (the time at which I had left). "Any time 
adverbial," remarks Declerck (1986: 328), "can always be applied to every TR in the 




Declerck admits, however, that apart from the so-called "time-when " adverbials, 
i.e. adverbials denoting the time at which a situation is said to hold true (e.g. yesterday, 
at 3 o 'clock, etc.): 
"...there also are adverbials referring to the beginning or/and end of a period (e.g. 
since 1970, from two o'clock until four, until now) and adverbials that denote 
nothing but duration (e.g. for two hours, all day long). It is necessary to examine 
whether these two types also fit into the system." (Declerck 1986: 357) 
According to Declerck, the purely "durational adverbs" define the duration of 
TS, not of TR, which goes against Reichenbach's (1947: 294) claim. In (3.10) I worked 
for two hours: 
"...the adverbial defines the duration of my working; the TR at which I worked is 
not identified, so its duration is not indicated either. The same is true in the perfect 
tenses, although there is often an implicature16 that the period indicated lasts up to 
the TO (so that the duration adverbial ultimately also indicates the time of the 
situation and the TR with which it is simultaneous)." (Declerck 1986: 357) 
Thus, (3.11)7 have lived in Paris for five years can be interpreted in two ways. 
The first reading, on which for five years expresses no more than duration (and therefore 
tells us nothing about TR), is that somewhere in the course of my life there has been a 
period of five years during which I lived in Paris. This interpretation can be enforced by 
the addition of a clause like but now I am living in London. The second reading is that 
for five years indicates a period that reaches up to now (cf. McCoard, 1978: 46; Dowty, 
1979: 343). This interpretation is brought to the fore when we use a progressive form 
(have been living) because the progressive refers to the middle of a situation, i.e. 
represents the situation as not yet completed at TO. There appears to be an implicature 
15 This bold print was inserted by us. 
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that the second reading will be the more prominent of the two if it is allowed by the 
context. 
When a durational adverbial is interpreted as indicating a period up to (and 
including) the TO, it serves the same function as adverbials of the type since 1956, from 
2 o'clock to 1, until World War II. Adverbials like these refer to at least one of the two 
boundaries (beginning and end) of a period, and may therefore be called "boundary 
adverbials". Although they would seem to indicate both time and duration, they are 
primarily time adverbials. Those that refer to both the beginning and ending-point of a 
period naturally also specify the duration of the timespan. Those that refer to the 
beginning only (e.g. since 1950, from then onwards) indirectly also do this, because 
they will normally be interpreted as indicating a TR that continues up to the TO. 
However, those that refer to the end only (e.g. until 1950) do not specify any duration 
(except if they collocate with a future tense, in which case TU is interpreted as 
indicating the beginning of the period). "Boundary adverbials" will therefore be taken to 
specify the TR at which the situation is located, not the time of the situation itself. This 
is in keeping with the fact that the TS need not be interpreted as covering exactly the 
same timespan as the period specified as TR. In (3.12a) I have met him once since 1950 
and (3.12b) I had met him once between 1940 and 1950, the duration of TS is much 
shorter than that of the period (TR) relative to which it is located. In such examples, the 
boundary adverbial behaves exactly like a "time-when" adverbial such as in 1950 or the 
day before. On the other hand, there does appear to be a conversational implicature 
seeing to it that, if the situation is a durative one, its duration will normally be 
interpreted as being the same as that indicated by the boundary adverbial. Thus, in 
(3.13a) I have lived in London since 1950, the normal interpretation is that the duration 
of the situation of my living in London is commensurate with the duration of the period 
denoted by since 1950 (and up to now). However, this interpretation merely results from 
an implicature and can therefore be ruled out by the context, as in (3.13b) I have lived in 
London since 1950, but only for a couple of years. Declerck's conclusion is that time 
adverbials of the boundary type serve the same function as time-when adverbials: they 
establish the TR relative to which TS is located as simultaneous. Remember that TR 
may be a point or a timespan and that "simultaneous with" allows for the possibility that 
TR and TS only partly overlap with each other. Purely durational adverbials, on the 
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other hand, refer to TS, not to TR. For this reason they can easily cooccur with time 
adverbials, as in (3.14) I worked (forj fourteen hours yesterday. It goes without saying 
that this is further evidence for the claim that, in the representations of the tenses, a 
distinction must be made between a TS and a TR relative to which the TS is located as 
simultaneous. A system like Comrie's, in which this distinction is not made, is clearly 
unsatisfactory. 
It is also important to note that Declerck (1986: 324) claims that the use of a 
tense relates to describing a situation and not to establishing a TR. Considering the 
example (3.15) John had already left when the others arrived, Declerck points out that 
we do not know when John left (or, more correctly, what is the time -"TO"- to which 
the time of the situation of John leaving is related). The past perfect of course implies 
that there is a TO, but it does not identify it. Time adverbials, on the other hand, do 
identify TOs. 
Before going on, it is good to bear in mind that Declerck remarks that the 
temporal schemata that he proposes are meant to account for the "basic temporal" uses 
of the tenses only. According to Declerck, the past perfect has several "nontemporal" or 
"special" uses. Let us consider the following examples: 
(3.16) (a) Bill had seen me before I saw him. 
(b) Bill saw me before I saw him. 
(c) Bill saw me before I had seen him. 
(In: Declerck 1986: 325) 
Declerck explains sentence (3.16a) as being an example of the "basic temporal" 
use of the past perfect: had seen refers to a situation that is represented as prior to the 
situation referred by saw. Sentence (3.16b) illustrates the fact that, when there is a 
clause introduced by before or after, the past perfect is often replaced by a past tense 
because the anteriority relation is already signaled by the conjunction. That is, the past 
tense in the head clause results from tense simplification and therefore represents a 
"special" use of the past tense. In (3.16c) it is the past perfect had seen that is not in 
keeping with the normal temporal meaning of the tense: here the past perfect refers to a 
situation that is not anterior to the one referred to by the past tense of the head clause. 
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Sentences of this type have been examined in Declerck (1979a), where it is argued that 
the past perfect is used as a modal form expressing "irrealis". The meaning of (3.16c) is 
something like "Bill saw me at a time when 1 had not yet seen him". The past perfect 
thus fails to represent the situation as factual, and we can easily find it in contexts that 
suggest that the situation did not hold at all (e.g. 3.17 1 concealed myself before Bill had 
seen me). In sum, (3.16b) and (3.16c) are instances of a "special temporal" use and a 
modal use of a tense respectively, and are therefore not counterexamples to the temporal 
scheme that has been proposed for the basic temporal use of the past perfect. 
3.6.4 The Simple Past 
If scheme 3.7 represents the structure of the past perfect, the structure of the past 
tense can be shown to be a subpart of this, as in scheme 3.8.: 
TS 
Scheme 3.8 
This representation of the past tense is in keeping with the view that the use of a 
past tense does not exclude the "situation referred to" from extending to the present or 
into the future (cf. McCoard, 1978: 45-51). Declerck thus concludes: 
uJohn was in London yesterday says nothing about whether John still is in London 
today nor about where he will be tomorrow." (Declerck 1986: 326) 
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Deelerck's representation accounts for this for it does not locate TS (the time 
that John is in London) as anterior to TU (and hence as lying wholly in the past). Rather, 
it represents TS as "simultaneous" with a past TO (established by yesterday). 
Declerck makes a further observation on the past tense. In some cases the past 
tense is accompanied by adverbials establishing more than one TR. Consider, for 
example, (3.18) I did it the day before yesterday. The representation of the temporal 
structure is shown in scheme 3.9: 
TS 
Scheme 3.9 
The TR2 which is located before TU is yesterday. TRi, which is located before 
TR2, is the day before yesterday. TS is located as simultaneous with TRi, not TR2. A 
similar example is (3.19) It happened a fortnight ago from yesterday, and we can even 
get instances with more times referred to, such as (3.20a) I did it the day before the last 
Sunday before Christmas. Scheme 3.9, however, would seem to be closer to the 
representation of the past perfect than to that of the past tense. Yet we normally say 
(3.21a) I did it the day before yesterday and not (3.21b) I had done it the before 
yesterday (unless we mean to locate the situation at a time prior to the day before 
yesterday). This means that, as far as the use of the tenses is concerned, complex 
adverbials that denote several times and state a temporal relation between them can 
establish only one TR. This principle has also been observed by Smith (1978: 48), who 
writes that "complex time adverbials are single units in temporal interpretation". So, an 
adverbial like the day before yesterday is felt to establish a single TR. If it is 
accompanied by a past tense, it establishes the one TR that is present in scheme 3.8 (i.e. 
the one which TS is simultaneous with). If it is accompanied by a past perfect, it can 
establish either of the TRs that occur in scheme 3.7. This accounts for the fact that 
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(3.22) 1 had left the day before yesterday can receive two interpretations: either the day 
before yesterday was the TO (= TR2) prior to which I had left, or it was the time at 
which I left (= TRi), as noted before in relation to Klein's objection. As a conclusion, 
Declerck (1986: 328) observes that: 
"...not all TRs and temporal relations expressed in a clause need be relevant to the 
selection of the tense of the clause. We can imagine complex adverbials like the 
day after the last Sunday before Easter. Even such an adverbial, which involves 
three TRs and two temporal relations, ultimately serves to specify a single TR. And 
this TR is the only one that is relevant to the selection of the tense of the 
accompanying verb." 
Declerck, however, points out one type of exception to this rule. It is possible, 
says Declerck (1986), that one of the TRs involved in the temporal relation expressed by 
the adverbial is not overtly indicated in the adverbial itself but must be identified from 
the context. Consider, for example, an adverbial like the day before. Whereas the day 
before yesterday ultimately does no more than establish a single TR, the day before 
establishes one TR and implies the existence of another. In the latter case the TR 
established by the adverbial (i.e. the TR with which TS is simultaneous) is only one of 
the two TRs involved. And since the relation between them is one of anteriority, the 
temporal scheme that is realized is that of the past perfect, not of the past, and we should 
therefore expect the day before to collocate with the former tense. Needless to say, this 
expectation is borne out, for we say (3.23) I had done it the day before rather than (3.24) 
I did it the day before. 
However, apart from the above kind of exception, it does appear to be the case 
that complex adverbials indicate only one TR relevant to the use of the tense. This is 
also clear from examples like (3.25) He was born at 7 o'clock on Christmas Day, 1977, 
where we have a complex adverbial of a different type. In this case the complex 
adverbial consists of several indications of time, which identify the same time (viz. the 
TR relative to which TS is located as simultaneous) with different degrees of 
preciseness. As far as the temporal relations are concerned that are relevant to the use of 
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the tenses, the different adverbials clearly establish a single TR (Smith (1978: 48) 
makes the same point). 
According to Declerck (1986: 329), the above discussion of the past perfect and 
the past tense has revealed a number of basic principles: 
[1] Irrespective of whether the tense is an "absolute" one (in Comrie's sense) or a 
"relative" one, TS is never directly related to TU. Rather, it stands in a relationship 
of simultaneity with a TO which may be referred to by an adverbial and which is 
itself related to a TO. The latter TO may be TU or may be related to TU via one or 
more further TOs. 
[2] Time adverbials of the boundary type serve the same function as time-when 
adverbials: they establish the TR relative to which TS is located as simultaneous. 
Durational adverbials, on the other hand, refer to TS, not to TR. 
[3] If the tense is such that several TRs are involved, the time adverbial can be 
interpreted as referring to any one of them. However, Declerck (1986: 356) notes an 
exception to this rule, which will be discussed in section 3.6.7.1. 
[4] As far as the use of the tenses is concerned, only one TR is established by two 
or more time adverbials in the same clause. 
3.6.5 The Simple Present 
On the basis of these principles Declerck represents the other tenses. In this 
dissertation we will follow Declerck's analysis of just one more tense, apart from the 
present perfect itself: the present tense, since the perfect is identified by Jespersen 
(1931: 47) as a "kind of present tense." The present tense, according to Declerck (1986: 










The present tense, in scheme 3.10, represents a situation as simultaneous with a 
TR which is itself simultaneous with TU. This is the case of the example offered by 
Declerck (1986: 330): 
(3.26) John is here today. 
The TR is indicated by today. As noted by Comrie (1985: 2, 36, 37), TU is by 
definition punctual (nondurative). TR, on the other hand, may be a longer timespan (e.g. 
today). This is in keeping with Declerck's definition of "simul": when we say that TR is 
simultaneous with TU, this does not mean that TR has to be punctual too. Similarly, the 
statement that TS is located as simultaneous with TR does not mean that the two must 
take up exactly the same portion of the time axis. The present tense in the example 
(3.26) John is here today does not exclude the possibility that John was here yesterday 
too, nor that he may remain here for some time in the future. That is, for the 
simultaneity relation to hold it is sufficient that one time partially overlaps the other. 
The above remarks, according to Declerck, make it clear that we need all three 
times (TU, TR and TS) in the description of the present tense. TR is necessary as an 
intermediary between TU and TS because it is the time indicated by today. Like other 
time adverbials that are "shifters" (Jakobson: 1957), such as yesterday and tomorrow, 
today locates a timespan relative to TU. And, as is the case in sentences with yesterday 
and tomorrow, TS is located relative to this timespan. Declerck's analysis of the present 
tense is, therefore, in keeping with the general principles that have been pointed out 
above. Moreover, it explains why the three times in question (TU, TR and TS) may be 
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different times in the sense that they may take up three different portions of the time 
axis. In the example (3.26) John is here today, TS (the time of John's being here) may 
be longer than TR (today), and this in its turn is longer than TU. 
3.6.6 The Present Perfect 
As noted before, in the opinion of Comrie (1981, 1985), the present perfect does 
not differ from the past tense in terms of time location: both tenses locate a situation as 
prior to the present moment. The difference between the two is rather one of aspect: the 
present perfect implies "current relevance", the past tense does not. This means that 
Comrie's analysis of the perfect runs counter to Reichenbach's. The latter holds that the 
perfect involves the present moment as reference point, whereas the reference point 
involved in the use of the past tense coincides with the time of the past situation. 
Declerck's theory (1986) will differ from Comrie's (1985) in that it does not 
consider the two tenses as locating situations in time in exactly the same way. As noted 
by Comrie himself (1985: 78-79), "adverbial indications of definite past time require the 
past tense". The present perfect, remarks Declerck: 
"...can cooccur with time adverbials only if the time of the situation is located 
relative to a time that extends from the past to the present. Thus, the present perfect 
can be used with such adverbials as lately, this afternoon, since 1960, etc. 
Adverbials like in the past, for some time, etc. are interpreted as denoting a period 
up to now when accompanied by a present perfect. An adverbial such as at some 
time can collocate with the perfect in the sense of 'at some time in a period up to 
now'. Even adverbials like at 2 o'clock are possible, but in that case too there is 
reference to a period extending to TU." (Declerck 1986: 346) 
As noted by Comrie (1985: 79), (3.27) I have arrived at two o'clock means 
"there has been at least one instance in my life when I arrived at two o'clock". All this 
suggests, according to Declerck, that the present perfect does not locate a situation in 
time in the same way as the past tense does. Whereas the past locates TS at a TR that 
9 6 
lies wholly before TU, the present perfect locates TS at a TR that reaches from the past 
up to TU. The relation between TR and TU is thus no longer of the type "X (wholly) 
before Y", but rather of the type "X before-and-up to Y". The latter relation can be 
represented as shown in scheme 3.11 below: 
X >Y 
Scheme 3.11 
The scheme of the present perfect then looks as is shown in scheme 3.12: 
TS 
Scheme 3.12 
It should be noted that this is different from what Declerck has observed in 
connection with the past tense, which leaves open the possibility that TS extends 
beyond TR and up to TU, but does express that TR is completely before TU. In scheme 
3.12 it is TR itself which extends up to TU. As for the TS that is located relative to it, it 
may also extend to the present (as in (3.28) 1 have lived here since 1950) or it may not 
do so (as in (3.29) I have seen him lately or I have been there twice). It is this difference 
between the present perfect and the past tense which accounts for the fact that, in the 
theory that holds that the only relevant distinction in tense is that between past and 
present, the present perfect counts as a present tense whereas the past tense self-
evidently does not. Thus, Banfield (1982: 265) notes that "in the case of the present 
perfect, despite the reference to a past time, the tense is present and retains a reference to 
the speaker and the moment of the utterance". 
This representation of the perfect seems to fit in nicely with the "extended now" 
analysis of the perfect advocated by McCoard (1978). It also concurs with an "indefinite 
past" analysis to the extent that it explains why the present perfect cannot be 
accompanied by adverbials referring to some "definite time" in the past: if the TR at 
which TS is located is identified as being such that TU is not part of it, then the 
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conditions for using the present perfect are not satisfied, since the present perfect 
requires that TR should include TU. On the other hand, the analysis seems to be able to 
account for the use of the perfect with adverbial indications of recent past such as just or 
this minute, since we can assume that the (very) recent past can be considered as part of 
the present in the extended sense (cf. Poutsma 1926: 263). Of course, the use of the 
perfect in such cases is highly conventionalized: British English uses the perfect with 
just and the past with the synonymous just now; American English uses the past tense in 
both cases (cf. McCoard 1978: 45). 
Declerck's analysis of the present perfect also accounts for the distribution of 
time adverbials over the past tense and the present perfect. Adverbials that establish a 
TR not including TU require the use of the past tense. Adverbials establishing a TR 
reaching up to (and including) TU trigger the use of the present perfect. According to 
Declerck (1986: 348), however, there are a couple of adverbials that deserve some 
special comment: 
[1] A question beginning with when must normally be in the past tense rather 
than in the present perfect. We say When did it happen? and not (3.30)*When has it 
happened? (except on a habitual interpretation). This is in keeping with Declerck's 
analysis. Nonhabitual when is always interpreted as referring to an interval of time that 
does not include TU. Otherwise we use since when (or for how long?). The use of the 
past tense with when and of the perfect with since when is thus predictable. 
[2] Comrie (1979: 30) notes that the use of long since (as in I have long since 
given up smoking) as a "potential counterexample" to the rule that time adverbials 
accompanying a present perfect cannot exclude TU from their reference. However, it 
does not seem that long since is an exception. Since refers to a period starting at a 
certain time in the past (contextually identified) and reaching up to some TO. This TO 
may be TU, in which case all conditions for using the present perfect are satisfied. The 
interpretation is that the time of my giving up smoking is located as simultaneous with 
this period. "Simultaneous with" will here receive the interpretation "at some time in 
the course of ' , which is one of its usual interpretations. The addition of long just means 
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that this unidentified time in the period indicated does not lie close to TU. This does not 
in any way interfere with the conditions for using the present perfect. 
[3] An adverbial like until now can be used both with the past tense - (3.31) / 
lived in the country until now - and with the present perfect - (3.32) I have lived in the 
country until now. This follows simply from the fact that until now can mean both "up 
to, but not including, TU" and "up to and including TU". As predicted by the theory, the 
past tense suggests that I have now stopped living in the country whereas the present 
perfect implies that I still do. 
In sum, the analysis advocated here claims that the difference between past and 
perfect lies basically in the different meanings of the "before" relation between TR and 
TU, and therefore in how they locate a situation in time. This runs counter to the view 
that the basic difference between the two tenses is one of aspect (viz. the absence or 
presence of an implication of current relevance). This is confirmed by the fact that 
current relevance can also be implied in sentences that make use of the past tense (cf. 
McCoard 1978: 56-60). 
The conclusion, then, is that, contrary to what is claimed by Comrie, the present 
perfect does differ from the past tense in the way it locates a situation in time. The past 
tense locates a situation relative to a TR which lies entirely in the past while the present 
perfect locates a situation relative to a TR which starts in the past and reaches up to TU. 
3.6.7 Refinements to the Schemata Presented 
It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of "before" relation: "wholly before" 
and "before and up to". The question that now arises is whether the same two 
possibilities do not show up in other tenses involving a "before" relation. Declerck 
(1986: 351) provides the following example: 
(3.33) When I visited John, he had been ill for three weeks. 
9 9 
In Comrie's system, according to Declerck, the past perfect involves the relation 
"E before R", and "before" is defined exclusively in terms of "wholly before". It is now 
clear that such an analysis is defective. An adequate theory must start from the 
observations that "before" generally allows the two interpretations and that both can be 
expressed by the past perfect, and that the two are distributed over two different tenses 
(past and present perfect) when the relevant TO is the time of utterance. 
This means that suitable symbols will have to be introduced in order to capture 
the different meanings of "before". Declerck (1986: 351) proposes that we should use 
the notation in scheme 3.13(a) to represent "wholly before" and that in scheme 3.13(b) 
to represent "before and up to". The notation shown in scheme 3.13(c) can then be used 
to cover the two possibilities at once, i.e. 3.13(c) shows a "before" relation that can be 
interpreted in both ways: 
(a) TR TO 
(b) TR »TO 
(c) TR TO 
Scheme 3.13 
The scheme of the past tense (scheme 3.8), therefore, must be adapted: the 
relation between TR and TU must be as shown in scheme 3.13(a). Since the scheme of 
the past tense forms part of the representations of the past perfect, this scheme will also 
have to be adapted in such a way that the relation between the relevant TR and TU is in 
terms of "wholly before". Instead of schemes 3.8 and 3.7 we must now have schemes 
3.14 and 3.15: 
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Declerck remarks that the observation that the relation "TR before TO" may 
have two different meanings naturally makes one wonder if the same could also be true 
of the relation "TR after TO". Comrie (1985: 123) again appears to deny this. He claims 
that "X after Y" means that each time point within X is to the right of each time point in 
Y. We may wonder, however, if there is not a second interpretation, in which "after Y" 
means "from Y onwards". This reading would be the exact counterpart of the 
interpretation in which "before Y" means "before and up to Y". But this is a question 
that Declerck (1986) leaves for future investigation. 
3.6.7.1 Exception 
Now that it has been pointed out that "TR before TO" must mean "TR before 
and including TO" with the present perfect, we can return to a remark made earlier in 
this chapter. When summing up the characteristics of the scheme assigned to the past 
perfect, Declerck (1986: 329) made the generalization (number 3 in our list) that in the 
scheme of any tense any one of the TRs can be taken to be referred to by the time 
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adverbial used in the sentence. Now we are in a position to note that there is an 
exception to this rule. The exceptional case is exemplified by sentences like the 
following: 
(3.34) (a) When I came back, Mary had written me two letters. 
(b) The cathedral restoration fund has today collected fifty thousand pounds. 
(c) When you reach the capital you will already have lost many of your men. 
In none of these sentences can the time adverbial be taken to refer to TRi (i.e. to 
the TR relative to which the TS is located). The adverbial clearly refers to TR2 (the time 
prior to which TRi is located). In each case the relevant "before" relation is one of 
"before and including", so that the time adverbial actually refers to the (perhaps 
provisional) ending-point of a period. The reason why it is impossible to interpret the 
time adverbial as referring to TRi (i.e. as referring to the whole of the period lasting up 
to TR2) is that this interpretation is incompatible with the kind of situation that is 
referred to. Situations like writing letters, collecting money or losing men are 
"cumulative", i.e. they are such that an increasing number of the entities that make up 
the set referred to by the object NP get involved in the situation as the latter proceeds in 
time (see Declerck: 1979b). Specification of that number, observes Declerck: 
"...is of course only possible if the situation is considered to have reached a terminal 
point. When we say that we have collected 50,000 pounds, this can only mean that 
this is the sum that we have collected up to a certain (provisional or definitive) 
ending-point. Since a sentence referring to such a measured cumulative situation 
thus requires (explicit or implicit) reference to the terminal point of a period, a 
time adverbial occurring in it can easily be taken to establish that ending-
point17."(Declerck 1986: 356) 
15 This bold print was inserted by us. 
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3.6.8 The Present Perfect Compared with the Simple Past 
Declerck's (1986) tense model shows that the difference between the present 
perfect and the simple past is the TR. While in the former the TR extends up to the TU, 
involving it, in the latter the TR is located "wholly before" the TU. Its semantic frame, 
in our opinion, justifies the use of the present perfect in "hot news" (McCawley: 1971) 
or in other situations closely related to the moment of speech. In this way, we may 
conclude with Declerck (1986) that the present perfect: 
"...obviously, cannot locate a situation in time in the same way as the past tense 
does. Comrie's (1985) claim that both tenses do not differ in the way they locate a 
situation in time, since they both locate it before the present moment, is thus 
incorrect."(Declerck 1986: 311) 
Declerck's theory of tense, therefore, assigns to the present perfect an analysis 
which does not coincide with that of the past tense. However, if we think of the various 
readings of the present perfect as proposed by McCawley (1971) and the ambiguity of 
the present perfect with durational adverbs, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 
4, it seems that the analysis proposed by Declerck (1986) fails to account for them. In 
our opinion, therefore, Declerck (1986) did not rule out the possibility of categorizing 
the present perfect as a tense which at the same time marks aspect, in Comrie's (1976) 
sense of the term18 (cf. Dowty 1979: 340). 
18 "Aspects are different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation" (Comrie 
1976:3) 
CHAPTER 4 
A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT PERFECT 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two aims: firstly, to suggest an answer to the question posed by 
Heny (1982), in response to Richards (1982), as to whether there are two semantically 
distinct frames of the present perfect with "durational phrases"19; secondly, to propose a 





We begin by analyzing two different points of view, those of Mittwoch (1988) 
and Michaelis (1994). Mittwoch proposes a solution for the ambiguity of the present 
perfect based on formal semantics, while Michaelis tries to explain the different 
meanings of the present perfect by utilizing discourse-pragmatic principles. After 
pointing out some limitations of both explanations, we start to construct a new semantic 
framework. To do so, Zeno Vendler's (1967) aspectual classes of verbs are modified 
according to Godoi (1992), whose concept of aspect is introduced then in contrast to 
Comrie's (1976). Based on these concepts, and couched in Declerck's temporal 
schemata, as developed in chapter 3, we then propose a semantic analysis of the main 
meanings of the present perfect. 
19 "Durational phrases" in this dissertation is understood as "durational adverbs". 
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4.2 The Ambiguity of the English Present Perfect 
4.2.1 Mittwoch (1988) 
Mittwoch (1988) addresses a number of interlocking problems concerning 
20 
English aspect (understood as Comrie's definition of aspect ). Her starting point is a 
question reopened by Heny (1982) in response to Richards (1982): do perfect sentences 
with durational phrases have two distinct readings, depending on different scope 
relations of the perfect and adverbial operators? More generally, are there two 
semantically distinct uses of the perfect? In section 1 of her article, Mittwoch argues for 
an affirmative answer to these questions. 
In order to discuss the perfect with durational phrases, Mittwoch adopts, like 
Richards and Heny (1982), the Extended-Now (XN) theory of the perfect (cf. McCoard: 
1978). This theory states that the perfect serves to locate some event within an interval 
stretching back in time from a given reference time, as discussed in the preceding 
chapters; for a (non-embedded) present tense sentence the reference time is the time of 
utterance. Considering the following sentence: 
(4.1) Sam has been in Boston for 20 minutes. (Richards: 75, Heny: 138) 
Mittwoch observes that it can mean that there has been a twenty-minute period 
in the relevant XN interval during which Sam was in Boston. It can also be used, more 
naturally in fact, to imply that the twenty-minute period extends up to the moment of 
utterance, with the further implication that Sam is still in Boston. In that case the 
twenty-minute period is in fact coextensive with the XN interval implied by the perfect. 
According to Mittwoch, such an interpretation is made explicit by the addition of the 
last: 
(4.2) Sam has been in Boston for the last 20 minutes. 
18 "Aspects are different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation" (Comrie 
1976:3) 
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The problem is whether the second use represents a logically distinct reading of 
(1) or whether (1) has only the first reading, the second being merely compatible with 
this reading, a limiting case of it, that may in certain contexts be inferred by general 
conversational principles. 
Mittwoch points out that Dowty (1979), Bennett and Partee (1972) and Richards 
(1982) opt for the view that (4.1) is genuinely ambiguous and account for this ambiguity 
by means of the relative scope of the perfect operator have and the durational adverbial 
for 20 minutes. In the first reading have has wider scope than the adverbial, in the 
second it is within the scope of the adverbial: 
(4.3) Pres (w,i) [Have [For 20 minutes (Sam be in Boston)]] 
(4.4) Pres (w,i) [For 20 minutes [Have (Sam be in Boston)]] 
Declerck (1986), analyzing sentences like (4.1), as noted in the last chapter, 
proposes that durational adverbs define the duration of TS (time of the situation). The 
TR (time of reference) at which the TS happens is not identified, so its duration is not 
indicated either. In the present perfect, however, there is often an implicature that the 
durational adverbial also indicates the TR, so that the period indicated lasts up to the 
TU (time of utterance), since the TR of the present perfect extends up to the moment of 
speech. Thus, (4.1) Sam has been in Boston for 20 minutes (Richards: 75, Heny: 138) 
can be interpreted in two ways. The first reading, on which for 20 minutes expresses no 
more than duration (and therefore tells us nothing about TR), is that somewhere in the 
course of Sam's life there has been a period of 20 minutes during which he was in 
Boston. The second reading is that for 20 minutes indicates not only that the event lasted 
20 minutes, but also that these 20 minutes refer to a period that reaches up to now. 
According to Declerck, the second reading will be the most prominent of the two if it is 
allowed by the context. 
Neither Mittwoch's interpretation nor Declerck's seem to tell the whole story, 
however. It is somewhat curious to realize that (4.5) Sam has lived here, with adverbial 
supplements, yields to the possibility of the two readings commented above, while (4.6) 
Sam has been fired does not allow a second reading. It indicates, in our opinion, that 
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there are more elements involved in the possibility of an ambiguous interpretation of the 
present perfect with durational adverbs than those represented in Mittwoch's solution as 
well as in Declerck's. We will return to this issue in section 4.4.1. 
4.2.2 Michaelis (1994) 
Michaelis (1994) follows, unlike Mittwoch, a discourse-pragmatic tradition in 
the analysis of the ambiguity of the present perfect. In her article she examines the 
primary readings of the English present perfect as distinguished by McCawley (1971). 
She exemplifies and paraphrases them in (1): 
(4.7) (a) We've been sitting in traffic for an hour, (universal/continuative) 
A state obtains throughout an interval whose upper boundary is 
speech time. 
(b) We've had this argument before, (existential/experiential) 
One or more events of a given type are arrayed within a present 
inclusive time span. 
(c) The persons responsible have been fired, (resultative) 
The result of a past event obtains now. 
In her analysis Michaelis rejects the compositional semantic account offered by 
Klein (1992) in which the meanings of past, present, and future perfects are reducible to 
the semantic contribution of the particular auxiliary tense and the anteriority relation 
expressed by the participle. Following Richards (1982:101) she argues that certain 
grammatical characteristics of the present perfect cannot be componentially explained 
from a semantic point of view. One such characteristic is the "constraint barring definite 
time adverbs" (cf. Michaelis 1994:113), exemplified in (4.8a): 
(4.8) (a) Harry has joined the navy (*in 1960). 
(b) [It was 1972.] Harry had joined the navy in 1960. 
She argues that if there was an anteriority relation expressed by the participle, 
then the "definite" time adverbial "in 1960" should be acceptable. To support this 
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observation, Michaelis compares sentence (4.8a) with sentence (4.8b) and points out 
that the constraint barring "definite'' time adverbs does not characterize the past perfect, 
so why should it characterize the present perfect? She argues as if the past perfect and 
the present perfect, just by the fact of being perfect tenses, were perfectly parallel in 
their semantic structure, which is not the case, as we saw in chapter 3. 
To explain the difference between (4.8a) and (4.8b), Michaelis also rejects 
Binnick's explanation: 
"...since the reference time of the present perfect is the present, and since 
reference time is the time of adverbial reference, the past time reference 
supplied by the temporal adverbial in I960 is excluded, because this adverbial 
does not describe R." (Binnick 1991: 52) 
According to Michaelis, Klein's analysis of the past perfect undermines the 
foundation of this argument, by demonstrating that reference time cannot be regarded as 
the sole time of adverbial reference for the perfect. Klein, as discussed in chapter 3, 
observes that past-perfect sentences like (4.9a,b) below are ambiguous as to whether an 
adverbial expression modifies E or R. According to Klein, in (4.9a), at two describes R, 
and in (4.9b) at two modifies E, while R is three o'clock: "Why then should the 
formally parallel present perfect forbid modification of E, asks Michaelis?" (Michaelis 
1994:114) 
(4.9) (a) [Yesterday, the mail arrived at two.] I had (already) left at two. 
(b) [Yesterday, the mail arrived at three.] I had left at two. 
However, Michaelis does not take into consideration the fact that the past perfect 
generates two times of reference, as explained in the last chapter. Since the adverbials 
apply to any time of reference of the sentence (cf. Declerck 1986: 329), the ambiguity 
referred to can be predicted. In the case of the present perfect, there is only one time of 
reference, which includes the time of utterance (cf. Declerck 1986: 347), not allowing 
the type of ambiguity discussed by Klein (1992). Observe that the adverbials in Klein's 
examples are not durational, and therefore refer to TR (cf. Declerck 1986: 358). If we 
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restate Binnick's argument (1991) considering the time of reference as a period of time 
and not a point, as discussed in chapter 3, it seems that it accounts perfectly well for 
Michaelis' "constraint barring definite time adverbs": 
"...since the reference time of the present perfect includes the present, and 
since time-when adverbials refer to TR (cf. Declerck, 1986: 358), the past 
time reference supplied by the temporal adverbial in 1960 is excluded, 
because this adverbial does not include present time." 
Michaelis also rejects Richards' "extended now" view of the present perfect. 
According to her, the truth-condition definition of the present perfect given by him21 
22 
while a useful point of departure, is inadequate. She argues that definitions of past and 
present perfect do not capture the meaning difference seen in contrasting pairs like the 
one below: 
(4.10) (a) I have willed my fortune to Greenpeace. 
(b) I willed my fortune to Greenpeace. 
Michaelis says that: 
"There seems to be no reason to presume that (4.10a) expresses an event 
proposition which is true somewhere within an interval whose upper 
boundary is now, while (4.10b) does not....Richards' definition of the present 
perfect does not capture the fact that sentences like (4.10a) are interpreted in a 
way that makes them synonymous23 with sentences like (4.10b): a single 
event occurred at some point prior to now." (Michaelis 1994: 112) 
2' Have (A) is true in M relative to (w,i) iff there is a subinterval j of i such that A is true in M relative to 
( w j ) (Richards: 1982) 
22 Past (A) is true relative to i iff there is an interval j earlier than i such that A is true relative to j . 
(Richards: 1982) 
15 This bold print was inserted by us. 
109 
Michaelis' remarks, however, do not seem to be in keeping with the fact that the 
two tenses (present perfect and past tense) collocate with different kinds of time 
adverbials and thus cannot be seen as "synonymous": 
(4.11) (a) I have now willed my fortune to Greenpeace. 
(b) *I willed my fortune to Greenpeace now. 
(4.12) (a) *1 have willed my fortune to Greenpeace in J 994. 
(b) I willed my fortune to Greenpeace in 1994. 
Moreover, her observations certainly do not prove that analyzing the perfect as 
representing a situation within a time of reference which extends up to a point of 
orientation (which is the point of speech) is wrong. In other words, there is no evidence 
whatever for the claim that the point of speech cannot act as a point of orientation for an 
extended time of reference. As regards this, we might as well subscribe to 
Reichenbach's principle that every tense involves a point of reference and to Prior's 
(1967) claim that the primary reference point is the point of speech. And if we subscribe 
to these views, the conclusion must be that the simple past and the present perfect do 
differ in the way they locate a situation in time (since the reference time for the past 
tense is certainly located wholly before the point of speech). 
Let us comment on two observations to support this conclusion. First, when 
Declerck discusses example (4.13) below: 
(4.13) I know what Tom is like. I (*have) spent my holidays with him two years ago. 
he notices that: 
"...even though there is no doubt that there is current relevance here if I know what 
Tom is like it is because I spent my holidays with him. We have to use the past 
tense apparently because the situation is located at a time which wholly precedes 
the present. Note that the perfect would have to be utilized if we used for the last 
two years instead of two years ago. This means that the primary factor determining 
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the use of the perfect and the past is the way in which the situation is located in 
time." (Declerck 1986: 311) 
Second, if we observe, following Declerck (1986: 311) that the past reference 
point necessary to account for the past perfect can be established by the past tense, but 
not by the present perfect as in: 
(4.14) 1 had left before Tom (*has) arrived. 
our conclusion must be that the present perfect cannot locate a situation in time in the 
same way eis the past tense does. This leads us to reject Michaelis' claim (1994: 112) 
that in sentences (6a) and (6b) the simple past and the present perfect are 
"synonymous." 
Once we have verified that Binnick's argument (1991) seems to be valid with 
certain adaptations and that the simple past differs from the present perfect in terms of 
locating a situation in time, Michaelis' conclusion that: 
"...the present perfect form is polysemous in much that same way that 
words may be polysemous: a single form has several related meanings." 
(Michaelis 1994: 113) 
seems very suspicious because it does not account for the fact that the "continuative" 
reading of the present perfect can be interpreted as perfective or imperfective (cf. 
Mittwoch: 1988), while the other two readings, "experiential" and "resultative" cannot. 
Since we argued for a semantic structure differentiating the present perfect from other 
tenses, it is possible that the ambiguity of the "continuative" reading is a result of an 
interaction of this structure with another element of the sentence. We will return to this 
matter later on in this chapter. 
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4.3 Building a New Semantic Framework 
4.3.1 Comrie (1976) 
Comrie (1976) discusses the term "aspect" and the concepts related to this 
category. He presents short descriptions of some approaches, exemplifying the concepts 
through data gathered from a large number of languages. As a general definition of 
aspect, Comrie (1976:3) takes the formulation that "aspects are different ways of 
viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation". From this definition, Comrie 
defines perfective and imperfective aspects: 
"...perfectivity indicates the view of a situation as a single whole24, without 
distinction of the various separate phases that make up that situation; while the 
imperfective pays essential attention to the internal structure of the situation." 
(Comrie 1976: 16) 
The notion of a single whole to describe the perfective aspect was criticized by 
Dahl (1985: 73-9) who observes that this characteristic does not fit completely even to 
those languages in which the notion of "whole" as opposed to "phases" comes close to 
the description of the opposition between perfectivity and imperfectivity. Unfortunately, 
though, he does not go further into the issue and in the end also adopts the notion of a 
"global view" to define perfectivity. 
Godoi (1992: 174) criticizes the above concept of "global view" to describe 
perfectivity. She points out that this notion does not explain sentences which express 
the beginning of a situation located in the past such as: 
(4.15)0 nenê dormiu e aí conseguimos descansar um pouco. (Godoi 1992: 174) 
Sentences intuitively felt as perfective such as (4.16) below would also remain 
unaccounted for since the concept of "globality" as proposed by Comrie cannot apply to 
them: 
15 This bold print was inserted by us. 
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(4.16) Ele falou comigo várias vezes. (Godoi 1992: 174) 
As far as the present perfect is concerned, as already discussed in chapter 3, 
Comrie classifies it as an aspect of the past tense, which Declerck (1986) rejects 
vehemently, proving that the present perfect actually locates a situation in time 
differently from the past tense. 
4.3.2 Vendler (1967) 
According to Vendler, considerations involving the concept of time are not 
limited merely to the 
"...obvious discrimination between past, present, and future; there is another, a 
more subtle dependence on that concept: the use of a verb may also suggest the 
particular way in which that verb presupposes and involves the notion of time." 
(Vendler 1967: 97) 
This "particular way" is identified by Vendler in the form of four "verbal 
categories" based on their cooccurrence and/or entailment features with other verbs, 
tenses and time adverbials. The four categories are: 
[1] States ("know", "have", "love"): last for a period of time; involve time instants 
in an indefinite and nonunique sense. 
[2] Achievements ("die", "discover", "reach the mountain top"): occur at a single 
moment; involve unique and definite time instants. 
[3] Accomplishments ("kill a rat", "write a letter", "eat an apple"): imply the notion 
of unique and definite time periods. According to Kenny (1963), the meaning of an 
Accomplishment invariably involves the coming about of a particular state of 
affairs. 
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[4] Activities ("walk", "ride a bicycle", "push a cart"): call for periods of time that 
are not unique or definite. They involve homogeneous action. 
These categorial memberships of different verbs are determined according to 
certain tests. For example, Vendler proposes the following test to distinguish 
Accomplishments from Activities: 
" If it is true that someone is running or pushing a cart now, then even if he stops in 
the next moment it will be still true that he did run or did push a cart. On the other 
hand, even if it is true that someone is drawing a circle or is running a mile now, if 
he stops in the next moment it may not be true that he did draw a circle or did run a 
mile." (Vendler 1967:100) 
In other words, draw a circle counts as an Accomplishment because (4.17) John 
was drawing a circle does not entail (4.18) John drew a circle. While push a cart cotants 
as an Activity because John was pushing a cart does seem to entail John pushed a cart. 
This test, however, contradicts Kenny's (1963) assumption that the meaning of an 
Accomplishment invariably involves the coming about of a particular state of affairs, 
since this entailment fails when the Accomplishment appears in a progressive tense. 
This is what Dowty (1979) calls the "imperfective paradox". This is a problem that must 
be solved if one wishes to take the aspectual classes seriously as part of the meaning of 
a sentence (cf. Godoi 1992). 
Furthermore, Dowty (1979: 60) notices that an Activity verb describing 
movement behaves like an Accomplishment verb if it occurs with either a locative of 
destination or with an adverb of extent as in: 
(4.19) (a) John walked (a mile). 
(b) John walked (to the park). 
Even when a locative or extent phrase is not present, remarks Dowty, it is 
possible to assign an Accomplishment reading to an Activity verb in the proper context: 
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"Thus if I know (and the addressee knows) that John is in the habit of swimming a 
specific distance every day (to prepare himself for a swimming race perhaps), then 1 
can assert that today John swam in an hour, or that he finished swimming early, or 
that on Tuesday he stopped, but did not finish swimming." (Dowty 1979: 61) 
It is also interesting to note that the sentences proposed to exemplify 
Accomplishments and Achievements are always couched in the past as if the tense itself 
were part of their meanings: 
Vendler (1967:106): 
Accomplishments: 
A was drawing a circle at t means that t is on the time stretch in which A drew that 
circle. 
Achievements: 
A won a race between ti to t2 means that the time instant at which A won that race is 
between ti and t2. 
Dowty (1979: 56, 58): 
Accomplishments: 
(4.20) John painted a picture in an hour. 
Achievements: 
(4.21 ) John noticed the painting in a few minutes. 
Thus a question about Vendler's (1967) categories is: what are they categories 
of? Are they categories of tenses, verbs, verb phrases or sentences? 
Finally, Vendler (1967:104) proposes a test to distinguish States and 
Achievements from the other two categories. States and Achievements, according to 
him, cannot occur in the progressive, but Activities and Accomplishments can, as 
exemplified below: 
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(4.22) a.*John is knowing the answer -State 
b *John is reaching the top -Achievement 
This test, however, is problematic in Portuguese since "Stative" verbs are 
perfectly acceptable in the progressive form: 
(4.23) Carlos está sabendo a resposta - State 
Sílvia está querendo tomar sorvete - State 
Unless we consider "sabendo" and "querendo" as non-statives, which aggravates 
the problem of the instability of the aspectual classes of verbs, already noted by Vendler 
(1967:118,120). 
4.3.3 Shi (1990) 
Shi (1990) proposes, following Smith (1985), that States and Actions are two 
verbal types encoding two primitive situation types State and Action. If a verb can occur 
in the progressive it is an Action; otherwise it is a State. Accomplishment and 
Achievement encompass both State and Action, in that they both describe some 
causative Action of an agent and resultative change of state in the patient. 
Accomplishment and Achievement differ in that with the former, the direct object 
undergoes a change of state while it is the subject that changes state with the latter. 
With this new classification, Dowty's "imperfective paradox" persists, unless the 
progressive form of a verb is considered responsible for a change from Accomplishment 
to Achievement. But Dowty remarks: 
"....I know of absolutely no evidence from English syntax that the progressive tense 
in Accomplishments such as John was drawing a circle is a different tense operator 
from the progressive in Activities such as in John was pushing a cart." (Dowty 
1979:134) 
The problem with the progressive test to differentiate States from Activities also 
remains unsolved for languages like Portuguese and, like the examples of 
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Accomplishments and Achievements provided by Vendler (1967) and Dowty (1979). 
the examples given by Shi (1990) for these two categories are also in the past, thus 
suggesting that these two categories are firmly linked with the past tense: 
(4.24) (a) Accomplishment: John killed a horse in an hour. 
(b) Achievement: John reached the mountain top at 3 o 'clock. 
Another issue discussed by Shi is the concept of "boundness". Boundness is 
considered by Shi as an inherent aspectual property of sentences. Following Dahl 
(1985), Shi defines boundness thus: 
"A class of situations or a characterization of a situation, i.e. a sentence25, is 
bounded if and only if it is an essential condition on the members of the class or an 
essential part of the characterization that a certain limit is attained." (Shi 1990: 59) 
Follows from this definition that the fact that Accomplishments and 
Achievements can occur with "for an hour" when their NP arguments are unbounded is 
not because unbounded NP arguments of Accomplishments and Achievements 
change the inherent aspectual properties of these "verbs", as has been suggested by 
some researchers (e.g. Verkuyl: 1972; Dowty: 1979 and Smith: 1985), but because 
when the NP arguments of these verbs are unbounded, the whole sentence becomes 
unbounded, hence their cooccurrence capability with "for an hour" but not with "in an 
hour". For sentences whose main verbs are Accomplishments, boundness is achieved if 
the direct object of the verb is bounded. In the case of Achievements, the sentences are 
bounded if the subject of the verb is bounded. 
In relation to the definition of aspect, Shi maintains Comrie's definition of: 
"different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation" (Comrie 
1976: 3) and, following Dowty (1979) and Johnson (1981), analyzes aspect in terms of 
two components: "aspectual class" and "aspectual forms". Aspectual class refers to the 
boundness of sentences and aspectual forms, i.e. the aspectual particles of inflections in 
15 This bold print was inserted by us. 
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a language, serve to indicate from which point on the time axis a particular situation is 
referred to. Based on these definitions, Shi observes that: 
"...perfectivity simply refers to bounded situations viewed as relatively anterior to 
the reference point on the time axis, i.e. the Reference Time. If, however, the 
terminal boundary of a situation is not available, as in the case of an unbounded 
situation, then the anteriority viewpoint refers to the initial boundary of the 
situation." (Shi 1990: 62) 
Shi's analysis, in our opinion, is very relevant in the sense that it alleviates the 
semantic burden of the verb or verb phrases, placing it on the sentence, and offers a 
definition of aspect, at least partly related to the notion of boundness. 
43.4 Hatav (1989) 
Hatav (1989) deals with the definition of sequential clauses, with particular 
attention to Stativities. She proposes a semantic theory, centered on the notion of end 
points: 
"Situations have end points iff they are contained in their reference time, and only 
such situations can appear on the time line. Events are always contained in their R-
time and hence are always candidates for the time line, but States are contained in it 
only when: 
[a] they are interpreted as inchoatives 
[b] their duration is restricted by overt linguistic marking, for example, 
adverbials such as 'for three hours'. 
When States are contained in their reference time, that is, have end points, they too 
may appear in sequence." (Hatav 1989: 487) 
According to Hatav, therefore, a sequence relation holds between a, b, and c iff 
the first point of b's R-time is located after the final point of a's, and, in turn, the first 
point of c's R-time is located after the final point of b's R-time. The situations 
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composing the sequence are necessarily included in their (separate) R-times, which 
means that they may not continue beyond their respective R-times. In other words, the 
duration of the situation must be restricted in order to be contained in its R-time. Hatav 
labels such situations as having the EP property, which is defined below: 
"A situation 5 has EPs iff all subintervals of S are included in its reference time R. 
EPs = the first and last time units t at which S is true."(Hatav 1989: 493) 
The sentences below exemplify the occurrence of "situations" (understood as 
Statives or Activities) in sequence and thus included in their reference time: 
(4.25) He lived in Moscow for three years and moved to Leningrad. (Forsyth 1970: 12) 
(4.26) He was in hospital for six months, then returned to the front and fought till the 
end of the war. (Forsyth 1970: 63) 
(4.27) After sleeping the whole morning, Ana Célia joggedfor half an hour and took a 
refreshing shower. 
According to Hatav, Hinrichs (1982) and Partee (1984) cannot account for the 
States (and the Activities) in sequence on the time line because they argue that States 
and Activities always contain their R-time. However, Hatav claims that: 
"States and Activities do not always contain their R-time. In fact they can bear three 
different kinds of relations to their R-time. They can contain it, be contained in it, 
or coincide with it (as having exactly the same interval)." (Hatav 1989: 494) 
She illustrates as follows: 
(4.28) S contains R: 
A: Why didn 't you come to my party yesterday? 
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B: I was sick yesterday; you know I have been sick for the last three weeks, and. 
unfortunately, 1 have not recovered yet. 
(4.29) S is contained by R: 
I was sick yesterday, but my friend came and gave me a pill, and by midday I was 
feeling well. 
(4.30) S coincides with R: 
J was sick yesterday, all day long, but after a good night's sleep 1 got up in the morning 
feeling better than ever. 
Having defined the EP property, Hatav, observes that Accomplishments and 
Achievements are always contained in their R-time, while States and Activities may 
also contain theirs. This difference, she argues, is due to the fact that Accomplishments 
and Achievements are restricted, by definition, to one single interval, while for States 
(and Activities) the number of intervals is not limited. 
4.3.5 Godoi (1992) 
4.3.5.1 Aspect 
As opposed to Comrie who sees aspect as "not concerned with relating the time 
of the situation to any other time-point, but rather with the internal temporal 
constituency of the one situation" (Comrie; 1976: 5), Godoi (1992) defines it as "the 
relation between the time of reference (understood as a period) and the time of the 
situation (i.e. the time that the event takes up on the time axis)". This relation 
presents two possibilities: 
"[a] o tempo de referência inclui o tempo de evento e a situação terá as 
'pontas', será 'fechada'; 
[b] o tempo de evento inclui o tempo de referência e a situação não terá 
'pontas', será 'aberta'." (Godoi 1992: 208) 
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Based on this definition of aspect, which uses the EP properly as defined by 
Hatav (1989). Godoi (1992: 209) distinguishes two types of aspect: 
[1] Perfective aspect: 
[1.1] TS c TR 
[1.2] TS e TR (inclusão imprópria) 
[2] Imperfective aspect: 
[2.1] TR c TS 
[2.2] TR £ TS (inclusão imprópria) 
According to Godoi, cases [1.1], [1.2] and [2.2] will have end points. In case 
[2.1] the situation will lack the end points, characterizing an open situation. 
At this juncture, it is interesting to recall a question raised by McCoard (1978: 
80), and discussed in chapter 1. When McCoard is analyzing adverbs like never, which 
is seen in the literature as indefinite, he provides two sentences: 
(4.31) (a) I never learned how to swim in my youth. 
(b) / have never yet learned how to swim. 
His intention is to question the validity of the "indefinite time parameter" in 
differentiating the present perfect from the past tense, in which, in our opinion, he 
succeeds perfectly. However, in the second part of his argument, McCoard remarks: 
"....But if 'preterite never" is definite, so is 'perfect never', since as we argued, the 
period never-vet-so-far is scarcely less well-defined. One might say that the latter 
period is 'open-ended' and therefore unbounded and indefinite. But never yet does 
not refer to future time, only to that part of time which comes up to now." 
(McCoard 1978: 80) 
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In fact, if we apply Godoi's aspect system to a sentence in the present perfect in 
which the time of the situation coincides with its extended-now TR. a curious thing 
happens. Let us examine the following example: 
(4.32) Mr. Kenny has lived in Curitiba for three years now. 
In this sentence TS = (XN)TR (in which (XN)TR means that the TR extends up 
to and includes the TU), which in Godoi's analysis (1992) could be represented as either 
TS £ (XN)TR or (XN)TR e TS ("inclusão imprópria"). As seen above, Godoi also 
claims that "inclusão imprópria" has "end points", which is in keeping with the 
observation that Mr. Kenny started living in Curitiba three years ago (start point) and 
has been living in Curitiba up to now (end point), and therefore it is not unbounded (cf. 
McCoard 1978: 80 and Declerck 1986: 356). When this situation happens, however, the 
form (XN)TR ç TS is the only one that occurs in English, constituting the so called 
continuative reading of the present perfect. It seems that TS ç (XN)TR does not happen 
with the English present perfect owing to a semantic barrier in English which does not 
allow a perfective reading when the TR of a situation is simultaneous with TU. 
4.3.5.2 Aspectual Classes of Verbs 
Godoi points out that Guenthner, Hoepelman & Rohrer (1978) propose the new 
parameter of "gradual becoming" instead of Dowty's "change of state" (1979) in order 
to capture the differences among the aspectual classes of verbs and avoid the problems, 
discussed earlier in this chapter, with Vendler's classification. In this way. 
Accomplishment would be represented as: A0 —» 0 , i.e., the gradual development 
(indicated by A</>, in which A is the operator of changing) results in a State (<j) ). The 
State would be represented as: (/> —> </> in which 0 remains constant in a given period of 
time. The Activity would be: A<p —> A(p , i.e. an on-going change remains as an on-
going change through the period of time considered and the Achievement would be 
represented as: —\(p —> <p, meaning an instant change. 
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Godoi (1992: 164) remarks, howev er. that even with the inclusion of the concept 
of "gradual change" many problems remain unsolved, especially the "imperfective 
paradox", which involve "Accomplishments'' and "Achievements" according to Dowty 
(1977). As noted before, Dowty remarks that the analysis of Accomplishments in terms 
of "become-sentences" was motivated (on the semantic side) by the need to capture the 
meaning of an Accomplishment verb phrase, which invariably involves the coming 
about of a particular state of affairs: 
"Yet it is just this entailment that such a result-state comes about that fails when the 
Accomplishment verb phrase appears in a progressive tense. In other words, the 
problem is to give an account of how 'John was drawing a circle' entails that John 
was engaged in a bringing-a-circle-into-existence Activity but does not entail that 
he brought a circle into existence. This is the 'imperfective paradox'." (Dowty 
1977:133) 
According to Dowty (1977), the "imperfective paradox" also holds for 
"Achievement terms", since VPs like fall off a table are "Achievement terms" Vendler's 
sense, and when in the progressive form do not entail the final state of being fallen off 
the table. 
Declerck (1979), discussing the "imperfective paradox", remarks that Vendler's 
distinction between "Accomplishment terms" and "Activity terms" (or between 
"bounded" and "unbounded" expressions, applies primarily to situations rather than to 
linguistic expressions. It follows that the only kind of linguistic expressions to which the 
bounded/unbounded distinction is applicable are linguistic propositions: propositions 
are, indeed, the logico-linguistic correlates of situations (cf. Zydatiss 1976: 42). This is 
in keeping with the findings of Verkuyl (1972), who has shown that the (un)bounded 
nature of a sentence may depend not only on the verb, but also on most of the nominal 
constituents (Subject NP, Indirect Object NP, etc.). Shi (1989) also comes to the same 
conclusion. The following sentences, taken from Declerck (1979: 268), illustrate this 
point: 
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(4.33) (a) .lobt ate an ounce of cheese (in an hour), (hounded) 
(b)John ate cheese (for hours), (unbounded) 
(4.34) (a) (For hours) water ran out of the tap. (unbounded) 
(b) A liter of water ran out of the tap (in an hour), (bounded) 
(4.35) (a) John drew a circle on the floor (in an hour), (bounded) 
(b) (For hours) little girls (came and) drew a circle on the floor, (unbounded) 
These observations and examples lead Declerck to conclude that Dowty's initial 
assumption that VPs like draw a circle are "Accomplishment" VPs is false (the same 
can be said of the VPs like fall off the table classified by Dowty as "Achievement" VP): 
the "Accomplishment/Activity" distinction applies not to VPs but to situations, and VPs 
like draw a circle can occur in unbounded as well as bounded propositions. In this way, 
says Declerck: 
"...the 'imperfective paradox', as formulated by Dowty, is the problem of how it is 
possible that we can use an 'Accomplishment VP' like draw a circle in a sentence 
in the progressive, which implies that the result-state did not necessarily come 
about." (Declerck 1979: 271) 
.And he offers the following answer: 
"....a sentence like John was drawing a circle does not involve a bounded VP: as 
we have observed, the bounded/unbounded distinction applies not to VPs but rather 
to linguistic propositions and the sentence above is an unbounded proposition. This 
means that, from a linguistic point of view, the problem of the 'imperfective 
paradox' simply does not arise..." (Declerck 1979: 271) 
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Godoi (1992). in accordancc with Declerck's conclusion (1979), proposes that 
the aspectual classes refer only to situations (cf. Shi 1990:62) and a situation is 
necessarily located in time (cf. McCoard 1978: 92) and that therefore: 
"....trabalhar com as classes Aspectuais isoladas, listando-as no infinitivo (cf. 
Vendler, Dowty, Dahl, entre outros) ou apresentando-as num único tempo torna-se 
um exercício encerrado numa espécie de círculo vicioso Assim, a classe 
Aspectual poderá ser determinada apenas quando se trata de uma situação que tem 
seus TU, TS e TR, e não é possível determiná-la sem ambigüidades se tratando de 
verbos, SVs ou sentenças atemporais." (Godoi 1992: 164-169). 
According to Godoi, to affirm that an Accomplishment represents a gradual 
development that results in a state is possible only when a situation located in the past 
has "end points", i.e. is a concluded situation. Achievements, also involving the notion 
of change, although an instantive change, are, in the same way, possible only when the 
situation is completed in the past. Otherwise there is no way to deduce any completion 
entailed in these two categories. 
Based on the above discussion, Godoi (1992: 166,167) proposes new definitions 
for Accomplishments and Achievements: 
[1] Accomplishment: 
[ P ] ( H ' A t ^ t ) 
|P j Past Operator (= necessarily in the past) 
H'- An Operator for an interval up to now, but not including TU 
[2] Achievement: 
[ P ] ( H ' -</>-> <M 
Summarizing the representations of the aspectual classes, according to Godoi, 
we would have: 
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Aspectual Class Representation 
States 
Activities A0 —> A0 
Accomplishments P ( H ' A 4>-></>) 
Achievements P ( H ' -.</>-»</>) 
It is interesting to note that, with this classification, there seems to be two types 
of Activities, those which have the possibility of becoming Accomplishments and those 
which lack this possibility as exemplified below: 
[1] In (4.36) I'm writing a letter, there is the possibility that I finish writing the letter 
and then say: (4.37) I wrote a letter, which is an Accomplishment. 
[2] In (4.38) I'm running, when I finish running I can say: I ran, which is an 
Activity with EPs. 
According to Godoi (1992: 209), all aspectual classes (i.e. States, Activities, 
Achievements and Accomplishments) may have the perfective aspect (TS c TR & TS ç 
TR): 
(4.39) (a) Rita lived with her Grandmother in 1985. 
(b) Peter swam M-ith his friends on Saturday. 
(c) Marc won the science contest. 





The imperfective aspect (TR c TS & TR ç TS), is possible only for States and 
Activities because of the distributive property, i.e. the property which states that if a 
situation is interrupted at any moment "t" in which the situation was happening, it can 
be said that the situation happened (cf. Vendler 1967: 100). 
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4.4 A Semantic Analysis of the Present Perfect 
In this section, based on the concepts of tense as developed in chapter 3 and the 
concepts of aspect and aspectual classes as defined above, we will analyze the 
ambiguity of the English present perfect with durational adverbs and the readings of the 
present perfect as distinguished by McCawley (1971). 
4.4.1. The Ambiguity of the Present Perfect with Durational Adverbs 
Let us return now to the problem posed by Heny (1982) and Richards (1982) 
concerning the ambiguity of the present perfect with durational phrases. When 
analyzing the sentence (4.1) Sam has been in Boston for 20 minutes in section 4.2.1, one 
of the solutions proposed was Declerck's (1986), in which the durational adverb for 20 
minutes refers to the time of the situation and not to the time of reference, which for the 
present perfect extends up to the moment of speech and includes it. In this way, there is, 
according to Declerck, the possibility of two readings: [1] TS included in a longer TR 
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or [2] TR understood (by contextual matters ) as coinciding with TS, generating the 
continuative reading (McCawley: 1971). We also said that this interpretation seemed to 
be incomplete, since it could not account for the fact that in the sentence (4.6) Sam has 
been fired the continuative reading is not possible. 
Based on the concepts of aspect and aspectual classes developed above and on 
the XN theory for the present perfect as discussed in chapter 3, we propose the 
following analysis: 
(4.1) Sam has been in Boston for 20 minutes. 
26 Cf. Declerck 1986: 357. 
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11] The TR of the present perfect extends up to and includes Til (cf. Declerck: 1986). 
[2] The durational adverb for 20 minutes refers to TS, and thus does not say anything 
about TR (cf. Declerck: 1986). 
[3] The situation is Stative, and thus allows for a perfective reading in which TS c 
(XN)TR (since TS ç (XN)TR cannot happen in the English present perfect, as 
discussed before), and an imperfective reading in which (XN)TR <r TS (since the 
situation up to now has EPs, as discussed in section 4.3.5.1). In the perfective reading, 
therefore, 20 minutes c (XN)TR and in the imperfective reading (XN)TR ç 20 minutes. 
20 minutes in a continuative reading, in our analysis, is thus understood to coincide with 
TR not because of "implicature" as claimed by Declerck (1986:357), but because of its 
semantic frame. 
[4] Therefore, the two possible readings are [4.1] perfective aspect (somewhere in the 
course of Sam's life there has been a period of 20 minutes during which he was in 
Boston) and [4.2] imperfective aspect, in which for 20 minutes indicates not only that 
the event lasted 20 minutes, but also that these 20 minutes reach up to now. 
In this way we argue that there are two distinct semantic frames for the two 
readings of the present perfect with durational phrases, one being distinct from the other 
in aspect. 
Before returning to the solutions proposed by Declerck (1986) and Mittwoch 
(1988) for the present perfect with durational adverbs, discussed in section 4.2.1, let us 
recall that McCoard, when discussing the same subject, calls attention to the following 
point: 
"It is somewhat curious to realize that the most likely, 'neutral' interpretation of 
2/ The (XN) in front of the TR indicates that the TR reaches up to the TU and involves it (cf. Declerck: 
1986) 
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I've lived here, without adverbial supplements, involves lhe inference that the 
speaker is not presently living here." (McCoard 1978: 46) 
However, we may add to that comment that (4.40) I've broken my nose, even 
with adverbial supplements, cannot involve any other inference, except that somewhere 
in the past it happened. The question is: what is in (4.5) I've lived here that, with 
adverbial supplements, allows an ambiguous reading? It cannot be the adverbial 
supplements themselves, because they are not present. Or the other way round: Why 
cannot sentences like (4.40) I've broken my nose or (4.6) Sam has been fired (as 
proposed in section 4.2.1) have a continuative reading? This is the reason why in section 
4.2.1 we said that both Mittwoch's and Declerck's analyses were somewhat incomplete: 
focusing on the durational adverbs, neither explanations can account for the "potential" 
of some sentences in the present perfect, without durational adverbs, of becoming 
ambiguous. According to the analysis proposed above, we claim that the possibility of 
the ambiguity with a sentence in the present perfect lies in three factors: 
[1] the XN time of reference of the present perfect; 
[2] the aspectual class to which the situation involved in the present perfect belongs; 
[3] the aspects which are compatible with the aspectual class of the situation. 
Sentences (4.6) Sam has been fired and (4.40) I've broken my nose, thus, are 
different from (4.5) I've lived here in that (4.6) and (4.40) are Achievements, which 
must be in the perfective aspect (cf. Godoi: 1992), while (4.5) is a State, which may 
occur in both perfective and imperfective aspects, generating an ambiguous reading. 
The following scheme and comments illustrate and summarize the different 





TR »TU : Extended-Now 
Aspectual relationship: 
TR x TS 
(a) Perfective: TS c (XN)TR 
May occur with all aspectual classes: 
(4.41) (a) Linda has lived in London (but now she is living in New York) - Stative 
(b) Peter has solved a Math test - Accomplishment 
(c) Robert has won the race - Achievement 
(d) Ann has run - Activity 
(b) Imperfective: (XN)TR ç TS 
May occur only with Statives and Activities: 
(4.42) (a) Rusty has lived in London for 3 years ( now) - Stative 
(b) Sarah has worked a lot (lately) - Activity 
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When Statives and Activities appear with the present perfect, therefore, we have the 
possibility of an ambiguous reading of the sentence, since their perfective and 
imperfective aspects occur in only one form: have + past participle. 
4.4.2 A Semantic Interpretation of McCawley's Readings 
Based on the concepts above, let us examine now the three primary readings of 
the present perfect distinguished by McCawley (1971): 
[1] Universal/Continuative - A situation persists throughout an interval whose upper 
boundary is speech time. 
(4.43) All my adult life I have waited for the emergence of a strong center party. 
[2] Existential/Experiential - One situation is located in the past within a present-
inclusive time span. The situation may be repeated (iterativity). 
(4.44) (a) He has written a letter today. 
(b) I've written six letters today. 
[3] Resultative - The result of a past situation obtains now. 
(4.44) He has had a haircut - (Result: His hair is shorter now.) 
Reading [1] is the ambiguous reading analyzed in the last section. In the 
perfective aspect it seems to overlap with a non-iterative reading of [2] and with 
reading [3], for any situation that happened in the present perfect in the perfective aspect 
(as well as in the past) can be said to have a result in the present. Readings [2] non-
iterative and [3], in which all aspectual classes may occur since the aspectual form 
involved is TS c (XN)TR, seem to have the same semantic frame. Let us concentrate in 
this section, therefore, on reading [2] when it is "iterative." McCoard, in relation to 
iterativity, observes that: 
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"...when the sentence 7 have lived here since then' is placed in a contcxt of'separate 
occasions, such as Whenever J am on vacation. Whenever I can afford it, and so on. 
the 'first-choice' reading changes dramatically to an 'iterative* sense. Regardless of 
how this is effected by the interaction of when or other contextual elements, the 
28 
iterativity is neither a property of the perfect alone , nor is it strictly in 
opposition to the past. (McCoard 1978: 49) 
We agree with McCoard when he says that iterativity is not "a property of the 
perfect alone". In our analysis, however, we will consider the influence of the aspectual 
classes on the iterativity that happens with the present perfect, in order to check whether 
it differs semantically from the other readings being analyzed in this section. As 
characterized by McCawley (1971), iterativity consists of a number of repetitions of a 
certain situation in the past. In the case of the present perfect it means that each one of 
the repeated situations will have its EPs within the extended now time of reference as 
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All aspectual classes, therefore, may occur in an iterative reading. It is 
interesting to observe the following examples, however: 
(4.45) (a) Karen has lived in Italy for five years now. 
(b) Karen has eaten apples for five years now. 
(c) Karen has won the New York Marathon for five years now. 
TU 
2 8This bold prim was inserted by us. 
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In (4.45a) the situation involved is a State and. as analyzed before, allows for the 
imperfective aspect and the continuative reading. In (4.45b) the situation involved is an 
accomplishment, which like (4.45c), which is an achievement, must be in the perfective 
aspect and have EPs. not allowing a continuative reading. When durational adverbials 
are used with accomplishments or achievements, the result is an iterative reading. 
Now we are in a position to offer an answer to the question posed by Michaelis 
(1984), as to whether McCawley's primary readings have different semantic frames. 
We propose that: 
[1] McCawley's continuative reading may involve only States or Activities and they 
have the possibility of an ambiguous interpretation in respect to aspect, as analyzed in 
the last section. 
[2] Non-iterative Existential and the Resultative readings may involve any of the four 
aspectual classes and will always occur in the perfective aspect. 
[3] An iterative Existential reading may also involve any aspectual class in the 
perfective aspect and each repetition of the situation is "immersed" in the extended-
now TR of the present perfect. 
We argue, therefore, that there are three different semantic frames for the 
readings proposed by McCawley (1971) and reject Michaelis' (1994:113) claim that the 
different readings are due to "a polysemy similar to that which may be found in words." 
4.4.3 Categorizing the Present Perfect 
We may begin by asking what elements are involved in a "tense". The answer, 
based on Declerck's (1986) tense model and Godoi's (1992) aspect model discussed 
above, would be: 
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( 1 j TU. TH and TS ( cl: Rcichenbach: 1947; Declerck: 1986: Godoi: 1992). 
[2] Temporal relationship expressed by the relations of anteriority, simultaneity or 
posteriority between the TU and the TR involved (cf. Declerck: 1986; Godoi: 1992). 
[3] Aspectual relationship: perfectivity or imperfectivity, depending on the relation 
between the TR and the TS involved (cf. Godoi: 1992). 
In the present perfect, as well as in the simple past, these elements occur. [2] and 
[3] are responsible for the differences between these tenses, and not just [2] as suggested 
in Declerck's tense model. Moreover, the aspectual relationship is the element which 
was missing in Declerck's (1986) analysis of the present perfect to enable it to offer a 
semantic frame for the different readings of the present perfect, without resorting to the 
idea of "current relevance" or "indefiniteness" of an action which occurred in the past. 
These three elements interact in a unique way in each tense, defining its 
properties. Since the present perfect has all three elements and they interact in a unique 
way, as discussed in chapters 3 and 4, we believe that there are solid grounds for 
categorizing the present perfect as a "tense" and not as "aspect" (Comrie: 1976/1985) or 
a marker of "inclusion" (McCoard 1976: 152). 
CHAPTER 5 
FROM RESEARCH TO PRACTICE 
This chapter is intended only to show a way of applying the research developed 
in this dissertation to the classroom, pointing out what we understand as essential in the 
teaching of the present perfect to Brazilian EFL students. To do so. we include four 
sections: research and teaching, language analysis versus language use, the English 
present perfect compared with Portuguese tenses and presentation of the present perfect. 
In the first section, we comment on three ways in which we believe research can 
be useful for classroom teachers. In the second section, since we believe that the 
communicative approach is the best one available today, we set out to identify some 
misconceptions about it, and thus to clarify our position in relation to it. Given this 
framework, in the third section, we compare, although superficially, the English present 
perfect with Portuguese tenses, using the semantic frames proposed in this dissertation. 
And finally in the fourth section, we present the elements that we believe essential to a 
good understanding of the present perfect. 
5.1 Research and Teaching 
Few people would deny the importance of applying research findings to 
classroom practice, although it is not always clear in what ways such research, often full 
of technical jargon, can be of immediate use to the teacher. In fact, for teachers to be 
able to make more appropriate use of researchers' experience, research papers should be 
seen as sources of information, inspiration, and support. 
The most typical way in which research has served the practice of teaching is by 
providing information. The journals are full of descriptions of how teaching and 
learning worked under various conditions and in various settings. Most of this 
information, however, is presented at a general level, having been derived from the 
averaging of many observations of individuals or classes, and pertains to specific 
questions or hypotheses formed by the researchers. In terms of information, therefore, 
the vast bulk of the research literature will, in many cases, be of little practical use to a 
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particular tcacher. unless it is used as a kind of encyclopedia that teachers consult foi-
information as they need it. with their own specific questions in mind, and with a clear 
sense of the applicability ofthat information to their particular situation. 
A second way in which research can serve practice is by providing inspiration. 
By inspiration is meant a picture of how teaching could be different, could be better, 
could become the ideal teaching and learning each teacher once imagined. As Clark 
observed: 
"We need some imaginative stimulus, some not impossible ideal such as may shape 
vague hope, and transform it into effective desire, to carry us year after year, 
without disgust, through the routine-work which is so large a part of life." (Clark 
1986:41) 
Finally, research can serve practicing teachers by providing them with support 
for what they are already doing well. Research is often seen exclusively as a force for 
change. Usually, a call for change implies that what has gone before is faulty, 
inefficient, or inadequate to the task. However, in many cases, research gives theoretical 
support to what classroom teachers have been doing for a long time. At the same time, 
teaching is an isolating and potentially lonely profession in which individual teachers 
rarely have the time or opportunity to learn about and discuss how their own teaching 
compares with that of others. While research reports are certainly not a substitute for 
professional dialogue among teachers, they can provide both evidence for and 
explanations of why good teaching works as it does (cf. Doyle: 1983). 
With this perspective in mind, and based on the analysis of the present perfect 
proposed in this dissertation, in this chapter we will strive to present some 
recommendations which hopefully will be useful as a frame to inspire the development 
of practical activities. However, before the recommendations, we would like to expand 
on the topic of language analysis versus language use because it is directly related to 
grammar issues and is a topic widely debated in the EFL literature. 
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5.2 Language Analysis x Language Use 
According to Celce-Murcia (1979), second language educators have alternated 
over the years between favoring teaching approaches which focus on having students 
analyze language in order to learn it and those which encourage students to use language 
in order to acquire it. Earlier this century, this distinctive pattern was observable in the 
shift from the analytic grammar-translation approach to the use-oriented direct method. 
Although the character of the field is somewhat more heterogeneous today, a recent 
example of the shift, this time in the opposite direction, is the loss of popularity of the 
Chomsky-inspired cognitive code approach, in which analyzing structures and applying 
rules were common practices, and the rise in popularity of more communicative 
approaches which emphasize language use over rules of language usage (cf. 
Widdowson: 1988). In fact, the Communicative Approach, one of the most popular 
approaches today, devotes a significant amount of classroom time to promoting 
communication among students (cf. Larsen-Freeman: 1986). Despite the popularity such 
approach now enjoys, it seems that there are still a number of misconceptions about 
what it involves. 
5.2.1 Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) 
For some time now, there have been recurrent attempts to take stock of 
Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) and to identify its characteristic features 
(e.g. Richards and Rodgers: 1986); and in areas such as teacher training the principles of 
CLT are largely treated as clearly understood and accepted (see, for example, Harmer: 
1991-'). 
In spite of this apparent unanimity, however, there still appears to be a fair 
amount of confusion among many teachers over what exactly CLT is. There is general 
29 Interestingly, Harmer rejects the term "communicative" for the approach outlined in his book. He 
prefers to call it a "balanced activities approach", because of the inclusion of controlled, non-
communicative activities as an integral part of learning. However, since the approach takes 
communicative activities as the point towards which the other activities are designed to lead, there seems 
no reason not to accept Littlewood's (1992) term "pre-communicative" for the controlled activities and to 
keep "communicative approach'' as the general term. 
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agreement at the more abstract end that CLT involves an emphasis on communicating 
by means of the foreign language (the way in which this idea is expressed tends, as here, 
to be so vague as to make it difficult to disagree with); and, at the practical classroom 
end, CLT is strongly associated with a number of particular activity types such as 
problem-solving and pairwork. But in the middle ground, the area where theory meets 
practice, things become less certain. For example, what exactly does CLT set out to 
teach? Is there such a thing as a communicative language syllabus? If so, what does it 
consist of? Is it simply a notional-functional syllabus under a new name? Or does CLT 
only exist as a methodological approach, a way of helping learners to practice the skills 
needed to put their knowledge of the foreign language into use? 
In talking with EFL teachers, one is constantly surprised by the very disparate 
perceptions that they have of CLT. There are, possibly, a number of reasons for the 
confusion, not least the fact that CLT has developed extremely rapidly over the past 
fifteen or so years and has now moved a considerable distance from its original practices 
(though without substantially changing its original principles). 
A practical form of CLT has emerged, not only in the writings of applied 
linguists such as Littlewood (1992) and McDonough & Shaw (1993) but, perhaps more 
importantly, in mainstream language textbooks, such as the Headway series (Soars & 
Soars: 1992) and the New Cambridge Course (Swan & Walter: 1991), which represent 
good contemporary practice. However, certain misconceptions about CLT continue to 
survive, making it more difficult for many teachers to see clearly what is happening and 
to identify the useful innovations that CLT has brought. 
The first misconception we want to comment on is: CLT means not teaching 
grammar. In our opinion, this is the most persistent and most damaging misconception. 
It must be admitted, however, that there are good reasons for its existence. There have 
been a number of applied linguists who have argued strongly and in theoretically 
persuasive terms that explicit grammar teaching should be avoided. One line of 
argument is that grammar teaching is impossible because the knowledge that a speaker 
needs in order to use a language is simply too complex (Prabhu, 1987). Another line is 
that grammar teaching is unnecessary because the knowledge is of a kind which cannot 
be passed on in the form of statable rules but can only be acquired unconsciously 
through exposure to the language (Krashen, 1988). 
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For many teachers, the effects of these ideas have been felt through their 
practical application in language textbooks and syllabuses. In the early days of CLT, 
pioneering textbooks such as Functions of English (Jones: 1976) included no explicit 
teaching of grammar (although this book) was aimed at students who had typically 
already been through a more conventional grammar-based course). Syllabuses were 
developed (and are still in force in many places) which expressed the teaching aims 
purely or predominantly in terms of what the learners would learn to do ("make a 
telephone call to book a hotel room"; "scan a written text to extract specific 
information"), and which ignored or minimized the underlying knowledge of the 
language that they would need to actually perform those tasks. 
The exclusion of explicit attention to grammar, however, was never a necessary 
part of CLT (cf. Castaños 1989: 17). It is certainly understandable that there was a 
reaction against the heavy emphasis on structure at the expense of natural 
communication. But there have always been theorists and teachers pointing out that 
grammar is necessary for communication to take place efficiently, even though their 
voices may for a time have been drowned out in the noise of learners busily practicing 
in pairs. This is such self-evident common sense that, from the vantage-point of the 
present, it seems odd that it should ever have been seriously questioned. 
Of course, that still leaves the question of how the learners learn the necessary 
grammar. In the consensus view of CLT that was mentioned before, it is now fully 
accepted that an appropriate amount of class time should be devoted to grammar. 
However, this has not meant a simple return to a traditional treatment of grammar rules. 
The view that grammar is too complex to be taught in that over-simplifying way has had 
an influence; and the focus has now moved away from the teacher covering grammar to 
the learners discovering grammar, although a deductive tactic, in certain situations, may 
be necessary, as we will suggest in section 5.4.1 (Inductive versus Deductive 
presentation). 
Wherever possible, the learners are first exposed to new language in a 
comprehensible context, so that they are able to understand its function and meaning. 
Only then is their attention turned to examining the grammatical forms that have been 
used to convey that meaning. The discussion of grammar is explicit, but it is the learners 
who are doing most of the discussing, working out , with guidance from the teacher, as 
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much of their own knowledge of the language as can easily and usefully be expressed 
(cf. Brumfit: 1985). Behind this strategy lies the recognition that the learners may well 
have "understood" more about the language than they, or the teacher, can put into 
words. If the new language were introduced in the form of an apparently all-embracing 
(but actually very incomplete) rule from the teacher, this would convey the unspoken 
message that the learners had nothing further to understand about the language point and 
simply needed to practice it. If, on the other hand, the talking about grammar is 
postponed until the learners themselves can contribute by bringing to light what they 
already "know" in some sense, the unspoken message is that the process of acquiring 
the new knowledge is one which takes place in them and which they have some control 
over. Indeed, with the recent emphasis on training learners to learn efficiently, this 
message is likely to be explicitly discussed. 
This "retrospective" approach to grammar is a natural development from the 
original CLT emphasis on viewing language as a system for communication; and it also 
takes into account the fact that learning is likely to be more efficient if the learners have 
an opportunity to talk about what they are learning. Ellis (1992) argues that looking 
explicitly at grammar may well not lead immediately to learning, but that it will 
facilitate learning at a later stage when the learner is ready (in some way that is not yet 
understood) to internalize the new information about the language. The retrospective 
approach also has the advantage that, if the lesson is conducted in English, it encourages 
the learners to communicate fairly naturally about a subject that is important to what 
they are doing: the language itself. 
The second misconception is: CLT means teaching only speaking. Again, 
there are reasons why this misconception is fairly widespread. CLT was influenced, as 
earlier approaches had been, by the general movement in linguistics towards seeing the 
spoken language as primary. In addition, a focus on encouraging learners to 
communicate leads naturally towards thinking about what they will need to 
communicate about and for (this is part of the wider tendency in CLT to look beyond 
the classroom). For many learners, the main uses that they are likely to make of the 
language are oral: getting around in the foreign country if they visit it, talking to visitors 
from that country, etc. Even if they are unlikely in reality to use the language outside the 
classroom, learners are often willing to suspend their disbelief and act as if they might 
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need the language for personal contacts30. Therefore, the emphasis is likely to be on 
speaking and listening skills. 
A further reason for this misconception is that CLT stresses the need for the 
learners to have sufficient practice, of an appropriate kind. This is often translated, 
especially by teacher trainers, into the principle that TTT ( Teacher-Talking-Time) is to 
be reduced and STT (Student-Talking-Time) is to be maximized. Students are therefore 
put into pairs and told to talk to their partners. The slogan "TTT bad, STT good" almost 
certainly represents a useful goal for most teachers (though perhaps rarely attained). 
However, it is also important to recognize that communication does not only take place 
through speech: and also that it is not only the speaker (or writer) who is 
communicating. Communication through language happens in both the written and 
spoken medium; and it involves at least two people. Learners reading a text silently to 
themselves are taking part in communication (assuming that the text has something of 
relevance to those particular readers) just as much as someone talking to their partner. 
CLT involves encouraging learners to take part in - and reflect on -
communication in as many different contexts as possible (and as many as necessary, not 
only for their future language-using needs but also for their present language-learning 
needs). Perhaps rather than Student-Talking-Time we should be thinking about the 
broader concept of Student-Communicating-Time (or even just Student-Time, to 
include necessary periods of silent reflection undistracted by talk from teacher or 
partner). 
A third misconception is: CLT means pairwork, which means role-play. The 
misconception here is not so much in the emphasis on pairwork itself as in the 
narrowness of the second assumption concerning the ways in which pairwork is used. 
One of the constant themes of CLT is that learners need to be given some degree of 
control over their learning (since language is a system of choices, the learners must be 
30 An alternative approach to setting up goals for language learning is to hold out as the final destination 
some kind of abstract mastery of the language (perhaps with a structure-oriented examination as the final 
validation). This runs counter to basic principles of CLT because it treats the language merely as a 
classroom-bound object of study, a pedagogic dead-end. Another alternative, which does provide an 
outside, authentically communicative goal, is to teach the language as a means of preparing to read 
literature. This is still accepted as the main aim in many university courses in particular. However, it 
represents a demoralisingly difficult and remote goal for a great many learners. Conversation has the 
advantage that it is possible to take part in it reasonably successfully at many levels, including 
elementary. 
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given the opportunity to learn how to make choices). Looking back, again with 
hindsight, at popular textbooks of even the fairly recent past, such as Kernel Lessons 
Intermediate (O'Neill & Kingsbury: 1973) from the 1970s, it is immediately noticeable 
that the content of what is said by the learners is controlled at every point by the book: 
make a question using these prompts; answer these questions about the text; read this 
dialogue; and so on. Even when pairwork is used, the learners never choose what to say, 
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they simply work out how to say what they are told to say . 
The use of pairwork is a physical signal of control and choice passing, to some 
extent, to the learners; but that needs to be complemented by real choice - which role-
play, particularly at simpler levels, may not encourage as much as other uses of 
pairwork. It is helpful to start from considering how learners working together can 
actually help each other. They can provide each other with a relatively safe opportunity 
to try out ideas before launching them in public: this may well lead to more developed 
ideas and therefore greater confidence and more effective communication. They can also 
provide knowledge and skills which may complement those of their partners: this can 
lead to greater success in undertaking tasks. 
Instead of just seeing pairwork as a useful follow-up, a way of getting everyone 
practicing at the same time after a new language point has been introduced, we can see it 
as a potential preliminary stage to any contribution from the learners. They can work 
together to do a grammatical exercise, or to solve a problem, or to analyze the new 
language structures in a text, or to prepare a questionnaire for other members of the 
class, or to agree on the opinion they want to present to the class. Once pairwork is seen 
as a preparation as well as (or more than) an end-point, the range of possibilities 
increases dramatically. It is less a question of "When in my lesson do I get to the freer 
practice stage so that I can fit in a role-play in pairs?" and more a question of "Is there 
any reason why I can't use pairwork as part of whatever I'm planning to do now?" (Of 
course, one reason for not using it may be simply variety - even the best techniques can 
be overused). 
It is worth noting that this is essentially no different from the way in which translation is used in the 
grammar-translation method: the sentence or text to be translated provides the content, and learner and 
teacher only have to worry about how to express that content. This control of content simplifies the 
teacher's task, of course, in that s/he does not need to judge - or respond to - the appropriacy, interest, 
relevance, etc. of what the learners say, but only whether the responses are grammatically correct or not. 
142 
Finally, a fourth misconception that we would like to discuss is: CLT means 
expecting too much from the teacher. It is perhaps cheating to label this a 
misconception, since there is a great deal of truth in the argument - voiced most 
persuasively by Medgyes (1986) - that CLT places greater demands on the teacher than 
certain other widely-used approaches. Lessons do tend to be less predictable; teachers 
do have to be ready to listen to what learners say and not just how they say it, and to 
interact with learners in as "natural" a way as possible; they do have to use a wider 
range of management skills than in the traditional teacher-dominated classroom. In 
addition, non-native speakers of English probably do need a higher level of language 
proficiency - or rather, a different balance of proficiency - to be able to communicate 
with ease, and to cope with discussing a broader range of facts about language use than 
they are accustomed to. Perhaps most importantly, teachers may have to bring to light 
deeply-buried preconceptions about language teaching (mostly based on their own 
experiences at school as recipients of language teaching), and to compare them openly 
with alternative possibilities that have less of the appeal of familiarity but perhaps make 
better pedagogic sense. 
In some ways, there is no answer to these points. It is certainly difficult, for 
example, to ignore the charge that CLT is an approach developed by and for native 
speaker teachers. Nevertheless, the label of misconception is perhaps valid for two 
reasons. First, the points are presented as defects of CLT, as reasons for rejecting it, but 
they can equally well be presented as reasons for embracing CLT. Teachers have the 
opportunity to re-evaluate their beliefs and practices; they have an incentive to develop 
their skills; they are encouraged to enjoy themselves in their work, to avoid dull 
repetition of the same predictable set of materials, activities and answers year in, year 
out. This view may seem unduly optimistic to some, but there seems no reason to 
assume that the majority of teachers do not welcome such opportunities, if they are seen 
as opportunities. Secondly, the extent of the demands can easily be exaggerated. Indeed, 
this misconception may sometimes be fostered by teachers who may have other reasons 
for not wishing to change their current practices. Even Medgyes (1986), in order to 
make his point more forcefully, ends up by describing as the CLT norm an 
unreal i sti cal ly superhuman teacher that few CLT teachers would recognize. It can, 
admittedly, be difficult to use a communicative approach if one is obliged to use 
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resolutely uncommunicative materials; but that is increasingly not the case. Many 
textbooks now provide very practical, straightforward CLT guidelines and activities 
which place few demands on the teacher beyond a willingness to try them out with 
enough conviction. 
If the pattern alluded to earlier is perpetuated, then one would expect CLT 
approaches to be challenged. Indeed, there are already signs that this is happening. As 
Eskey points out with exasperation: 
"We used to believe that if students learned the form, communication would 
somehow take care of itself. Now we seem to believe that if students somehow 
learn to communicate, mastery of the forms will take care of itself." (Eskey 1983: 
319) 
The problem, as Eskey (1983) suggests, is that form does not take care of itself, 
at least not for many learners and not in the most efficacious manner possible. Indeed, 
researcher Pienemann (1984) concludes that "giving up the instruction of syntax is to 
allow for the fossilization of interlanguage in simplified form" (1984: 209). Thus, while 
comprehensible input may be necessary and sufficient for untutored second language 
acquisition, it does not necessarily follow that instruction should be limited to what is 
necessary and sufficient. Surely the motivation for language instruction is not simply to 
supply what is minimally necessary for learning to take place, but rather to create the 
optimal conditions for effective and efficient L2 pedagogy (cf. Larsen-Freeman & Long, 
1990). 
Whereas opponents of a language-analytic approach have usually equated the 
teaching of grammar with the teaching of explicit linguistic rules, we submit that 
whether or not the students are provided with explicit rules is really irrelevant to what it 
means to teach grammar. Neither should the teaching of grammar require a focus on 
form or structure alone. Communicative competence should be seen to subsume 
linguistic competence, not to replace it. In our opinion, linguistic accuracy is as much a 
part of communicative competence as being able to get one's meaning across or to 
communicate in a socio-linguistically appropriate manner. Thus, a more satisfactory 
characterization of teaching grammar, in tune with the above assumptions, is that 
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teaching grammar means enabling language students to use linguistic forms accurately, 
meaningfully and appropriately. 
CLT, however, is by no means the final answer, but whatever innovations take 
place, they will do so against the background of the changes brought about by CLT and 
will need to accommodate or explicitly reject those changes. Certain of the changes, 
however, are too important to lose: the concern with the world beyond the classroom, 
the concern with the learner as an individual and the view of language as structured to 
carry out the functions we want it to perform (cf. Rail, 1989). 
5.2.2 Learning Strategies (Focus on Procedures) 
Corder (1988) remarks that teaching is a matter of "providing the learner with 
the right data at the right time and teaching the student how to learn". Helping 
students how to learn and to take on responsibility for their own learning is considered 
by many teachers to be an integral part of education. In fact, many teachers agree that 
the most efficient procedure is to encourage learners to think for themselves, i.e. to 
analyze the grammar of English for themselves. In this way, students are encouraged to 
think critically about language and to draw conclusions for themselves about its 
structure and meaning (cf. Canning: 1991). A uniform methodology of presentation may 
actually inhibit this sort of critical thought. By giving students samples of language 
which they are required to process simply according to teacher guidance we are 
exaggerating their dependence on the teacher, instead of encouraging them to do things 
for themselves. When students begin to discover things for themselves it is enormously 
exciting, and therefore enormously motivating. 
Learning to learn, therefore, is an umbrella term for a wide variety of activities 
designed to develop learning strategies. It is primarily concerned with the process of 
learning and aims to focus pupils' attention on how they learn in addition to what they 
learn. It takes into account that different learners have different ways of learning and 
different preferences regarding activities and learning materials. It therefore aims to 
develop self-awareness and gradually lead pupils to a conscious development of their 
own learning strategies, so that they can become more effective and independent 
learners. Many of these strategies can be applied to whatever subject a pupil is learning 
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and, although difficult to isolate, can be broadly classified as suggested by Gail Ellis 
(1992:7): 
[1] Planning for learning, hypothesizing, self-assessment and monitoring. These involve 
learners in reflecting on the learning process and are referred to as metacognitive 
strategies. 
[2] Sorting, classifying, comparing, matching, predicting, developing an awareness of 
visual and audio clues as aids to meaning, repeating, using a class library or dictionary. 
These involve learners in doing things with the language and their learning materials 
and are referred to as cognitive strategies. They relate to specific activities in specific 
skills areas such as listening for specific information, sorting words into groups and so 
on. 
[3] Collaborating, peer-correction, which involve learners in cooperating together in 
language learning activities, and are referred to as "social mediation strategies" (cf. 
Cohen: 1986). Opportunities for developing these are usually set up through pair or 
group work activities and project work. 
Ellis (1992) remarks that many materials for young learners include activities 
which develop cognitive strategies but few provide opportunities for reflection either 
before or after an activity. It is in this area that teachers need to supplement their 
materials. Much of the reported failure of learning strategies being transferred to new 
tasks is due to not combining metacognitive information with a cognitive approach. For 
example, in order to get children to learn a group of new words the teacher might ask 
them to sort them into groups (the cognitive strategy of sorting). However, there is little 
point in children doing this if they do not realize why they are doing it. In other words, 
the reflective dimension (the metacognitive strategy of deciding how to tackle the task 
and evaluating it afterwards) is missing. In addition, some children may find other 
strategies more effective, such as associating words with pictorial images, repeating 
words, copying words and so on. 
1 4 6 
A possible beneficial effect of learning to learn, which can be empirically 
observed, is increased motivation, and a more questioning, active and personal 
involvement of the learners. Developing curiosity and positive attitudes towards foreign 
language learning in young learners is particularly important. Most are learning a 
foreign language for the first time, and early foreign language learning aims to provide 
them with a positive experience and the desire to continue. Early foreign language 
learning also aims to prepare pupils for the more formal and exam-orientated courses in 
secondary school. Learning to learn provides the basic learning tools for this. 
Most teachers develop some, if not all, of the strategies described above with 
their pupils. However, they may not always do this in a systematic or overt and explicit 
way so that pupils are made aware of what they are doing and why. Furthermore, when 
focusing on learning to learn for young learners, for whom school and learning are 
central in their lives, it is particularly important that strategies are demonstrated with 
transfer in mind. This will help pupils see how certain strategies can be used with 
different tasks or subjects. For example, a self-testing strategy using two-sided cards can 
be used for practicing English vocabulary, times tables or countries and their capitals. In 
fact, virtually any class activity may be used for learning to learn. All that is necessary is 
to focus upon the learning process aspect of an experience, which always exists side by 
side with the content. 
The teacher, therefore, plays a central role in this process. As observed by 
Evertson (1985: 55): 
"The teacher is expected to elicit work from students. Students in all subjects and 
activities must engage mentally in directed activities which are believed to produce 
learning..." 
Children can be given opportunities to reflect on different strategies but they will 
rarely learn to use them spontaneously unless they are prompted by their teacher. The 
teacher needs to take on a guiding and questioning role, often necessitating the use of 
the learners' mother tongue, to encourage them to reflect on their basic assumptions 
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about learning. By doing this, they will model the types of questions about learning that 
pupils will gradually learn to ask themselves (cf. Brophy: 1979). 
In view of the importance of being explicit about learning to learn, it is useful for 
teachers when planning a lesson to consider what the learner training focus is going to 
be. This can range from sharing information with pupils about objectives and activities, 
providing opportunities to work independently of the teacher through pair or group 
work, allowing pupils to choose from a selection of tasks and materials for part of a 
lesson, to direct strategy training such as predicting or reviewing and so on. This 
advance planning will enable teachers to think about how best to integrate and carry out 
the learner training objectives with a particular class. 
A good way to begin is through self-assessment. This provides opportunities for 
both reflection and experimentation. Many course materials for young learners now 
incorporate simple instruments such as charts, checklists or questionnaires for this 
purpose. Self-assessment enables children to monitor and perceive their progress so that 
all learners have a sense of achievement, to identify those points that need more 
practice, and those that need less. In this way, it enables them to plan their own work. 
Self-assessment can take different forms depending on when it is done during 
the learning period. For example, global self-assessment can take place at the beginning, 
middle or end of a study period to clarify expectations and attitudes as well as to chart 
progress. Specific self-assessment can be done at any time through a period of study to 
develop awareness of what is being learned and how it is being learned. It can include, 
for example, self-testing, self-correcting, self-rating, self-questioning and reviewing so 
that pupils can identify their strong and weak points and decide what to do next. An 
example of specific self-assessment which encourages pupils to review their work and 
to ascertain what they do or do not remember about the previous lesson is to ask 
questions such as: 
- What did we do last lesson? 
- What did you learn last lesson? 
Similarly, to review a lesson and to delve further the teacher could ask questions 
like those below, suggested by Gail Ellis (1992: 8). They encourage pupils to reflect on 
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both the content and methodology of a lesson, thereby identifying their preferred 
materials and activities and developing an awareness of individual differences: 
- What did you learn today? 
- Did you enjoy this unit/topic/story? Why/Why not? 
- Did you enjoy this activity? Why/Why not? 
- Was it useful? Why/Why not? 
- How well did you do? Why? 
According to our experience, students' comments may initially be monosyllabic 
and vague. Comments could even be recorded and listened to afterwards but this will 
depend on time available. Gradually students can be given a few minutes to reflect 
silently on these questions. Answers to these questions provide the teacher with valuable 
information and rapidly encourage more dialogue between students and teachers not 
only on what is learned, but also on how the content is learned by the students. 
5.3 The English Present Perfect Compared with Portuguese Tenses 
Since a natural tendency of second language learners is to resort to the 
parameters they are familiar with in their mother tongues, it is interesting to examine 
how the English present perfect can be compared with Portuguese tenses, in order to 
understand possible difficulties EFL Brazilian learners may have. Let us consider the 
following examples: 
(5.1) Jonathan has had a hair cut. 
Jonathan cortou o cabelo. 
(5.2) Jonathan has lived in London, but now he lives in Curitiba. 
Jonathan morou em Londres, mas agora ele mora em Curitiba. 
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(5.3) Jonathan has lived in Curitiba for three years now. 
Jonathan mora/está morando em Curitiba há três anos agora. 
(5.4) Jonathan has eaten an apple a day since his youth. 
Jonathan tem comido uma maçã por dia desde sua juventude. 
We can notice in these examples that the present perfect can be understood in 
three ways in Portuguese: 
[1] past; 
[2] present; 
[3] compound form (present of ' t e r" + past participle of the main verb). 
Notice that the situation in [1] has "EPs" while situations in [2] and [3] do not 
have "Eps". This plurality indicates that there is no "one" form in Portuguese which 
translates the extended-now structure of the English present perfect and the meaning 
conveyed by its combination with the aspectual classes. Based on the principles 
discussed in chapter 4, we propose, in chart 5.1 below, a possible correspondence 
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Since all the possibilities in Portuguese shown in chart 5.1, are implicit in just 
one semantic frame in English, the problem a Brazilian learner has to face is multiple: 
[1] Even when the English present perfect is understood as the "pretérito perfeito" in 
Portuguese, the sentence in English cannot cooccur with time adverbials which exclude 
the time of utterance. With the Portuguese "pretérito perfeito", this would be perfectly 
possible. 
[2] Since there are two aspectual possibilities utilizing the same tense form, the student 
has to understand when to interpret a sentence in the present perfect as perfective or as 
imperfective. 
[3] With States and Activities, there is the problem of ambiguity analyzed in chapter 4. 
The student will have to learn how to interpret such sentences. 
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5.4 Presentation of the Present Perfect (Focus on Analysis) 
Before we suggest some topics we consider fundamental for the presentation of 
the present perfect, let us consider the issue of inductive versus deductive presentation, 
which has been the focus of many divergent opinions in the literature. 
5.4.1 Inductive x Deductive Presentation 
A choice teachers have to face is whether to work inductively or deductively 
during the presentation of a grammar point. An inductive activity is one in which the 
students infer the rule from a set of examples. For instance, students might induce the 
subject-auxiliary inversion rule in forming yes-no questions, after having been exposed 
to a number of such questions. In a deductive activity, on the other hand, the students 
are given the rule and they apply it to examples. If one has chosen an inductive 
approach in a given lesson, a further option exists: whether or not to have students 
explicitly state the rule. 
There are many times when an inductive approach in presenting a grammar 
structure is desirable, because by using such an approach one is nurturing within the 
students a learning process through which they can arrive at their own generalizations. 
At other times, when one's students have a particular cognitive style that is not well 
suited for language analysis or when a particular linguistic rule is rather convoluted, it 
may make more sense to present a grammar structure deductively. Frequently students 
request rules and report that they find them helpful. Moreover, stating a rule explicitly 
can often bring about linguistic insights in a more efficacious manner, as long as the 
rule is not oversimplified or so metalinguistically obtuse that students must struggle 
harder to understand the rule than to apply it implicitly. Indeed, one takes comfort from 
Corder's (1988) sensible observations: 
" What little we know about the psychological process of second language learning, 
either from theory or from practical experience, suggests that a combination of 
induction and deduction produces the best result.... Learning is seen as 
fundamentally an inductive process but one which can be controlled and facilitated 
by descriptions and explanations given at the appropriate moment and formulated in 
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a way which is appropriate to the maturity, knowledge, and sophistication of the 
learner. The old controversy about whether one should provide the rule first and 
then the examples, or vice versa, is now seen to be merely a matter of tactics to 
which no categorical answer can be given" ( Corder, 1973, in Rutherford & 
Sharwood Smith, 1988, p. 133). 
What we must bear in mind, whatever our choice is, is that what we are trying to 
bring about in the learner is a knowledge of the rules which can be used in 
communicative situations, and not knowledge of the rules for its own sake. 
5.4.2 Key Notions about the Present Perfect 
Keeping in mind all the remarks made about the issue of language analysis 
versus language use and about an inductive versus a deductive presentation, let us 
proceed to the recommendations about the semantic frame of the English present perfect 
we feel to be fundamental for a good understanding of this English tense. 
Unfortunately, the view of the English present perfect as defended in this 
dissertation is not common in the literature, and, therefore, its application in the 
classroom is not well developed in terms of communicative activities. The 
recommendations that follow are not intended to fill in this gap. They are just some 
general guidelines that hopefully may serve as inspiration for future research in applied 
linguistics. 
To present the present perfect, in our opinion, basically two questions need to be 
answered: 
[1] How is the present perfect formed? 
[2] What does the present perfect mean? 
Question [1] can be answered straightforwardly: 
Have + 3rd column of the verb that follows. 
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Question number [2], however, needs a more elaborate answer. In order to 
explain the semantic framework of the present perfect, the concepts involved in it must, 
in some way (inductively or deductively), be understood. These concepts, as discussed 
in the preceding chapters, are: 
[a] Elements involved in any tense: TU, TR and TS; 
[b] Temporal Relation: TU x TR; 
[c] Aspect: TR x TS; 
[d] Aspectual classes: States, Activities, Accomplishments and Achievements. 
These elements, presented and practiced within a communicative framework, 
without complicated linguistic jargons, in our opinion, would be a must to the students' 
comprehension of the multiple facets of the English present perfect as shown in chart 
5.1. Depending on the age of the students, Fig.5.3. below may be useful, if well 




The ambiguity that occurs when the aspectual class involved is a State or an 
Activity should also be discussed explicitly or made clear through examples. 
Finally, it is important to observe that dubious expressions such as "indefinite 
past", "current relevance" or "past viewed from the present" should be avoided in the 
presentation of the present perfect because they have no explanatory value and may 
create much confusion, especially in contrast with the simple past. 
CHAPTER 6 
FINAL COMMENTS 
Let us recall now the objectives of this dissertation and briefly comment on the 
solutions proposed: 
[1] to characterize the opposition between the English present perfect and the simple 
past; 
[2] to classify the English present perfect into the category of tense; 
[3] to analyze the ambiguity of the English present perfect with durational adverbs; 
[4] to analyze McCawley's primary readings of the present perfect (1971). 
After rejecting "definiteness" and "current relevance" as parameters to 
distinguish the present perfect from the simple past, following McCoard (1978), we 
presented, in chapter 3, Declerck's theory of tense and claimed that his interpretation of 
the XN-theory within his model of tense is capable of differentiating the present perfect 
from the simple past. Declerck's (1986) observation that the present perfect locates a 
situation in time differently from the simple past, contrary to Comrie's claim (1976), led 
us to conclude that the present perfect is a tense, but the possibility of its also being an 
aspect, according to Comrie's (1976) definition, was not discarded, especially because 
Declerck's theory of tense alone is not capable of accounting for the multiplicity of 
readings of the present perfect. 
We then proceeded to the analysis of the ambiguity of the English present 
perfect with durational adverbs, as posed by Heny (1982) and Richards (1982), and 
concluded that it is a "true" semantic ambiguity (cf. Dowty 1979: 343). To account for 
this ambiguity we defined the concepts of aspect and aspectual classes, following 
Godoi (1992), and analyzed their behavior in the tense schemata for the present perfect 
developed by Declerck (1986). 
Based on the same elements, i.e. Declerck's tense schemata, aspect and aspectual 
classes (Godoi: 1992), we proposed a semantic interpretation of the present perfect with 
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durational adverbs and of the primary readings of the present perfect as distinguished by 
McCawley (1971). We reached the conclusion that in the readings proposed by 
McCawley (1971) there are three semantically distinct frames and, therefore, rejected 
Michaelis' analysis (1994), in which she claims that the referred readings are "a non-
syntactic ambiguity." 
Having proposed a semantic frame for the different readings of the present 
perfect with elements that are present in any tense, we concluded that the present perfect 
is a real "tense" and not aspect as claimed by Comrie (1976). Moreover, we claimed 
that the aspectual relationship as defined by Godoi (1992) is the element that was 
missing in Declerck's model in order to explain the several readings of the present 
perfect and define it as a "tense." 
In relation to the definitions of the categories of "tense" and "aspect", we 
concluded that they do not hold an "either/or" relationship, but that they must coexist 
since the latter is part of the former. 
Finally, in chapter 5, based on the analysis of the present perfect developed in 
this dissertation, we proposed a frame for future research in applied linguistics, 
suggesting some key elements to be taken into account when the aim of a lesson is the 
presentation of the present perfect. 
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